Why Filipinos are not a patriotic people

"Ang isang lahi na walang marangal na gunita hinggil sa sarili ay isang lahing madalîng alipinin at patuloy na may isip-alipin kahit bigyan ng kalayaan." - Virgilio Almario.

( Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

It is truly disheartening that Filipinos are not a patriotic people. Yet, a decade and a hundred years ago this country teemed with patriots - Sancho Valenzuela, Flaviano Yenko, Aniano Diokno, Maximo Abad, Luciano San Miguel, Eugenio Daza, Julian Santos, Faustino Guillermo, Macario Sakay, Simeon Ola, Arcadio Maxilon, Martin Delgado, Urbano Lacuna, Juan Cailles, Licerio Geronimo, Sixto Lopez, just to name a few of the unheralded. But today ineptitude, helplessness, indifference and disregard for law and order prevail. Seekers of favor, privilege and position outnumber those who are willing to make sacrifices for the country. And not one among contemporary public officials show any real interest in leading the people out of poverty, ignorance and apathy. The puzzle becomes even more pronounced whenever the question is asked why the likes of Aguinaldo, Rizal, Bonifacio, Jacinto, Del Pilar, Luna, Lopez Jaena, Mariano Ponce are nowhere to be found. Did something unusual happen then that we are not told today?

Revisiting the Aguinaldo era

A diligent student of Philippine history could use the internet to get to the facts that would lead to the solution of the puzzle much faster. With some luck, he might find himself in a gold mine of information, The student would find books, pamphlets and documents containing unfamiliar accounts and events, facts that an average Filipino student could not have encountered in his school days or professional career. Indeed, so much had been deliberately missed out in Philippine school textbooks concerning the events that took place after the United States succeeded Spain as the colonial master of these islands at the turn of the twentieth century.

It will take a little while to gather the data and digest the facts, but eventually a clear scenario will form in one’s mind like several frames as in a graphical presentation. First to show would be the frame of Bonifacio, then Aguinaldo, then the battle of Manila bay, then the Filipino army and navy, then the siege of Spanish garrisons throughout Luzon, Visayas, and parts of Mindanao, then the victorious Filipino flag flying in towns and cities, then the first Filipino republic, then the armed intervention by the Americans, then the Filipino war of resistance, then the defoliation, reconcentrado and water cure, then the surrender of Filipino guerrilla fighters, then the American colonial government, then the public school system and the final frame, the new Filipino.

The student would realize no sooner that the reason why today's generation of Filipinos are not patriotic is because they are descendants of the new Filipino, or those that William Howard Taft condescendingly called the little brown brothers. (Taft, 125). These were the generation of Filipinos who had undergone a process of reeducation, which the nationalist historian Renato D. Constantino called the remaking of the Filipino. The parents were the patriotic Filipinos who fought side by side with Aguinaldo, but the offspring would be taught to become subservient Filipinos of the American colonial era.

But what would likely escape notice by the unwary student is that the reeducation process was not accidental, or a result of teaching English or other American-oriented subjects. As will be proved later, the reeducation process was deliberate. It was carefully designed to erase from the memory of the Filipinos a very sad chapter in their country's history. The public school system was utilized to implement a systematic process of indoctrination in order that Filipinos will have no recollection of the horrors they went through in their heroic resistance to American occupation. That the process was successful can be gleaned from its product, the new Filipino whose descendants today are wrestling with lost national identity, unfamiliar with the blood and tears that their forefathers shed in a bitter struggle to establish a government of their own, free and independent.

McKinley's clever ploy

The story of the transformation of the Filipino from the patriotic to the subservient came about with the rise of America as a world power in late 19th century. U.S. President William McKinley wanted to take the Philippine Islands as an American colony following the British model. However, territorial expansion that ignored the rights of the inhabitants to American citizenship violated the constitution of the United States and the libertarian tradition of the American people. Nevertheless, President McKinley was obsessed and completely consumed by his imperialistic design.

He ignored the favorable opinion of Admiral Dewey and the other American generals about the capability of Filipinos for self-government and their superiority over the Cubans who the United States freed after the Spaniards were driven out of Cuba. He also refused to acknowledge the accomplishment of the Filipinos in defeating the Spaniards and establishing a de facto government that held ninety-three percent of the country and administered to ninety-four percent of the population. The so-called Philippine republic, according to Washington officials, was not recognized as a belligerent by the powers, e.g., England, United States, Germany, Japan or Russia, and therefore, for practical purposes, did not exist. But whenever the American generals needed anything from Aguinaldo - oxen, horses, wagons, timber, encampments, supplies or information, he was addressed as Commanding General of the Philippine Forces.

Rather than sympathize with a struggling people, the McKinley administration concocted a very clever ploy. The American public was made to believe that the Filipinos were savages, uncivilized, and unfit for self-government. The Filipinos were likened to the American Indians who lived among several tribes scattered all across the Philippine archipelago. McKinley presented himself as the knight in shining armor that Divine Providence had anointed to lead the Filipinos out into the bright sunlight of western civilization. (Storey, 177). But what the American public was not made privy to was the prospects of enormous profits from hemp, sugar, timber, India rubber, gold, silver and other precious metals, coaling stations, and control of commerce in the east that made the Wall Street schemers very excited about. Neither was the American public told that the Filipinos fought the Spaniards to gain their independence and will fight the Americans to defend that independence. And so McKinley's obsession to colonize the Philippines proceeded with the ayes of the members of the United States Congress and applause of the American people.

