An American defector to the Aguinaldo army

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

There were several defections of American soldiers to the Filipino side during the Philippine-American war. The most famous defection was that of a black man, David Fagan, who enlisted as major in the Nueva Ecija brigade of General Urbano Lacuna. (Funston, 376) There was also the case of bugler Maurice Sibley of the 16th Infantry, who became the right hand man of General Tomines of Isabela and eventually married an Igorot woman.(Khaki, 36) Other defections to the Filipino army by American soldiers occurred in many parts of the country. In Marinduque, some captured American soldiers opted to join the forces of Colonel Maximo Abad. In Cebu, five white defectors joined the forces of General Arcadio Maxilon. (Foreman, 524).

It is not the purpose of this article to inquire into the reasons why these American soldiers defected to the Filipino side. Suffice it is to say that no war in the military history of the United States can compare with this little war, as U.S. President McKinley called the Philippine-American war, on the number of defections to the enemy.

The following is an account on one such defection that can qualify as a plot for a movie:

“We will call him Jackson. Jackson was silent, morose man, who had few friends in the battery. He was evidently of good education, and he spoke Spanish fluently. Ordinarily, he was a first class soldier, doing his duties efficiently. He had one failing, however, that made him unpopular. Occasionally he would break out in a wild spree, always ending in the guard-house. When drunk, he was a fighting lunatic, quarreling with everyone.

“Jackson fell in love with a pretty mestiza girl who, with her mother, conducted a cantina in the plaza. In time they were married in church by the native padre. After that wedding, Jackson was shunned by his comrades. There is an unwritten law among soldiers that a white man must not wed a native.

“The artilleryman resented the scorn of his fellow-soldiers, become more sullen, and spent more time than was good for him in the company of the Filipinos. One pay-day he went on one of his mad sprees. While fighting madness was on him he attacked a young lieutenant, striking him in the face.

“To attack an officer is a grave crime in the army. Jackson was court-martialed and sentenced to six years in military prison. While he was confined in the guard-house awaiting transportation to the United States to serve his sentence, a member of the guard permitted him to escape. It is a hard duty to mount guard over a friend and treat him like a caged animal.

“Jackson was supposed to make his way to Manila and stow away on an outgoing steamer for the China coast. Instead, he made his way by night to the casa of his wife, and together they stole away to the insurgent army.

“A few weeks later we began to hear stories of the white renegade. He was in command of a company of insurrectos. He moved like a ghost about the country, appearing in the most unexpected places. Again and again his command attacked American outposts. On one occasion he captured two army wagons loaded with supplies, killing several members of the guard.

“For months we were kept busy chasing Jackson. The natives protected him, and he was always warned of our approach. One night the main army of insurgents surrounded the town of Imus and made a general attack. The fight continued for several hours in the darkness.

“As I lay in the trenches, I could distinctly hear the voice of Jackson swearing and calling to his troops to advance. The insurrectos were driven off, and by daylight they had disappeared.

“Months later, when I was with the native scouts, I witnessed the tragic end of Jackson's career. A column under General Swan attacked the Filipino trenches near Noveleta, west of Imus. The scouts were in the advance guard.

“When we went over the trenches, we found Jackson lying by the roadside. He was twice wounded, - through the lungs and abdomen. Although it may read like a fiction, it is a fact that his native wife was crouched in the mud of the road, holding his head in her lap. He refused to speak to us and died defiant, fighting against the flag he had sworn to uphold.

“A few months later his wife became the mother of a blue-eyed boy. She always seemed to hate the Americans, and would never afterward speak to an American soldier.

“An interesting sequel to Jackson's story followed in the visit of an American lawyer to the Islands sometime later. He hunted up several of the men who were present when Jackson died, and asked them to aid him in locating the body. It had been buried in a trench with about sixty Filipinos who died in the fight. The lawyer had the body exhumed, placed in an iron coffin, and shipped back to the United States.”(O'Reilly, 102-104)

Observations of an American POW

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

Aguinaldo was fighting a war, at the same time, he was running a government. These two facets of Philippine life in the 1900's was observed closely by an American prisoner of war named Albert Sonrichsen.

Sonrichsen was arrested on charges of espionage by Filipino troops while taking photographs inside Filipino lines in January 27, 1899, a few days before the outbreak of the Philippine-American war. He was in company of American soldiers who were dressed in civilian clothes. They were held as prisoners under guard in Malolos.

At the outbreak of the war in February 4, 1899, enraged Filipinos tried to lay their hands on prisoner Sonrichsen, but the Filipino jail guards shielded him, and made sure he was safe. As the war progressed and the Americans began to advance from Manila, the Filipinos retreated to the north, bringing with them all the prisoners, mostly Spaniards, including Sonrichsen.

In April 22, the prisoners were joined at San Isidro, Nueva Ecija by other American prisoners - Lieutenant Glenmore and soldiers under him, who were captured by Filipino troops in Baler, Tayabas (Quezon) during an attempt by the Americans, on orders of Admiral Dewey, to rescue the Spanish contingent holed up in a besieged church.

In June, Sonrichsen became seriously ill and found himself in Vigan being treated in a Filipino hospital and cared for by a nurse. Later, he was moved to Abra, where he was allowed free movement. He taught in a Filipino school and was paid a salary equivalent to the pay of a lieutenant in the Filipino army. During this period, he observed that Filipinos under 30 have the ability to read and write, if not in Spanish, at least in their native dialect. He also noted that Filipinos took every opportunity to learn and improve themselves.

In November, he escaped and was appointed guide and interpreter to U.S. General Young's forces. In this capacity, he was able to make comparison between the government of Aguinaldo, and the American controlled government. If he were to make a choice, he said, he would choose the Aguinaldo government. Among his observations - Filipino soldiers are disciplined and humanely treated the prisoners; schools were established in each town, even while the war was going on; a fine college was being ran in Vigan; cockfighting was strictly forbidden which was allowed by the Americans. He further remarked that the American officers do not seem to understand the native - they inspire fear, rather than respect.

Here is a letter from Sonrichsen, recounting his captivity and his observations:

"NEW YORK,
"December 26, 1900.

"DEAR SIR: In answer to your letter of the 20th I hereby offer you any assistance that lies within my power. After a consultation with Messrs. Scribner's Sons, with whom I have made a contract to publish my book on the Philippines, I find that they have no objection to my position as an anti-imperialist before the public, although my narrative takes rather an unbiased stand. It gives merely an account of my ten months' experience as a prisoner of war among the insurgents of Luzon, stating facts as they presented themselves to my eyes, regardless of political factions, leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions, which can not, however, but be in favor of the Filipinos.