War of extermination and devastation

What Aguinaldo thought was an alliance with the Americans against Spain was eventually exposed to him as a masquerade to the real motives of the Americans. Soon after Aguinaldo had defeated the Spaniards and a large of contingent of American troops had arrived in Manila, war was commenced by the U.S. military in February 4, 1899, which influenced a wavering U.S. congress to ratify the Treaty of Paris, the treaty between Spain and the United States which ceded the Philippines to the latter, by a majority of only two votes. McKinley gave the Filipinos only one choice - submit to American authority or die. The Filipinos chose to fight a vastly superior army rather than submit to a new master. For almost a year, the Filipino army faced the superior American forces in open-field or conventional warfare only to be clobbered in each engagement. Filipino initiatives for truce were rebuffed by the Americans with a demand for an unconditional surrender of the entire Filipino army before any talks are opened. But the Filipinos refused the terms of an unconditional surrender without a clear commitment that a government under an American protectorate will be respected. And so the fighting continued.

Eventually, the succession of defeats in various battlefields forced Aguinaldo to change strategy. He issued an order to disband the 30,000 strong Filipino army in November, 1899 and constitute the officers and soldiers into guerrilla units in their home provinces. The change in strategy surprised the Americans who began to suffer heavier casualties from sneak attacks and ambuscades by Filipino guerrillas. So the bloody conflict, which should earn the title, the first modern guerrilla warfare in Asia, dragged on for three more years. The tenacity of the Filipinos was reflected in a statement of Teodoro Sandico, a member of the Aguinaldo cabinet, who issued a proclamation on May 16, 1899 which said in part:

“... I think it is our duty to exhaust all our resources for war, organize all our forces, and not consider ourselves conquered until the last cartridge has been fired.” (Luzon, 21)

McKinley did not want a prolonged war because he was facing a reelection. Neither was he willing to let the American public know exactly what was happening in the Philippine islands. McKinley refused to accept General Arthur MacArthur's report that the whole Filipino nation was loyal to Aguinaldo and that practically every town served as a base of Filipino guerrilla operation with full moral and material support from the townspeople. McKinley was following a very clear objective – put the Philippines on the map of the United States. Therefore, he had to misrepresent to the American people that the war was being waged only by what he called the Tagalog tribe, and that the several other tribes were willing to accept American authority. He had to keep the American public hold on to the misconception that the Filipinos were savages and unfit to govern themselves, and justify his intrusion into their purely domestic affairs.

Accordingly, the American generals were put under severe pressure to end the war soonest because the American public might soon ask why a small savage tribe is able to resist the most powerful army in the world with 70,000 soldiers manning 500 stations by June, 1900. (Storey, 160) And it was at this point that all rules of civilized warfare was thrown aside and strict press censorship was enforced.

McKinley’s predicament and the unusually stiff resistance of the Filipino guerrillas drove the American command to adopt a counter strategy. The new strategy targeted the civilian population who were deliberately made to suffer untold hardships so that they will have no other recourse but to long for peace. In his circular order no.22, General Bell, in implementing his pacification campaign in Batangas province, said:

"To combat such a population, it is necessary to make the state of war as insupportable as possible, and there is no more efficacious way of accomplishing this than by keeping the minds of the people in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that living under conditions will soon become unbearable. Little should be said. The less said the better. Let acts, not words, convey the intention." (Storey 120).

Accordingly, the war turned into a war of extermination and devastation characterized by a very negligible ratio of combat prisoners versus deaths (historical data is about 4 prisoners to 1 death), torture, concentration camps, indefinite incarcerations, indiscriminate killings, defoliation and devastation of towns and farms, and fueled mainly by racist contempt - a colored race had no right to stand up before a supposedly superior white race - accentuated by retaliation from the Filipino side. According to a prominent American anti-imperialist, George Seawall Boutwell, one pretext for the war, has been the assertion that the Filipinos were uncivilized, and, therefore, that they were not entitled to consideration. (Willis, 250). The Filipinos were called niggers, gugus, khakias and ladrones. As the war dragged on American loathing of Filipinos amplified to higher levels. One author who described the conflict as a war of extermination says the war was characterized by the slaughter of innocent women and children “... the Americans burning and devastating all before them ... and shooting every Filipino.” (Valentine, 18).

Torture was resorted to all throughout the islands. John Morgan Gates said that by the middle of 1900, Americans and Macabebes resorted to the water cure and other forms of terror. They seized people and forcibly filled their stomachs with water until they revealed the hiding place of guerrillas, supplies, or arms. (Gates, 175). According to Blount, the water cure was practically the only way the Americans could get a Filipino betray his own countrymen. (Blount, 204).

Another harsh method used extensively was the reconcentrado, or something equivalent to a huge concentration camp, a method inherited from the Spaniards. Civilians were herded into designated security zone and any person, animal, food, or anything useful to the guerrillas, that were found outside the security zone were killed or destroyed.

U.S. General J.W. Bell, in his report of December 6, 1901 to Washington discloses the methods he will employ to rid Batangas of rebels, viz:

"I am now assemblying in the neighborhood of 2,500 men who will be used in columns of fifty men each. I take so large a command for the purpose of thoroughly searching each ravine, valley and mountain peak for insurgents and for food, expecting to destroy everything I find outside the towns. All able-bodied men will be killed or captured... These people need a thrashing to teach them some good common sense, and they should have it for the good of all concerned." (Storey, 120)

Moorefield Storey quotes a Republican Congressman who visited the islands in 1902 expressed these observations:

"You never hear of any disturbance in Northern Luzon; and the secret of its pacification is, in my opinion, the secret of the pacification of the archipelago. They never rebel in Northern Luzon because there isn't anybody there to rebel. The country was marched over and cleaned in a most resolute manner. The good Lord in heaven only knows the number of Filipinos that were put under ground. Our soldiers took no prisoners, they kept no records; they simply swept the country, and wherever or whenever they could get hold of a Filipino they killed him. The women and children were spared, and may now be noticed in disproportionate numbers in that part of the islands." (Storey, 121-122)

The indiscriminate target of American military campaign was best described by John Rich McDill when he said:

"During our military operations in the field we saw a most beautiful country, but week after week we passed through abandoned and silent towns, villages, and fields, ... The women and children, the old and feeble, and the sick, were hiding unsheltered in the woods and mountains. We, a perfectly armed and equipped army of the most powerful republic in the world, were pursuing and killing sad-eyed little brown men and boys, who were scantily clothed, poorly nourished, and almost unarmed..." (McDill, 2).

The new American strategy worked. By sowing fear, inflicting pain, causing death, or destroying property, the Americans succeeded in forcibly isolating the guerrillas from the civilian population, the main support base, and this was the principal factor that caused the weakening of the resistance and bringing it to an end. General Miguel Malvar, the last of the great Filipino generals to surrender, in explaining why he and three thousand of his men gave up in April, 1902, wrote that he could no longer bear the sufferings of the people.

The estimate of the death toll in Luzon attributed to the war was one-sixth of the population. (Storey, 121). The total population of the Philippine Islands in 1900 was somewhere between eight to nine million. An American war protester made this comment:

"There is no doubt that we have caused the destruction of more lives in the last three years than the Spanish did in any century of their misrule. " (Winchester, 13). [author: It brings to mind the holocaust four decades later. The only difference is, the Jews did not forget whilst the Filipinos did.]

Despite the strict censorship employed by the U.S. military on reports by U.S. national newspaper correspondents, numerous documented accounts of the use of harsh methods found their way into local newspapers from letters of American soldiers to their families in the United States. Some of these letters led to investigations by the U.S. Congress. A transcript of one such investigation contained the testimony of two American soldiers, William Lewis Smith and Charles Riley, describing in detail the administration of water cure to the presidente [town mayor - author] of Igbarras, Iloilo and three of the town’s policemen, including the subsequent burning of the whole town.


Blot on an immaculate linen

Definitely, against the backdrop of the great American heritage, this McKinley misadventure in the Philippines was destined to become an ugly episode in the glorious pages of American history. It would be a contradiction to the long held constitutional and democratic principles of liberty that the American people hold dear - that men are created equal and have inherent rights to freedom and democracy. Certainly, American authorities would not allow the true story of Philippine conquest blemish American honor. Therefore, it would be logical to assume that steps were taken to muddle this section of Filipino history, erase it from the memory of the Filipinos, make them forget the horrors they went through, and hide it from the prying eyes of future generation.

True enough, steps were taken to make Filipinos forget!

Francis Burton Harrison, once the Governor General of the Philippine Islands, described the steps taken:

"The exhibition of the Filipino flag, under which they had fought their war against us, was made by statute a criminal offense. Patriotism was never encouraged in the schools, nor ideas which tended to arouse their own national consciousness. Everything which might help to make the pupils understand their own race or think about the future of the country was carefully censored and eliminated. Nevertheless, the good sound stock of American ideas which they received instructed them inevitably in our own democratic ideals, and in our pride in own liberties." (Harrison, 45).

The irreconcilable former General of the Filipino army, Artemio Vibora Ricarte, who took to his grave his refusal to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, preferring solitary confinement, then a self-exile in Yokohama, Japan, saw beyond the facade of American altruism an insidious design when he said:

"The truth is America taught our young people the things that commemorate the lives of Lincoln and Washington in order that we will forget in our hearts the exemplary deeds of our nation's great heroes. The Americans believe that once we are able to speak good English is proof enough that we have learned, yet in our minds is being instilled a wrong thinking, the superiority of the white race." (author's translation of Tagalog text found in Kabataan, 12).

Many political and military leaders of the defunct Aguinaldo government accepted generous offer of high position in the American colonial government. Those who did not and refused to take the oath of allegiance to the United States were exiled to the Marianas. [Aguinaldo, for his part, rejected all offered positions in the American colonial government, although he took the oath of allegiance to the United States. When the Japanes Imperial Army occupied Manila during WWII, Aguinaldo and Ricarte actively supported the Japanese sponsored government. - author]

War relics and voluminous captured Filipino government records and documents officially labeled as Philippine Insurgents Records (PIR) were shipped to the United States. American teachers came to inaugurate an American-sponsored public school system. English supplanted Spanish, [a language change that was not done by the Americans in Puerto Rico or Cuba - author], and with it went the loss of Hispanic literary and intellectual heritage, making the succeeding generation of Filipinos fertile grounds for the propagation of the good sound stock of American ideas.

Filipino schoolchildren were taught to revere America, and belittle the land of their birth. The first line of a beautiful Tagalog love song, for instance, was translated to English with emphasis on the state of being borne poor, instead of placing the focus on the demigod character of the hero, who was born on top of a mountain with the clouds as his cradle; he played with thunder and was caressed by lightning. In another case, the popular Tagalog folk song, the bahay-kubo, was translated to English as “My nipa hut is very small”, again, the emphasis on smallness. And yet this popular folk song is supposed to depict a prosperous small rural farm where all kinds of vegetables abound.

Another important step that American authorities took was the designation of Dr. Jose Rizal as the national hero. Carl Crow, says:

"Among other things the Filipino people lacked to make them a nation was a hero - a safe hero, the only safe ones, of course, being dead. Aguinaldo held the highest place in the eyes of his countrymen, as the leader of the recent insurrection, but he was ... one who might be of considerable danger to the American administration. It was expedient to establish a hero whose fame would overshadow that of Aguinaldo, and thereby lessen that leader’s ability to make future trouble. ... Governor Taft, ... at once fixed on Jose Rizal…" (Crow, 53).