"With regard to the authentic facts for which you have asked me, I am rather puzzled as to what you could make the best use of. If you mean anything that comes within my own personal experience, I am only too glad to serve you. Possibly I had best give you a brief outline. On January 27, I899, I left Manila in company with a friend and entered the insurgent lines for the purpose of taking photographs. We were arrested as spies and taken on to the insurgent capital at Malolos, and there held until hostilities broke out, a week later. The Filipinos certainly had every right to take us for spies, since we were dressed in civilian clothes and had a camera in our possession, my companion being recognized as a member of the American Army.

"Upon learning that the outbreak had occurred, great excitement prevailed at Malolos. A wild rabble gathered before the gates of the prison in which we were confined and attempted to drag us out, but our guards, the insurgent regular soldiers, threw themselves in between us and the mob, fighting in our defense until we were removed to safer quarters. This rather goes to prove that the insurgents are neither savages nor armed rabble, but well disciplined and acquainted with the rules of international law.

"We were also informed by Filipino officials several days later that the outbreak was the result of a sentry's blunder and that they had hastened to apologize and offered to make reparation, but that General Otis had refused to consider all advances made by them for a peaceful settlement. In March the renewed activity of the Americans forced the insurgents to retreat to San Isidro, taking us with them. Our treatment was at times hard, but owing rather to circumstances than to the Filipinos themselves, who seemed on the whole inclined to make our lot as bearable as possible.

"In San Isidro we were joined by Lieutenant Gilmore and several of his men on April 22.

"In May we were once more on the march, together with several hundreds of Spaniards, retreating constantly until, in June, we found ourselves in Vigan, the capital of the northern province of Ilocos.

"Here several of us became seriously ill and were sent to the local hospital. Medicines and medical skill were sadly in want. Still we were treated equally as well as the wounded Filipinos themselves, the women nursing us as they did their own. In September we were taken up the Abra River to Bangued, in the heart of the Abra Mountains, and here we were allowed the full liberty of the town, well treated and cared for. I was able to teach school here, for which I received a pay almost equal to that of a second lieutenant in the insurgent army. Many of my companions were able to do likewise; all, in fact, that were capable of speaking the Spanish language. Even during the war the Filipinos established schools in every town, and Vigan could boast of an excellent college which followed its daily routine as in times of peace. Upon the arrival of the Americans these schools and colleges were broken up, and the buildings ever since have been confiscated as barracks.
"I also observed that every Filipino under 30 could read and write, if not Spanish, at least his native dialect. The Spanish friars discouraged the study of Spanish, and for this reason the poorer people were unable to learn more than what was taught in the convent schools -reading, writing (in native dialect) Bible history, psalm singing, and the rudiments of arithmetic. Whenever given the opportunity, however, the people of all classes are anxious to learn and improve themselves.

"In November I succeeded in effecting my escape, and was appointed guide and interpreter to General Young's forces. In this capacity I was able to make comparisons between the two governments and am forced to say that I drew my conclusions in favor of the Aguinaldo government. The people were more discontented, becoming more and more so every day. Our officers do not seem to understand the natives, and inspire fear rather than respect. Cock fighting, which is strictly forbidden by the insurgents, is freely allowed in American territory. Taxes are heavier than formerly, and our soldiers have so raised the prices of food products that the poorer people are suffering heavily from want.

"These are the facts which I present to you now, but whether they are suitable for your purpose or not I can not say. Should you wish further details, I am willing to oblige you - or the cause rather - of which I am strongly in favor.


"Respectfully yours,
"ALBERT SONRICHSEN"
(Pettigrew, 298-299)

The Patriot and the Elite

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

An interesting exchange of letters between Benito Legarda, in whose honor one of the streets near Malacanang is named after, former cabinet member of President Aguinaldo and Aguinaldo himself which clearly differentiates the thinking of an elite and a patriot. Legarda wanted the Filipinos to give up the fight and submit to American rule, while Aguinaldo defiantly stood for continuation of the struggle.

In his reply to Legarda, Aguinaldo expressed his frustrations, which, apparently was directed towards the elite of Philippine society, when he said:

“What is life to us if we are to be the slaves of the foreigner? It is a pity that all the enlightened Filipinos do not employ their knowledge and experience in the defense of their country.”

The Legarda and Aguinaldo letters presented below were lifted verbatim from pages 26-30 of the pamphlet "The Luzon Campaign", Vol. 1, No. 7, published by the Philippine Information Society, Boston, 1901, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ ACC6166.0001.007.

Here is the letter from Legarda:

“Manila, July 7, I899.
“SR. DON EMILIO AGUINALDO:

“MY DEAR DON EMILIO:

“Mr. Olimpio Guamson has delivered your message to me, asking for my frank and honest opinion concerning our present political situation, and the probable future which awaits us. I shall give it with pleasure, not only because it is my duty as a Filipino, but because of the sincere friendship which binds me to you. I will refrain from making a critical judgment of all your actions prior to the 4th of February, the date of the Outbreak of Hostilities, taking them simply as data upon which to base my deductions, and will presuppose in all of them good faith from the point of view of the patriotic motives which impelled you to perform them.

“We have commenced hostilities; we have had our wish, for remember perfectly well that war was the desire of the majority in Malolos, the military element, however, being prominent in this majority, and raising its voice upon the subject, dragging after it the rest of the people. And what has been gained? Nothing but ruin, death, and desolation.

“We have not been able to prevent the Americans from going anywhere they pleased, and it has been plainly evident that the valor upon which we depended was not enough, but to conquer it is necessary to have many things which the Americans possess in abundance, and which we lack.

“As time goes on our chances for victory grow less, and the further the American troops advance so much worse is our condition for asking concessions for our unhappy country.

“Up to the present time the American troops, in my opinion, have had no other object in view than to show their bravery, a quality which had unjustly and erroneously been denied them both privately and in the public press. So far, either on that account or for other reasons, America has not sent here an army capable of a military occupation of all our territory, nor has a formal campaign been commenced; that America can do so we are unable to doubt, and that it will be done if we persist in our present attitude we may feel certain. And what will then remain to us?

“What could we ask for?

“We are in error, and yet we persist in that error, impelled by those who dream of a triumph of a party which is to-day in a minority in the United States, without perceiving that this party is also American, and that they are not going to give us our independence out of hand as a matter of sentiment at the expense of the honor of America and in spite of the grave responsibility, both international and domestic, contracted under the Treaty of Paris. Others dream that because part of the press of Europe copies from American anti-imperialist papers the criticisms of that party against the Government of President McKinley a European intervention in our favor is to take place, without reflecting that the Treaty of Paris was made before all the civilized world and with its assent.

“The war so far has only laid bare our insufficiency and our shortcomings.

“In my judgment, giving these conditions, the time has arrived for your policy to change in a radical manner, unless you wish to see forever annihilated the hope that our people may some day take its place in the concert of the civilized world, unless you wish to see the complete ruin of our race and of all our country, and unless you are willing to accept the grave responsibilities which will fall upon you. To-day then I address you as a friend and as a Filipino and say "Peace is an imperative necessity.