The designation of Jose Rizal as the national hero was calculated not only to lessen Aguinaldo's ability to make future trouble. It had the effect also, and this is the more important, of making future generation of Filipinos identify the Spaniards as villains and the Americans as saviors. On the other hand, if Aguinaldo were the national hero, future celebration of the hero's day would not only highlight the victory over the Spaniards by the Filipinos and the government they established, but also the unjust war of conquest waged by President McKinley on the Filipinos to deprive them of their freedom. The choice of Rizal over Aguinaldo saved the Americans from being remembered as the butcher of the Filipinos, the pillager of their land, and the destroyer of their republic.

Aguinaldo could not have been the choice for the national hero judging from the American effort to discredit him, as follows:

“Let it not be forgotten that Aguinaldo sold out his patriotism at Biac na Bato for a miserable pittance, which he failed to divide with his generals; that his ambition for preeminence did not stop short at the assassination of Andres Bonifacio and of General Luna.” (Briggs, 78).

The truth is Aguinaldo and his comrade-in-exile in Hong Kong lived frugally from the interest on the $400,000 Biak-na-bato funds which they deposited in two Hong Kong banks. When the second phase of the revolution started, Aguinaldo used the funds to purchase armaments from Hong Kong. On the other hand, the death of Bonifacio and Luna being blamed on Aguinaldo were the unfortunate result of collision of strong personalities that threatened the very survival of the Filipino cause. Bonifacio was mounting a counter revolution, while Luna was dividing the army. To quote Teodoro Kalaw: “the times demanded firmness and the Filipino cause could not afford to be divided”.

The new Filipino

From the day the American colonial administration was inaugurated in 1901 the new Filipino emerged, known today as the little brown Americans. These are Filipinos by appearance, but Americans in thought, word and deed. True to Harrison's specifications, the new Filipino spoke English very fluently, knew much about American ideals, history, arts, literature and music by heart, but have a very vague notion of their ancestors' struggle for freedom, or their sacred dreams and aspirations that drove them to arms. They would usually turn into very competent professionals, but would lack one very important trait – patriotism, thanks to the methodical classroom strategy that Harrison described.

The process of making Filipinos forget did not stop after the Americans let go of the Philippines in 1946. A Grade IV pupil in the year 1951 was still being taught to sing Star spangled banner, God bless America etc. By the time the same child stepped into High School, he would be made to study American history on the First Year and in later years memorize the address of Lincoln at Gettysburg and the poem, The Song of Hiawatha. In other words, for more than five decades the Filipino was subjected to something similar to what was considered diabolical - brainwashing.

In sum, the American conquest of the Philippines was not just a case of subjugating an unwilling people. It was also a case of making the same people forget that they were subjugated.

Where to, Filipino?

How else would the Filipino behave after being deliberately trained to think as an American? When Filipino leaders of the newly independent Philippine government signed treaties with the Americans that were today considered disadvantageous to the country, were those leaders dumb or lacking in intelligence? Definitely not. These leaders were very highly educated. The likelihood was by training the leaders had taken to the habit of putting the interests of America first, their own country's next. Strangely, the Filipino psychology mistook the interest of the American as his own, something that could only happen in a case of mistaken identity. The sad part was more and more foreigners, have now moved up to the same status as the American in the eyes of the Filipino. But the real tragedy seemed to be the low regard that the Filipino had learnt to give to anything native, while showing a religious-like devotion to things American or foreign, an attitude that had wrought havoc to the development of indigenous industries.

What lies ahead for the Filipino? For as long as schoolchildren are taught to sing Jack and Jill, not Leron Leron Sinta, and would likely never learn or hear the tune of Pamulenawen or Sarumbanggi, the Filipino would be doomed to national perdition. In other words, the Filipino malaise would remain unrecognized and no serious steps would be taken to unmake the colonial Filipino. Unless the Filipino national character changed, one could only hope that the nation would succeed given the heavy burden of corrupted sense of identity. The salvation of the Filipino would not come from foreign aid or investment, preferential treatment, free trade or remittances of OFWs. Rather, it would depend primarily on the rejuvenation of the Filipino mind, i.e., the rekindling the spirit of 1898 - the love of country and the aspiration to be free and independent. The only recourse of the Filipino would be to reclaim the patriotic character of the heroes held hostage by the muddled past, and to acknowledge that the Filipino race could accomplish great things just as Aguinaldo did. It will give the Filipino today the confidence, strength and courage to remedy the present and approach the future.

A nation can only succeed if the people make sacrifices. But without patriotism there can be no sacrifice.

An American defector to the Aguinaldo army

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

There were several defections of American soldiers to the Filipino side during the Philippine-American war. The most famous defection was that of a black man, David Fagan, who enlisted as major in the Nueva Ecija brigade of General Urbano Lacuna. (Funston, 376) There was also the case of bugler Maurice Sibley of the 16th Infantry, who became the right hand man of General Tomines of Isabela and eventually married an Igorot woman.(Khaki, 36) Other defections to the Filipino army by American soldiers occurred in many parts of the country. In Marinduque, some captured American soldiers opted to join the forces of Colonel Maximo Abad. In Cebu, five white defectors joined the forces of General Arcadio Maxilon. (Foreman, 524).

It is not the purpose of this article to inquire into the reasons why these American soldiers defected to the Filipino side. Suffice it is to say that no war in the military history of the United States can compare with this little war, as U.S. President McKinley called the Philippine-American war, on the number of defections to the enemy.

The following is an account on one such defection that can qualify as a plot for a movie:

“We will call him Jackson. Jackson was silent, morose man, who had few friends in the battery. He was evidently of good education, and he spoke Spanish fluently. Ordinarily, he was a first class soldier, doing his duties efficiently. He had one failing, however, that made him unpopular. Occasionally he would break out in a wild spree, always ending in the guard-house. When drunk, he was a fighting lunatic, quarreling with everyone.

“Jackson fell in love with a pretty mestiza girl who, with her mother, conducted a cantina in the plaza. In time they were married in church by the native padre. After that wedding, Jackson was shunned by his comrades. There is an unwritten law among soldiers that a white man must not wed a native.