"Nothing can prevent the triumph of America.. Do not struggle against the inevitable.

“Peace must come some time, and the man who restores peace to the Philippines will win the admiration of the world, and the gratitude of his country. Be that man. Since 1896 you have been the soul of the people, and have merited their blessings for your wonderful and providential wisdom. Be now the peace-maker that your glory may be perpetuated. As you are the man who, when brought here by the Americans, roused the people as one to the work of our emancipation from Spain, be now the one to say 'Enough of conflict.'

“We have seen that our ideals cannot be realized by this means; let us make peace, and let us work and learn. For by working and learning with a free people, such as the Americans, we shall cast from us the vices of our old masters, and will some day win the independence we so much desire.

“This is what I believe you are called upon to do, and I think that you will never repent it. There is no other remedy - no other path open. Do not forget that many Filipinos are losing their lives every day in the defense of the impossible: that every day the ruin of property sacrificed in vain is greater, and that, if finally there is no help other than to submit to American sovereignty, it is not just to sacrifice more lives and property, whereby you will contract before God and man responsibilities of such proportions that they alarm me.

“Stop while you may, and believe me that now is the appointed time: a little later the policy of the American Government will change completely the sentiment of that free and noble people, which loves its own liberty as much as it desires that of other nations, and then a race war will come which will end in our extermination.

“I believe that with what I have said I have performed my duty and complied with your wishes. I must, however, state that I have done so freely, without suggestions or coercions of any kind, and also that I have made no special political studies, nor have I had preparation for speaking upon matters of this nature. The only merit of this opinion is that it is the manifestation of the intimate conviction of a citizen who is inspired by the best of good faith and the desire of his people.

“I am, as ever, your affectionate friend and obedient servant,

“B. LEGARDA.”

And here is Aguinaldo's reply:

“Personal.
“REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
“OFFICE OF THE PRSESIDENT,
“Tarlac, September 14, 1899.

“SR. BENITO LEGARDA, Manila.

“MY DISTINGUISHED FRIEND:

“Your two kind letters have reached my hands and I have informed myself of all you say in them. Many thanks for the information you give me. I beg that you will pardon me for my delay in making reply, but I must tell you that sometime elapsed before they reached me.

“I believe what you tell me as to the re-enforcements of the enemy which will not be long in arriving. Not only do I believe this, but I am convinced of this fact, and even before the outbreak of hostilities was sure that with their wealth and their innumerable and powerful elements of war, they could, whenever they so desired, send as many as they need.

“In reply to this I must tell you that it is impossible for me to turn back from the enterprise which I have undertaken -that of defending our country, and especially as I have sworn that as long as life lasts I shall labor until I gain the acknowledgment of the independence of the Philippines. Do not attribute this declaration to my vanity, but to my desire to fulfill a former promise. This, aside from the fact that the struggle for the independence of our country is just and based upon our perfect rights.

“We are not alarmed by the numerous arms nor the valor of our enemy. What is life to us if we are to be the slaves of the foreigner? It is a pity that all the enlightened Filipinos do not employ their knowledge and experience in the defense of their country. I repeat, we will not give up the struggle until we gain our longed-for independence: death is of but little moment to us if we are but able to ensure the happiness of the people and of future generations.

“We must no longer allow ourselves to be fascinated by the flattering promises of the enemy. You know that they first solemnly assured me that they would acknowledge our independence. Nevertheless, the attempt is now being made to force autonomy on us by superior strength. They have been using explosive bullets since the 9th of August last, and have bombarded defenseless forts, contrary to the precepts of international law. But it matters not that they use these elements of destructive warfare. Resistance and firmness of our resolution will be sufficient to wear them out. If this is not enough to induce our enemies to desist from their endeavor, we will go, if necessary, into the mountains, but never will we accept a treaty of peace dishonorable to the Philippine arms and disastrous to the future of the country, such as that which they seek to impose.

“For this reason I advise all those who do not feel themselves strong enough to accept this sacrifice, and whose services are not indispensable to our Government, to return to Manila and the towns occupied by the enemy, reserving themselves to strengthen the organization of our Government when our independence is gained, replacing those who, wearied by the struggle, are in need of rest.

“I am not displeased that some Filipinos have consented to hold office under the Americans; on the contrary, I rejoice that they have done so, for thus they will be enabled to form a true estimate of the character of the Americans. I also rejoice that our enemies having had recourse to the Filipinos for the discharge of the duties of high positions in the public service in its various branches, have shown that they recognize the capacity of our people for self-government.

“Before closing I take the liberty of addressing you the following question: To what is due that policy of attraction employed by our enemy if not to the resistance of our army?

“One should never repent of a just determination.

“Kind regards to your family, and to Messrs. Arellano, Pardo, Torres, and other friends.

“Command at will your most affectionate friend,

“E. AGUINALDO.”

Why the U.S. destroyed the Malolos republic

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

Every Filipino who went through high school would have learned that there once existed an earlier Filipino republican government, the first Filipino republic and the first in Asia, the so-called Malolos republic, with Emilio Aguinaldo as its president. But that awareness is oftentimes superficial and wanting in in-depth knowledge. Not many Filipinos know that the so-called Malolos republic was a functioning government. Congress enacted laws and elected officials administered the functionaries of government in the towns and provinces. It collected taxes, customs duties and war assessment; floated bonded indebtedness, and even issued a paper currency. It maintained an army and navy and provided services in education, commerce, science, health, justice and foreign service. It operated for more than a year from its proclamation in July 3, 1898 up to its destruction by the Americans in November 12, 1899, when the last capital at Bayambang, Pangasinan was overran by American forces.

Yes, the Philippine-American war destroyed the Malolos republic. But a question may be asked - why was it not allowed to exist by the Americans? If war is only an expression of political objectives, then Washington officials, with their commitment to human rights and libertarian heritage, could have easily halted the war to let the Filipinos go on their own. Instead, U.S. president William McKinley forcibly annexed the Philippines, destroyed the Filipino republic and imposed American sovereignty over the unwilling inhabitants of the islands. Why?

U.S. military officers - Dewey, Anderson, Lawton and several other who had a first hand acquaintance with Filipinos provided the U.S. State Department with favorable impressions on the Filipinos and their capability for self government. Even U.S. president McKinley was reported to have indicated no immediate interest in the acquisition of the Philippines and instead placed the future of the Philippines in the hands of the peace negotiators, when he said:

"’..I do not want any ambiguity to be allowed to remain on this point. The negotiators of both countries are the ones who shall resolve upon the permanent advantages (notice that he said ‘advantages’ and not ‘rights’) which we shall ask in the archipelago, and decide upon the intervention (control), disposition and government of the Philippine Islands.’ He further said: ‘The Madrid Government can rest assured that up to now nothing is decided a priori in my own mind, against Spain, nor do I consider anything decided by it against the United States.’” (Treaty, 122)

But during the Peace Treaty negotiations in Paris the United States commissioners surprisingly demanded from Spain the cession of the Philippines to the United States.