“The artilleryman resented the scorn of his fellow-soldiers, become more sullen, and spent more time than was good for him in the company of the Filipinos. One pay-day he went on one of his mad sprees. While fighting madness was on him he attacked a young lieutenant, striking him in the face.

“To attack an officer is a grave crime in the army. Jackson was court-martialed and sentenced to six years in military prison. While he was confined in the guard-house awaiting transportation to the United States to serve his sentence, a member of the guard permitted him to escape. It is a hard duty to mount guard over a friend and treat him like a caged animal.

“Jackson was supposed to make his way to Manila and stow away on an outgoing steamer for the China coast. Instead, he made his way by night to the casa of his wife, and together they stole away to the insurgent army.

“A few weeks later we began to hear stories of the white renegade. He was in command of a company of insurrectos. He moved like a ghost about the country, appearing in the most unexpected places. Again and again his command attacked American outposts. On one occasion he captured two army wagons loaded with supplies, killing several members of the guard.

“For months we were kept busy chasing Jackson. The natives protected him, and he was always warned of our approach. One night the main army of insurgents surrounded the town of Imus and made a general attack. The fight continued for several hours in the darkness.

“As I lay in the trenches, I could distinctly hear the voice of Jackson swearing and calling to his troops to advance. The insurrectos were driven off, and by daylight they had disappeared.

“Months later, when I was with the native scouts, I witnessed the tragic end of Jackson's career. A column under General Swan attacked the Filipino trenches near Noveleta, west of Imus. The scouts were in the advance guard.

“When we went over the trenches, we found Jackson lying by the roadside. He was twice wounded, - through the lungs and abdomen. Although it may read like a fiction, it is a fact that his native wife was crouched in the mud of the road, holding his head in her lap. He refused to speak to us and died defiant, fighting against the flag he had sworn to uphold.

“A few months later his wife became the mother of a blue-eyed boy. She always seemed to hate the Americans, and would never afterward speak to an American soldier.

“An interesting sequel to Jackson's story followed in the visit of an American lawyer to the Islands sometime later. He hunted up several of the men who were present when Jackson died, and asked them to aid him in locating the body. It had been buried in a trench with about sixty Filipinos who died in the fight. The lawyer had the body exhumed, placed in an iron coffin, and shipped back to the United States.”(O'Reilly, 102-104)

Observations of an American POW

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

Aguinaldo was fighting a war, at the same time, he was running a government. These two facets of Philippine life in the 1900's was observed closely by an American prisoner of war named Albert Sonrichsen.

Sonrichsen was arrested on charges of espionage by Filipino troops while taking photographs inside Filipino lines in January 27, 1899, a few days before the outbreak of the Philippine-American war. He was in company of American soldiers who were dressed in civilian clothes. They were held as prisoners under guard in Malolos.

At the outbreak of the war in February 4, 1899, enraged Filipinos tried to lay their hands on prisoner Sonrichsen, but the Filipino jail guards shielded him, and made sure he was safe. As the war progressed and the Americans began to advance from Manila, the Filipinos retreated to the north, bringing with them all the prisoners, mostly Spaniards, including Sonrichsen.

In April 22, the prisoners were joined at San Isidro, Nueva Ecija by other American prisoners - Lieutenant Glenmore and soldiers under him, who were captured by Filipino troops in Baler, Tayabas (Quezon) during an attempt by the Americans, on orders of Admiral Dewey, to rescue the Spanish contingent holed up in a besieged church.

In June, Sonrichsen became seriously ill and found himself in Vigan being treated in a Filipino hospital and cared for by a nurse. Later, he was moved to Abra, where he was allowed free movement. He taught in a Filipino school and was paid a salary equivalent to the pay of a lieutenant in the Filipino army. During this period, he observed that Filipinos under 30 have the ability to read and write, if not in Spanish, at least in their native dialect. He also noted that Filipinos took every opportunity to learn and improve themselves.

In November, he escaped and was appointed guide and interpreter to U.S. General Young's forces. In this capacity, he was able to make comparison between the government of Aguinaldo, and the American controlled government. If he were to make a choice, he said, he would choose the Aguinaldo government. Among his observations - Filipino soldiers are disciplined and humanely treated the prisoners; schools were established in each town, even while the war was going on; a fine college was being ran in Vigan; cockfighting was strictly forbidden which was allowed by the Americans. He further remarked that the American officers do not seem to understand the native - they inspire fear, rather than respect.

Here is a letter from Sonrichsen, recounting his captivity and his observations:

"NEW YORK,
"December 26, 1900.

"DEAR SIR: In answer to your letter of the 20th I hereby offer you any assistance that lies within my power. After a consultation with Messrs. Scribner's Sons, with whom I have made a contract to publish my book on the Philippines, I find that they have no objection to my position as an anti-imperialist before the public, although my narrative takes rather an unbiased stand. It gives merely an account of my ten months' experience as a prisoner of war among the insurgents of Luzon, stating facts as they presented themselves to my eyes, regardless of political factions, leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions, which can not, however, but be in favor of the Filipinos.

"With regard to the authentic facts for which you have asked me, I am rather puzzled as to what you could make the best use of. If you mean anything that comes within my own personal experience, I am only too glad to serve you. Possibly I had best give you a brief outline. On January 27, I899, I left Manila in company with a friend and entered the insurgent lines for the purpose of taking photographs. We were arrested as spies and taken on to the insurgent capital at Malolos, and there held until hostilities broke out, a week later. The Filipinos certainly had every right to take us for spies, since we were dressed in civilian clothes and had a camera in our possession, my companion being recognized as a member of the American Army.