The motive behind the annexation of the Philippines by the United States had always been attributed by Filipino nationalist historians to American imperialism. They claim that American big business saw the Philippines as a "prized possession for its unexploited natural resources, its strategic location for commerce in the east and for its harbors well suited for coaling stations and repair of ships."

But Senator Richard F. Pettigrew of the United States, a prolific critic of McKinley, gave an inkling of the more plausible motive. He said England influenced the decision of the United States to keep the Philippines as a colony because a new republic in the orient might encourage the English colonies to establish their own. Here is the revealing statement of Senator Pettigrew:

“At first we did not intend to keep the Philippines. About the early part of June, I898, the English papers began to publish articles urging the Americans to keep the Philippines. England became alarmed at the prospect of a republic being set up in the Orient. It would be like starting a prairie fire among her Malay subjects in Borneo, Singapore, Hongkong, and her other East India possessions. Hence President McKinley did not wish to start another Paul Kruger to set a bad example to the subjects of the Empress of India. The ‘London Spectator’, on the Philippines, hoped the United States would keep them, saying: 'The weary Titan needs an ally, and the only ally whose aspirations, ideas, and language are like his own is the great American people." (Pettigrew, 607) [The name Paul Kruger is associated with the First Boer War. After the British annexed South Africa in 1877, Kruger led a war of resistance against the British who were defeated in the decisive battle at Majuba in 1881 and an independent republic was established. - author]

The prospect of antagonizing the British on one hand and offending the democratic idealism of the American people on the other perhaps explains the evolving nature of McKinley's policy towards the Philippines. This policy was initially announced as a hands-off policy and eventually evolved into a policy of annexation.

The change in policy can be gleaned from the succession of events following the declaration of war with Spain in April 25, 1898. At this time, U.S. President McKinley had no clear-cut position about American intentions in the Philippines. While the United States granted the Cubans their independence after liberation from Spain and the same policy being expected by the Filipinos for themselves, nothing of the sort came about. The fact is, the Filipinos willingly sided with the Americans because they considered the Cuban experience as a manifestation of the good intentions of the Americans. But a period of non-decision prevailed on the Philippine question, which McKinley himself admitted he agonized on it.

After the defeat of Spanish fleet at Manila Bay, a Peace Protocol between Spain and the United States was signed in August 12, 1898. Even at this time, the intention to annex the Philippines was absent. The protocol merely gave the United States the right to hold the city, the bay and harbor for coaling purposes. There was no mention about cession of the archipelago, nor a takeover of island of Luzon or another Philippine island.

Believing that the Americans would let them enjoy an independent government under an American protectorate, the Filipinos cooperated with the Americans in most cordial manner. Aguinaldo secured the initial cache of arms from Commodore Dewey. Two U.S. cruisers, the Raleigh and the Concord, effected the surrender of the Spanish garrison in Subic Bay and the 1,200 Spanish prisoners were turned over by Dewey to Aguinaldo. Dewey also sent his cruisers to seek out the German cruiser Irene which challenged the identity of a Filipino steamer, the Filipinas, on the basis that the Filipino flag it was flying did not represent a country recognized as a belligerent. Dewey defended the act of flying of the Filipino flag by the Filipino vessels saying he tolerated it. This friendly American attitude towards the Filipinos continued until about the arrival of the first expedition of American troops in mid 1898.

However, from August to the later part of 1898, the United States policy on the Philippines swayed towards annexation. The new policy revealed itself during the Treaty of Paris negotiations. The United States demanded cession of the whole Philippine archipelago. This demand had gone beyond what was originally specified in the Peace Protocol, which merely allowed the United States to hold the city, the bay and harbor. And as events later confirmed, the might of the U.S. military was called upon to effect the complete subjugation of the Filipinos notwithstanding their heroic resistance.

Among the papers annexed to the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain were 51 pages of documents comprising the section labeled Protectorates, Colonies, and Non-Sovereign States (see Treaty), which were detailed description of how the British administered their possessions.

Did the United States follow the advice to hold the Philippines as a colony because England fear the loss of her own colonies in the East whose inhabitants might follow the course of the Filipinos - throw off the colonial yoke and establish a republic?

Philippine Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon thought so when he said:

"I should not be surprised if Britain, France and Holland would be pleased to see the American flag continue to fly over these islands in perpetuity. But to those nations I will say a word in all friendship. It is this: What their subject peoples ultimately do will not be determined by anything which happens in the Philippines." (Bell, 5)

Surely, more light on this issue should be forthcoming.

How the 1898 Treaty of Paris was railroaded

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

Is it not rather unusual that the United States had to pay $20 million to Spain in order to effect the annexation of the Philippine Islands. If the spoils of war are the prerogative of the victor, as the saying goes, why pay? This article attempts to examine the motivations that led to the consummation of the Treaty of Paris in December 10, 1898.

The Treaty of Paris was preceded by a Peace Protocol that ended the Spanish-American war. The protocol was signed in August 12, 1898 at Washington DC by Secretary William R. Day of the U.S. State Department and French Ambassador Jules Cambon, who acted as plenipotentiary of Spain.

Article I of the Peace Protocol provided for the relinquishment by Spain of all rights and sovereignty over Cuba which paved the way for the establishment of an independent Cuba. Article II provided for the cession of Puerto Rico and several other islands in the West Indies and in the Ladrones by Spain to the United States, and these territories became possessions of the United States.

However, the status of the Philippines was not clearly defined in the Peace Protocol. A vague provision gave the United States the right to occupy the bay, harbor and city of Manila, as follows:

"Third. On similar grounds, the United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the city, bay and harbor of Mania, pending the conclusion of the a Treaty of Peace, which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."

The control, disposition and government of the Philippines was finally determined and contained in what is now referred to as the Treaty of Paris. Article III of the treaty provides as follows:

"Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, comprehending the islands lying within the following line: ...

"The United States will pay Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratification of the present treaty."

In the course of the negotiations between the American and Spanish commissioners it became clear that the United States wanted to take over from Spain control of the Philippines. The Spanish Commissioners rejected the American position on the basis that the Peace Protocol of Washington merely provided for temporary possession and occupancy of the city, bay and harbor of Manila and did not admit the possibility that the United States would in any way claim any sovereignty over the Philippine Island.

The parties were deadlocked and unable to agree. Spain proposed to take the issue to arbitration. The prospect of subjecting the treaty to unnecessary delay was not acceptable to the American Peace Commissioners. Therefore, to this Spanish proposition, the American side made a counter offer to pay $20 million to Spain, which the Spanish Commissioners viewed as a “take it, or leave it” offer, accompanied by a threat to renew the hostilities, as can be gleaned from the following reply issued by the Spanish Commission:

“…The Spanish Commissioners are now asked to accept the American proposition in its entirety and without further discussion, or to reject it, in which later case, as the American Commission understands, the peace negotiation will end and the Peace Protocol of Washington will, consequently, be broken.” (Treaty, 213)

The American gambit worked and Spain yielded, expressing its total surrender to the United States position in the following terms:

"The government of Her Majesty, moved by lofty reasons of patriotism and humanity, will not assume the responsibility of again bringing upon Spain all the horrors of war. In order to avoid them it resigns itself to the painful strait of submitting to the law of victory, however harsh it may be, and as Spain lacks material means to defend the rights she believes are hers, having recorded them, she accepts the only terms the United States offers her for the concluding of the Treaty of Peace." (Treaty, 213)

Thus, the Treaty of Paris was signed and the United States took possession of the Philippines Islands under questionable circumstances.

The Questions

(1) The American commissioners heard several testimonies from the American generals assigned in the Philippines, from experts on natural resources, from the famous English author, John Foreman, but not from a Filipino. Felipe Agoncillo, the official Filipino representative handpicked by President Emilio Aguinaldo, was refused recognition and barred from presenting the case for the Filipinos.

"The testimony of no Filipino, nor representative of that people, appears to have been taken by American commissioners at Paris, who had summoned before them witnesses from all over the globe to testify about the islands and the people there. The treaty was signed, and then came the demand upon the Filipinos for immediate and absolute allegiance to the United States." (Thomas, 61)

However, the credentials of the representative of the Catholic Hierarchy, Bishop Placido Chapelle, were recognized and he was given the opportunity to work out a special provision in the treaty, i.e., Article VIII, which provided for the protection of the property and rights of the Catholic Church in the Philippines.

Why were the Filipinos ignored and barred from the conference?

(2) The United States annexed Puerto Rico and the Philippines, but freed Cuba. Why the difference in treatment?

It must be borne in mind that the United States prided itself as the land of the free, the bastion of democracy, and enshrined the proposition that all men are created equal. Accordingly, in dealing with the issue of acquisition of foreign territories, the administration of U.S. president William McKinley had to reckon with the constitutional restraint and libertarian tradition of the American people, lest the United States is branded a neo-colonialist or accused of being unfaithful to its democratic heritage. Be that as it may, it is now possible to speculate why the Peace Protocol was framed in such a way that Spain ceded Puerto Rico and freed Cuba, but was indecisive as far as the Philippine Islands was concerned.

The Cuban people were in a state of rebellion against Spain and, therefore, had clearly expressed their desire to be free and independent. To hold Cuba as a colony against the wishes of the Cuban people would be viewed as an act of imperialism. Hence, Article I of the Peace Protocol provided for relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba which led to its independence from foreign rule.

In the case of Puerto Rico, the people were not in the state of rebellion against Spain and did not express their desire to be free and independent. Leaving the territory in the hands of Spain or without a functional government would be irresponsible. Hence, the annexation of Puerto Rico as provided in Article II of the Peace Protocol was justifiable because temporarily holding the territory until the Puerto Ricans finally decide what they want for themselves would be viewed as humanitarian.

A different case presents itself for the Philippine Islands. The Filipinos have already thrown off the Spanish yoke and established a government of their own with full knowledge of the representatives of the U.S. government and, presumably, McKinley and Washington officials. Not only did the Filipinos express their desire to be free and independent, but they were, in fact, already administering the country and the remnants of Spanish authority were hopelessly holed up in the besieged capital of Manila.

If the United States were true to her libertarian and democratic traditions the direction for the Philippines was no other than an independent republic. However, at this time, the idea of a colony was already being considered by the American commissioners. Attached to the treaty documents forwarded by President McKinley to the U.S. Congress were item no. 14, "Protectorates, colonies and non-sovereign states", and item no. 15,"The Federated Malay States: A sketch of growth and political organization by Francis B. Forbes. Apparently, an independent Filipino republic would be anathema to the English and inconsistent with the interest of big American business interests who saw a golden opportunity for commercial expansion in the east, which was already being entertained at the time.

A way out of the predicament was to write Article III of the Peace Protocol that would hold the status of Philippines in abeyance until it was successfully resolved at the Treaty of Paris in favor of annexation. In the meantime, the administration of President William McKinley would have already perfected the clever ploy – convince the American people that the Filipinos were savages and unfit for self government and the United States was coming to educate and prepare them, which meant securing a license to keep the Philippines as a colony.

Balangiga - victory in guerrilla warfare

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

In September 29, 1901, an American garrison in the town of Balangiga, Samar was attacked by a force of Filipino guerrillas assisted by villagers and led by Eugenio S. Daza, who was operating under the command of Filipino General Vicente Lukban. Of the 74 American soldiers from Company C of the 9th U.S. Infantry, 50 were killed or died later of wounds while 24 were able to escape, of which 20 were wounded.

The attack was precipitated by the use of forced labor in cleaning the town that the officer in command of the American troops imposed on the villagers. Able-bodied men were canvassed from their homes and made to work for days, under guard in the heat of the sun and were not allowed to go home. They were given little food and water and slept in two tents which were very cramp and damp. Then, at the suggestion of the presidente (town headman), some eighty men were enlisted from a nearby village who indicated they wanted to work without pay provided the time they spend would be applied to their tax obligations. The American officer consented, not realizing that he was being set up for an entrapment because the men were from the guerrilla organization of Lukban.

While the Americans were having breakfast in the morning of September 29th, they were surprised by the guerrillas and a horde of bolo-wielding villagers. It was carnage - blood, entrails, brains and dead bodies were strewn all over the encampment.

The aftermath was a grim retaliation by the Americans. Apart from burning the town of Balangiga and killing every Filipino in sight, General Jacob H. Smith undertook to revenge the death of the American soldiers upon the whole population of Samar which, according to the American Encyclopedia, had in 1881, a population of over 250,000 persons and an area of 5,000 square miles. Smith ordered the scorching of Samar and turning it into a howling “wilderness where not even a bird could live.”

To quote from Mr. Root's (Secretary Root of the U.S. War Department) letter to the President of July 12, General Smith gave the following oral instructions:

"I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn: the more you kill and burn, the better you will please me," and, further, that he wanted all persons killed who were capable of bearing arms and in actual hostilities against the United States, and did, in reply to a question by Major Waller asking for an age limit, designate the limit as ten years of age.”