"Upon learning that the outbreak had occurred, great excitement prevailed at Malolos. A wild rabble gathered before the gates of the prison in which we were confined and attempted to drag us out, but our guards, the insurgent regular soldiers, threw themselves in between us and the mob, fighting in our defense until we were removed to safer quarters. This rather goes to prove that the insurgents are neither savages nor armed rabble, but well disciplined and acquainted with the rules of international law.

"We were also informed by Filipino officials several days later that the outbreak was the result of a sentry's blunder and that they had hastened to apologize and offered to make reparation, but that General Otis had refused to consider all advances made by them for a peaceful settlement. In March the renewed activity of the Americans forced the insurgents to retreat to San Isidro, taking us with them. Our treatment was at times hard, but owing rather to circumstances than to the Filipinos themselves, who seemed on the whole inclined to make our lot as bearable as possible.

"In San Isidro we were joined by Lieutenant Gilmore and several of his men on April 22.

"In May we were once more on the march, together with several hundreds of Spaniards, retreating constantly until, in June, we found ourselves in Vigan, the capital of the northern province of Ilocos.

"Here several of us became seriously ill and were sent to the local hospital. Medicines and medical skill were sadly in want. Still we were treated equally as well as the wounded Filipinos themselves, the women nursing us as they did their own. In September we were taken up the Abra River to Bangued, in the heart of the Abra Mountains, and here we were allowed the full liberty of the town, well treated and cared for. I was able to teach school here, for which I received a pay almost equal to that of a second lieutenant in the insurgent army. Many of my companions were able to do likewise; all, in fact, that were capable of speaking the Spanish language. Even during the war the Filipinos established schools in every town, and Vigan could boast of an excellent college which followed its daily routine as in times of peace. Upon the arrival of the Americans these schools and colleges were broken up, and the buildings ever since have been confiscated as barracks.
"I also observed that every Filipino under 30 could read and write, if not Spanish, at least his native dialect. The Spanish friars discouraged the study of Spanish, and for this reason the poorer people were unable to learn more than what was taught in the convent schools -reading, writing (in native dialect) Bible history, psalm singing, and the rudiments of arithmetic. Whenever given the opportunity, however, the people of all classes are anxious to learn and improve themselves.

"In November I succeeded in effecting my escape, and was appointed guide and interpreter to General Young's forces. In this capacity I was able to make comparisons between the two governments and am forced to say that I drew my conclusions in favor of the Aguinaldo government. The people were more discontented, becoming more and more so every day. Our officers do not seem to understand the natives, and inspire fear rather than respect. Cock fighting, which is strictly forbidden by the insurgents, is freely allowed in American territory. Taxes are heavier than formerly, and our soldiers have so raised the prices of food products that the poorer people are suffering heavily from want.

"These are the facts which I present to you now, but whether they are suitable for your purpose or not I can not say. Should you wish further details, I am willing to oblige you - or the cause rather - of which I am strongly in favor.


"Respectfully yours,
"ALBERT SONRICHSEN"
(Pettigrew, 298-299)

The Patriot and the Elite

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

An interesting exchange of letters between Benito Legarda, in whose honor one of the streets near Malacanang is named after, former cabinet member of President Aguinaldo and Aguinaldo himself which clearly differentiates the thinking of an elite and a patriot. Legarda wanted the Filipinos to give up the fight and submit to American rule, while Aguinaldo defiantly stood for continuation of the struggle.

In his reply to Legarda, Aguinaldo expressed his frustrations, which, apparently was directed towards the elite of Philippine society, when he said:

“What is life to us if we are to be the slaves of the foreigner? It is a pity that all the enlightened Filipinos do not employ their knowledge and experience in the defense of their country.”

The Legarda and Aguinaldo letters presented below were lifted verbatim from pages 26-30 of the pamphlet "The Luzon Campaign", Vol. 1, No. 7, published by the Philippine Information Society, Boston, 1901, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ ACC6166.0001.007.

Here is the letter from Legarda:

“Manila, July 7, I899.
“SR. DON EMILIO AGUINALDO:

“MY DEAR DON EMILIO:

“Mr. Olimpio Guamson has delivered your message to me, asking for my frank and honest opinion concerning our present political situation, and the probable future which awaits us. I shall give it with pleasure, not only because it is my duty as a Filipino, but because of the sincere friendship which binds me to you. I will refrain from making a critical judgment of all your actions prior to the 4th of February, the date of the Outbreak of Hostilities, taking them simply as data upon which to base my deductions, and will presuppose in all of them good faith from the point of view of the patriotic motives which impelled you to perform them.

“We have commenced hostilities; we have had our wish, for remember perfectly well that war was the desire of the majority in Malolos, the military element, however, being prominent in this majority, and raising its voice upon the subject, dragging after it the rest of the people. And what has been gained? Nothing but ruin, death, and desolation.

“We have not been able to prevent the Americans from going anywhere they pleased, and it has been plainly evident that the valor upon which we depended was not enough, but to conquer it is necessary to have many things which the Americans possess in abundance, and which we lack.

“As time goes on our chances for victory grow less, and the further the American troops advance so much worse is our condition for asking concessions for our unhappy country.

“Up to the present time the American troops, in my opinion, have had no other object in view than to show their bravery, a quality which had unjustly and erroneously been denied them both privately and in the public press. So far, either on that account or for other reasons, America has not sent here an army capable of a military occupation of all our territory, nor has a formal campaign been commenced; that America can do so we are unable to doubt, and that it will be done if we persist in our present attitude we may feel certain. And what will then remain to us?

“What could we ask for?

“We are in error, and yet we persist in that error, impelled by those who dream of a triumph of a party which is to-day in a minority in the United States, without perceiving that this party is also American, and that they are not going to give us our independence out of hand as a matter of sentiment at the expense of the honor of America and in spite of the grave responsibility, both international and domestic, contracted under the Treaty of Paris. Others dream that because part of the press of Europe copies from American anti-imperialist papers the criticisms of that party against the Government of President McKinley a European intervention in our favor is to take place, without reflecting that the Treaty of Paris was made before all the civilized world and with its assent.