Here is a first hand account of the Balangiga incident:

“The 9th U. S. Infantry had but recently returned from the China expedition. It had performed signal service there; had taken part in the capture of Tientsin, and had been among the first to rush the walls of the Imperial City at Peking. With the cessation of the Boxer activities in China, it had returned to the Philippines and had been scattered in small garrisons throughout the Islands. On August 11, 1901, Company C had been sent to Samar and had occupied without opposition, the small coastal village of Balangiga. The officials of the town professed friendship for the Americans. The company, whose strength consisted of seventy-four men, was housed in the public buildings. The company commander, Captain Thomas W. O'Connell, was a West Point graduate in the class of 1894. Lieutenant E. C. Bumpus, second in command, had served throughout the Insurrection in Luzon and had accompanied the regiment to China. Major Richard S. Griswold, attached to the company as surgeon, had seen service throughout the Insurrection. The company itself consisted mainly of veterans; a few had gone through the campaign in Cuba-many through the Insurrection in Luzon, and all through the Boxer campaign. One man had been a member of the crew of the Olympia during the battle of Manila Bay.

“It was known that the die-hard leader, Vicente Lucban, was active throughout the Island of Samar, but since he had confined his activities to the regimentation of the hapless natives in the interior of the Island, or the attack of small patrols of American troops, no particular trouble was expected from him.

“Established comfortably in Balangiga, Captain O'Connell set out to clean up the town. He directed the local Presidente to assemble the citizens and put them to work sweeping up the years old accumulation of rubbish and trash scattered throughout the streets and clearing the underbrush which had been permitted to grow unrestricted under houses and in the streets. In response to a complaint from the Presidente that he was unable to get the people to volunteer for work, the company canvassed the town and forced some one hundred able-bodied men to work under guard. A short time later, the town Presidente and the chief of police suggested that since several natives in the hills close to the town were supposed to work out their taxes, that it would be a good idea to assemble them in Balangiga to assist in the work. O'Connell assented and a couple of days later, eighty natives were brought in and lodged in conical tents in the vicinity of the soldier's barracks. As was later determined, these men were picked bolomen from the guerrilla force of General Lucban.

“In the evening of September 27, 1901, Lieutenant Bumpus with a detail of men, returned from the town of Basey, some twenty miles away, with the company mail. Basey was just across the narrow Sanjuanica (San Juanico) Straits from the larger town of Tacloban on the Island of Leyte. With Tacloban it contained a fairly large garrison. Company C of the 9th Infantry had received no mail for four months and the men were overjoyed at the large sack which Lieutenant Bumpus brought back with him. Also, they learned for the first time of the assassination of President McKinley, some three weeks previous.

“By 6:30 the following morning, the company was up and about, the men anxious to read their mail. The native workmen were lining up near the barracks under the supervision of the civilian chief of police. On guard were three sentries. The remainder of the company was at breakfast at an outdoor kitchen about thirty yards from the barracks. The only time that the soldiers were permitted to move out of their barracks without a loaded rifle was while actually messing.

“While everything was apparently quiet and according to routine, the native chief of police walked up to one of the sentries and without warning snatched the rifle from his hands and felled him with the butt. Immediately the bells in the town church rang, conch (sic) shells blew from the hills, and the entire male populace of Balangiga, assisted by the bolomen from Lucban's force, rushed Company C.

“The few survivors of this massacre were able to give vivid details of what actually happened. The three sentries armed with rifles were dispatched in the twinkling of an eye. A native group hidden in the town church rushed the officers' quarters, which were in the convent across the street from the barracks. Captain O'Connell, caught in his pajamas, jumped from the second story window of his room, started to cross to the barracks, was beset by twenty to thirty bolomen, and hacked to death. Lieutenant Bumpus was surprised sitting in a chair in his room, his mail in his lap; a bolo cut on the bridge of the nose severed the entire front part of his head. He was found in this position by the survivors. The surgeon, Major Griswold, was overwhelmed and stabbed to death without having a Chinaman's chance.

“Across the street the majority of the company were seated at the mess tables and most of them were killed before they could get on their feet. The First Sergeant was caught in the act of washing his mess kit and had his head split in two by a blow from an axe. One Sergeant's head was completely severed from his body and fell in his plate. In his hands were grasped a knife and a fork. The company cook, one of the few survivors, had fortunately a few weapons at his disposal. He threw a pot of boiling coffee at the first group of natives who rushed him and then held them off by hurling all the canned goods he could reach. When these were exhausted, he grabbed a meat cleaver and fought his way to the barracks where the rifles were located.

“The few men who had gained their feet and survived the first onslaught grabbed any weapon they could lay their hands on and tried to reach the barracks-picks, shovels, baseball bats, clubs, a bolo wrenched from a native's hand. Three men mounted a rock pile and defended themselves with rocks. Sergeant George F. Markley, a man of herculean proportions, though he was wounded, managed to reach the barracks by swinging his arms like a flail and kicking natives in the stomach. He obtained a rifle and began pumping Krag-Jorgenson bullets into the natives surrounding him. One soldier reached the barracks, but was grabbed by three natives who threw him down under a shower of bolo cuts. His arm reaching out in a last effort, touched a pistol thrown on the floor in the melee, and he was able to save his life by shooting his assailants.

“Hopelessly outnumbered, the Americans were butchered like hogs. American brains and entrails strewed the plaza and barracks. A few who sought flight in the water nearby were hunted down in boats and boloed to death.

“Fifteen minutes after the attack started, all but five of the seventy-four men of the company had either been killed or wounded. Of those wounded, twelve were able to be on their feet, and under the protection of Sergeant Markley's fire had managed to unite and gain possession of rifles. This small group, despite the disparity in numbers, firing their rifles until they became too hot to hold, were finally able to drive the bolomen away from the immediate vicinity of the barracks.

“A quick check indicated that the small group could not expect to hold the town. So a decision was made to escape by boat to the nearest American garrison. Under fire from the natives who had retired to a respectful distance, the senior survivor, Sergeant Bentron, loaded the group on five barotas (small dug-out canoes) which were found in the vicinity, and started towards Basey. The dead, fifty-six rifles, and several thousand rounds of ammunition were left at Balangiga. Before leaving, at the cost of two more casualties, the survivors hauled down the American flag which flew over the city hall, and took it with them.

“The trip of the survivors to Basey was nearly as harrowing as the massacre itself. The barotas, small, narrow, canoe-like craft, whose equilibrium was maintained by outriggers, could be rowed only at a snail's pace. A short distance out, one barota containing four men, filled up with water and slowly drifted back to shore. Then two wounded men were boloed to death. The other two, by running for their lives and then hiding, finally managed to find another boat and put to sea where they were picked up the following day by a steamer.