“The war so far has only laid bare our insufficiency and our shortcomings.

“In my judgment, giving these conditions, the time has arrived for your policy to change in a radical manner, unless you wish to see forever annihilated the hope that our people may some day take its place in the concert of the civilized world, unless you wish to see the complete ruin of our race and of all our country, and unless you are willing to accept the grave responsibilities which will fall upon you. To-day then I address you as a friend and as a Filipino and say "Peace is an imperative necessity.

"Nothing can prevent the triumph of America.. Do not struggle against the inevitable.

“Peace must come some time, and the man who restores peace to the Philippines will win the admiration of the world, and the gratitude of his country. Be that man. Since 1896 you have been the soul of the people, and have merited their blessings for your wonderful and providential wisdom. Be now the peace-maker that your glory may be perpetuated. As you are the man who, when brought here by the Americans, roused the people as one to the work of our emancipation from Spain, be now the one to say 'Enough of conflict.'

“We have seen that our ideals cannot be realized by this means; let us make peace, and let us work and learn. For by working and learning with a free people, such as the Americans, we shall cast from us the vices of our old masters, and will some day win the independence we so much desire.

“This is what I believe you are called upon to do, and I think that you will never repent it. There is no other remedy - no other path open. Do not forget that many Filipinos are losing their lives every day in the defense of the impossible: that every day the ruin of property sacrificed in vain is greater, and that, if finally there is no help other than to submit to American sovereignty, it is not just to sacrifice more lives and property, whereby you will contract before God and man responsibilities of such proportions that they alarm me.

“Stop while you may, and believe me that now is the appointed time: a little later the policy of the American Government will change completely the sentiment of that free and noble people, which loves its own liberty as much as it desires that of other nations, and then a race war will come which will end in our extermination.

“I believe that with what I have said I have performed my duty and complied with your wishes. I must, however, state that I have done so freely, without suggestions or coercions of any kind, and also that I have made no special political studies, nor have I had preparation for speaking upon matters of this nature. The only merit of this opinion is that it is the manifestation of the intimate conviction of a citizen who is inspired by the best of good faith and the desire of his people.

“I am, as ever, your affectionate friend and obedient servant,

“B. LEGARDA.”

And here is Aguinaldo's reply:

“Personal.
“REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
“OFFICE OF THE PRSESIDENT,
“Tarlac, September 14, 1899.

“SR. BENITO LEGARDA, Manila.

“MY DISTINGUISHED FRIEND:

“Your two kind letters have reached my hands and I have informed myself of all you say in them. Many thanks for the information you give me. I beg that you will pardon me for my delay in making reply, but I must tell you that sometime elapsed before they reached me.

“I believe what you tell me as to the re-enforcements of the enemy which will not be long in arriving. Not only do I believe this, but I am convinced of this fact, and even before the outbreak of hostilities was sure that with their wealth and their innumerable and powerful elements of war, they could, whenever they so desired, send as many as they need.

“In reply to this I must tell you that it is impossible for me to turn back from the enterprise which I have undertaken -that of defending our country, and especially as I have sworn that as long as life lasts I shall labor until I gain the acknowledgment of the independence of the Philippines. Do not attribute this declaration to my vanity, but to my desire to fulfill a former promise. This, aside from the fact that the struggle for the independence of our country is just and based upon our perfect rights.

“We are not alarmed by the numerous arms nor the valor of our enemy. What is life to us if we are to be the slaves of the foreigner? It is a pity that all the enlightened Filipinos do not employ their knowledge and experience in the defense of their country. I repeat, we will not give up the struggle until we gain our longed-for independence: death is of but little moment to us if we are but able to ensure the happiness of the people and of future generations.

“We must no longer allow ourselves to be fascinated by the flattering promises of the enemy. You know that they first solemnly assured me that they would acknowledge our independence. Nevertheless, the attempt is now being made to force autonomy on us by superior strength. They have been using explosive bullets since the 9th of August last, and have bombarded defenseless forts, contrary to the precepts of international law. But it matters not that they use these elements of destructive warfare. Resistance and firmness of our resolution will be sufficient to wear them out. If this is not enough to induce our enemies to desist from their endeavor, we will go, if necessary, into the mountains, but never will we accept a treaty of peace dishonorable to the Philippine arms and disastrous to the future of the country, such as that which they seek to impose.

“For this reason I advise all those who do not feel themselves strong enough to accept this sacrifice, and whose services are not indispensable to our Government, to return to Manila and the towns occupied by the enemy, reserving themselves to strengthen the organization of our Government when our independence is gained, replacing those who, wearied by the struggle, are in need of rest.

“I am not displeased that some Filipinos have consented to hold office under the Americans; on the contrary, I rejoice that they have done so, for thus they will be enabled to form a true estimate of the character of the Americans. I also rejoice that our enemies having had recourse to the Filipinos for the discharge of the duties of high positions in the public service in its various branches, have shown that they recognize the capacity of our people for self-government.

“Before closing I take the liberty of addressing you the following question: To what is due that policy of attraction employed by our enemy if not to the resistance of our army?

“One should never repent of a just determination.

“Kind regards to your family, and to Messrs. Arellano, Pardo, Torres, and other friends.

“Command at will your most affectionate friend,

“E. AGUINALDO.”

Why the U.S. destroyed the Malolos republic

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

Every Filipino who went through high school would have learned that there once existed an earlier Filipino republican government, the first Filipino republic and the first in Asia, the so-called Malolos republic, with Emilio Aguinaldo as its president. But that awareness is oftentimes superficial and wanting in in-depth knowledge. Not many Filipinos know that the so-called Malolos republic was a functioning government. Congress enacted laws and elected officials administered the functionaries of government in the towns and provinces. It collected taxes, customs duties and war assessment; floated bonded indebtedness, and even issued a paper currency. It maintained an army and navy and provided services in education, commerce, science, health, justice and foreign service. It operated for more than a year from its proclamation in July 3, 1898 up to its destruction by the Americans in November 12, 1899, when the last capital at Bayambang, Pangasinan was overran by American forces.