“Another boat containing two men floated away from the rest and drifted into shore where its occupants were butchered to death. The other three boats contained enough unhurt men to row, and gradually worked their way along the coast toward Basey. At noon the water supply became exhausted and drinking salt water only increased the suffering of the wounded. Boats put out from shore containing natives armed with spears and bolos. They intended to board the barotas but were held off only by the rifle fire of the few who were able to shoot. Several attempts to land were prevented by the appearance of large numbers of natives on the shore armed with spears and a few rifles. A school of sharks, attracted by the blood dripping from the boats, followed the beleaguered fleet. With only one man able to talk, the survivors reached Basey at 3:30 the following morning. Of the twenty-six survivors, twenty-two were wounded. Two had died enroute.

“Company G of the 9th Infantry, under Captain Edwin V. Bookmiller, was stationed at Basey. Bookmiller obtained the services of the steamer 'Pittsburg,' which was at Tacloban, and with fifty-five men of his company, immediately proceeded to Balangiga, arriving there at noon the same day. The Insurgents were driven from the town without difficulty, but the sight which met Bookmiller's eyes was not pretty to see. The barracks were on fire, consuming the bodies of the American soldiers there. Other bodies had been thrown down a well. The body of a Sergeant and the company dog were found in the kitchen covered with flour. The eyes of the dog had been gouged out and replaced by stones. The body of Lieutenant Bumpus was found with his eyes gouged out and his face smeared with jam to attract ants. The bodies of American soldiers not burned in the barrack's fire were denuded of clothes and mutilated in one way or another. Captain Bookmiller buried the bodies of the three officers and twenty-nine enlisted men in the plaza, burned the town and returned to Basey. Yet, surprised though they were, the Americans had sold 202 their lives dearly.” (Herman, 197-202)

Cebuanos at war with the Americans

Cebu was a hotbed of Filipino guerrilla activities during the war of resistance against the imposition of American sovereignty in the Philippine Islands at the close of the 19th century.

Before the arrival of the American troops in Cebu, a Filipino revolutionary government was already established in December 27, 1898 after the Spanish governor of the province, Montero, abandoned the island and sought refuge in Zamboanga. Juan Climaco and Arcadio Maxilon were responsible for the establishment of the local government and its adhesion to the Filipino government in Malolos, assisted by emissaries sent by Aguinaldo, namely: Pantaleon E. Del Rosario, Melquiades Lasala, a Cebuano of Bogo, Andres Jame, Lorega, and an Ilocano named Mateo Luga who had served in the Spanish army. The military arm was placed under the supreme command of General Arcadio Maxilon, with Juan Climaco as second in command.

In late February, 1899, the American expeditionary force arrived in Cebu and the commander of the American gunboat Petrel demanded the surrender of the fort and city. The Filipino governor of the province, Luis Flores, wary of the superiority of American arms but remaining very loyal to the Filipino government under President Emilio Aguinaldo, yielded, but filed the following protest:

"In view of the verbal intimation made by the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Petrel, of the U.S. Squadron, to this government, demanding the surrender of the garrison and city of Cebu, to be accompanied by the hoisting of the American flag in the peremptory term of fourteen hours, the assembled magma, convoked for its consideration, and the members of which are representative of all the vital forces of the country, agreed unanimously to accede to said demand in view of the superiority of the American forces; but without omitting to point out that neither the government of the province nor any inhabitants thereof have the power to conclude decisive acts prohibited by the honorable president of the Filipino republic, Senor Emilio Aguinaldo, our legitimate ruler, recognized as such by virtue of his indisputable capabilities of just government and illustrious generalship and universal suffrage.

"Sad and painful is the situation of this city, without means to defense and obliged to act contrary to its own convictions: in view of which it declares before the whole world that the occupation of this town is not based on any of the laws which form the code of civilized nations, which could hardly expect to behold such scenes at the end of a century called the enlightened one.

"We are told of conquests, of protectorates, of cessions made by the Spaniards; as if the Archipelago, and especially our souls, were merchandise subject to barter, when a single one is worth more than a thousand worlds of that metal called vile, perhaps for the reason that it fascinates as the eyes of a serpent.

"But be that as it may, of all this the commanding office must treat as already stated, with Senor Aguinaldo, without whose acquiescence the act which is demanded from this government cannot be legal.

"A copy of this manifesto will be given to each of the consular agents established in this city, the greatest possible publicity will be given it, and we shall communicate with Aguinaldo, remitting him a copy of this document.

"Given in Cebu, the 22nd of February, 1899.
"Louiz Flores,
"The Commander in Chief". (Taking 8-9)

The Americans attempted to set up a military government but they were faced with difficulties because the Cebuanos remained loyal to the Aguinaldo government and refused to cooperate. The municipal officials and citizens of twenty three towns of Cebu passively resisted American interference in civilian authority by issuing statements to the effect that the taking of the oath of allegiance to the United States, under the threat of imprisonment by the American military authorities, is not valid because it cannot contradict the sacred oath they have previously taken for the Filipino constitution. Here is an example of such letter of protest:

“The undersigned councilmen and citizens of the town of Danao, in the province of Cebu, assembled in extra session in the town hall on July 29, 1900. The meeting was called to order by Senor Victorino Buot, who took he floor and spoke in substance as follows:

’That we have reliable information that the American authorities intend to establish a new municipal regime in all the towns of the province of Cebu until the United States Congress decides upon a definite Philippine policy. In the organization of this new regime the townspeople would be compelled to take the oath of allegiance to America, thus forswearing their previous oath of allegiance made to preserve, protect and defend the Filipino republican constitution. This last oath, that to the Filipino constitution, was a solemn act, in which God was invoked as a witness: it became thus sacred. To break it would be criminal, especially since the oath expressed their real sentiments. Anyone could not conscientiously forswear it to take anew a directly opposite oath, as if it were an article of merchandise easy to exchange.’

“The mayor brought these facts before the assembled body in order that they might resolve upon a course that would be to the best interests of the Filipino people. The concurrents, after deliberation, in order to be united in their stand, reached an agreement as follows:

(1) That we agree entirely with the mayor's aforestated talk, and state that if we appear to be in agreement with the American authorities it is because we are doing so under duress.

“(2) That our oath of allegiance to the Filipino constitution was spontaneous and reflected our real sentiments: so, therefore, we cannot take any other oath as against our previous one.

“(3) That as peaceful citizens we oppose all violence and bloodshed: we submit, but protesting with all the strength of our souls against the enforced oath, and state that it is against our will and honest convictions, and one which our conscience repels. An oath under duress is valueless.

“(4) That since we, as peaceful people, are opposed to all bloodshed, we
obeyed the orders of the American authorities: but it is against our will. The council is in session, but only in appearance, as it is contrary to the wishes of our constituents.

(5) That in our hearts we recognize only the Filipino constitution and the Filipino authorities elected by the people. We declare that we are opposed to all other leaders save Filipinos, who are striving for the best interests of their people. These authorities are Gen. Arcadio Maxilon, commander in chief of the Cebu forces, and Gen. Juan Climaco, second in command and chief of staff. Up to this time we have recognized them. Now we make this recognition in express terms according to the dictates of our consciences and the observance of our oath.

“(6) That under the duress of the Americans we will maintain the best order under the present circumstances, that of passive resistance: we will continue to recognize that national Filipino government at heart.

“After debate and the ratification of these resolutions the session adjourned, and the councilmen and citizens signed them in the name of their constituents, and the delegate of justice, acting as secretary pro tempore, certified them.” (Taking, 14-16)

Eventually, the Americans ran out of patience and resorted to extreme and harsh measures. According to John Foreman, a vigorous policy of devastation was adopted. Towns, villages and crops were laid waste; Pardo, the Filipino military centre, was totally destroyed; peaceful natives who had compulsorily paid tribute to the Filipino government at whose mercy they were obliged to live, were treated as enemies; their homes and means of livelihood were demolished, and little distinction was made between the warrior and the victim of the war.

In an effort to prevent further desolation and suffering of the people, the Filipino provincial governor arranged with the American authorities for cessation of hostilities, paving the way for the surrender of the leaders of revolutionaries after two years of heroic stand.

Here's an account by John Foreman, in his book, The Philippines:

“In July 24, 1899, Juan Climaco and Arcadio Maxilon, chafing at the diminution of their influence in public affairs, suddenly disappeared into the interior and met at Pardo, where the military revolutionary centre was established. Aguinaldo's emissary, Pantaleon E. Del Rosario, Melquiades Lasala, a Cebuano of Bogo (known as Dading), Andres Jame, Lorega, and an Ilocano named Mateo Luga who had served in the Spanish army, led contingents under the supreme command of theinsurgent General Arcadio Maxilom. In the interior they established a fairly well-organized military government. The Island was divided into districts; there was little interference with personal liberty; taxes for the maintenance of the struggle were collected in the form of contribution according to the means of the donor; agriculture was not altogether abandoned, and for over two years the insurgents held out against American rule. The brain of the movement was centered in Juan Climaco, whilst Mateo Luga exhibited the best fighting qualities.

“In the meantime American troops were drafted to the coast towns of Tuburan, Bogo, Carmen, etc. There were several severe engagements with slaughter on both sides, notably at Monte Sudlon and Compostela. Five white men joined the insurgent leader Luga, one being an English mercenary trooper, two sailors, and two soldiers; the last two were given up at the close of hostilities; one of them was pardoned, and the other was executed in the cotta for rape committed at Mandaue.

“The co-existence of an American military administration in Cebu City conducting a war throughout the Island, and a Philippine provincial government with nominal administrative powers over the same region, but in strong sympathy with the insurgent cause, was no longer compatible. Moreover, outside the city the provincial government was unable to enforce its decrees amongst the people, who recognized solely the martial-law of the insurgents to whom they had to pay taxes. The Americans therefore abolished the provincial council, which was not grieved at its dissolution, because it was already accused by the people of being pro-American. Philippine views of the situation were expressed in a newspaper, El Nuevo Dia, founded by a lawyer, Rafael Palma, and edited conjointly by Jayme Veyra (afterwards a candidate for the Leyte Island governorship) and an intelligent young lawyer, Sergio Osmena, already mentioned at p. 521. This organ, the type and style of which favorably compared with any journal ever produced in these Islands, passed through many vicissitudes; it was alternately suppressed and reviled, whilst its editors were threatened with imprisonment in the cotta and deportation to Guam.

“Meanwhile the Americans made strenuous efforts to secure the co-operation of the Filipinos in municipal administration, but the people refused to vote. Leading citizens, cited to appear before the American authorities, persistently declined to take any part in a dual regime. The electors were then ordered, under penalties, to attend the polling, but out of hundreds who responded to the call only about 60 could be coerced into voting. Finally a packed municipal council was formed, but one of its members, a man hitherto highly respected by all, was assassinated, and his colleagues went in fear of their lives.

“The war in Panay Islands having terminated on February 2, 1901, by the general surrender at Jaro (vide p. 518), General Hughes went to Samar Island, where he failed to restore peace, and thence he proceeded to Cebu in the month of August at the head of 2,000 troops. A vigorous policy of devastation was adopted. Towns, villages and crops were laid waste; Pardo, the insurgent military centre, was totally destroyed; peaceful natives who had compulsorily paid tribute to the insurgents at who mercy they were obliged to live, were treated as enemies; their homes and means of livelihood were demolished, and little distinction was made between the warrior and the victim of the war.

“Desolation stared the people in the face, and within a few weeks the native provincial governor proposed that terms of peace should be discussed. The insurgent chief Lorega surrendered on October 22; Mateo Luga and Arcadio Maxilom submitted five days afterwards and at the end of the month a general cessation of hostilities followed. A neutral zone was agreed upon, extending from Mandaue to Sogod, and there the three peace commissioners on behalf of the Americans, namely Miguel Logara, Pedro Rodriguez, and Arsenio Climaco met the insurgent chiefs Juan Climaco and Arcadio Maxilom. As a result, peace was signed, and the document includes the following significant words, viz: putting the Philippine people in a condition to prove "their aptitude for self-government as the basis of a future independent life." After the peace, Mateo Luga and P.E. del Rosario accepted employment under the Americans, the former inspector of Constabulary and the latter as Sheriff of Cebu.

“A few months later, the Americans, acting on information received, proceeded to Tuburan on the government launch "Philadelphia," arrested Arcadio Maxilom and his two brothers, and seized the arms which they had secreted on their property. On the launch, one of the Maxiloms unsuccessfully attempted to murder the Americans and was immediately executed, whilst Arcadio and his other brother jumped overboard; but Arcadio being unable to swim, was picked up, brought to trial at Cebu, and acquitted. Thus ended the career of General Arcadio Maxilom, whom in 1904 I found living in retirement, almost a hermit's life, broken in spirit and body and worried by numerous lawsuits pending against him.

“ On April 17, 1901, Governor W. H. Taft went to Cebu accompanied by a Filipino, H. Pardo de Tavera, whose views were diametrically opposed to those of the Cebuano majority. Governor Taft established civil government there, although the law of habeas corpus had to be suspended because the war was still raging throughout the Island outside the capital. The provincial government as established by Governor Taft comprises a provincial board composed of three members, namely the Philippine Provincial Governor, the American Supervisor, and the American Treasurer; hence the Americans are in permanent majority and practically rule the Island. The executive of this body is the provincial governor and his staff. The first provincial governor appointed by Governor Taft was Julio Llorente, who resigned the magistracy in Manila and returned to Cebu to take up his new office until the election took place in January, 1902, when, by popular vote, Juan Climaco, the ex-insurgent chief, became provincial governor, and on the expiration of his term in January, 1904, he was re-elected for another two years.” (Foreman, 524-526)