Yes, the Philippine-American war destroyed the Malolos republic. But a question may be asked - why was it not allowed to exist by the Americans? If war is only an expression of political objectives, then Washington officials, with their commitment to human rights and libertarian heritage, could have easily halted the war to let the Filipinos go on their own. Instead, U.S. president William McKinley forcibly annexed the Philippines, destroyed the Filipino republic and imposed American sovereignty over the unwilling inhabitants of the islands. Why?

U.S. military officers - Dewey, Anderson, Lawton and several other who had a first hand acquaintance with Filipinos provided the U.S. State Department with favorable impressions on the Filipinos and their capability for self government. Even U.S. president McKinley was reported to have indicated no immediate interest in the acquisition of the Philippines and instead placed the future of the Philippines in the hands of the peace negotiators, when he said:

"’..I do not want any ambiguity to be allowed to remain on this point. The negotiators of both countries are the ones who shall resolve upon the permanent advantages (notice that he said ‘advantages’ and not ‘rights’) which we shall ask in the archipelago, and decide upon the intervention (control), disposition and government of the Philippine Islands.’ He further said: ‘The Madrid Government can rest assured that up to now nothing is decided a priori in my own mind, against Spain, nor do I consider anything decided by it against the United States.’” (Treaty, 122)

But during the Peace Treaty negotiations in Paris the United States commissioners surprisingly demanded from Spain the cession of the Philippines to the United States.

The motive behind the annexation of the Philippines by the United States had always been attributed by Filipino nationalist historians to American imperialism. They claim that American big business saw the Philippines as a "prized possession for its unexploited natural resources, its strategic location for commerce in the east and for its harbors well suited for coaling stations and repair of ships."

But Senator Richard F. Pettigrew of the United States, a prolific critic of McKinley, gave an inkling of the more plausible motive. He said England influenced the decision of the United States to keep the Philippines as a colony because a new republic in the orient might encourage the English colonies to establish their own. Here is the revealing statement of Senator Pettigrew:

“At first we did not intend to keep the Philippines. About the early part of June, I898, the English papers began to publish articles urging the Americans to keep the Philippines. England became alarmed at the prospect of a republic being set up in the Orient. It would be like starting a prairie fire among her Malay subjects in Borneo, Singapore, Hongkong, and her other East India possessions. Hence President McKinley did not wish to start another Paul Kruger to set a bad example to the subjects of the Empress of India. The ‘London Spectator’, on the Philippines, hoped the United States would keep them, saying: 'The weary Titan needs an ally, and the only ally whose aspirations, ideas, and language are like his own is the great American people." (Pettigrew, 607) [The name Paul Kruger is associated with the First Boer War. After the British annexed South Africa in 1877, Kruger led a war of resistance against the British who were defeated in the decisive battle at Majuba in 1881 and an independent republic was established. - author]

The prospect of antagonizing the British on one hand and offending the democratic idealism of the American people on the other perhaps explains the evolving nature of McKinley's policy towards the Philippines. This policy was initially announced as a hands-off policy and eventually evolved into a policy of annexation.

The change in policy can be gleaned from the succession of events following the declaration of war with Spain in April 25, 1898. At this time, U.S. President McKinley had no clear-cut position about American intentions in the Philippines. While the United States granted the Cubans their independence after liberation from Spain and the same policy being expected by the Filipinos for themselves, nothing of the sort came about. The fact is, the Filipinos willingly sided with the Americans because they considered the Cuban experience as a manifestation of the good intentions of the Americans. But a period of non-decision prevailed on the Philippine question, which McKinley himself admitted he agonized on it.

After the defeat of Spanish fleet at Manila Bay, a Peace Protocol between Spain and the United States was signed in August 12, 1898. Even at this time, the intention to annex the Philippines was absent. The protocol merely gave the United States the right to hold the city, the bay and harbor for coaling purposes. There was no mention about cession of the archipelago, nor a takeover of island of Luzon or another Philippine island.

Believing that the Americans would let them enjoy an independent government under an American protectorate, the Filipinos cooperated with the Americans in most cordial manner. Aguinaldo secured the initial cache of arms from Commodore Dewey. Two U.S. cruisers, the Raleigh and the Concord, effected the surrender of the Spanish garrison in Subic Bay and the 1,200 Spanish prisoners were turned over by Dewey to Aguinaldo. Dewey also sent his cruisers to seek out the German cruiser Irene which challenged the identity of a Filipino steamer, the Filipinas, on the basis that the Filipino flag it was flying did not represent a country recognized as a belligerent. Dewey defended the act of flying of the Filipino flag by the Filipino vessels saying he tolerated it. This friendly American attitude towards the Filipinos continued until about the arrival of the first expedition of American troops in mid 1898.

However, from August to the later part of 1898, the United States policy on the Philippines swayed towards annexation. The new policy revealed itself during the Treaty of Paris negotiations. The United States demanded cession of the whole Philippine archipelago. This demand had gone beyond what was originally specified in the Peace Protocol, which merely allowed the United States to hold the city, the bay and harbor. And as events later confirmed, the might of the U.S. military was called upon to effect the complete subjugation of the Filipinos notwithstanding their heroic resistance.

Among the papers annexed to the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain were 51 pages of documents comprising the section labeled Protectorates, Colonies, and Non-Sovereign States (see Treaty), which were detailed description of how the British administered their possessions.

Did the United States follow the advice to hold the Philippines as a colony because England fear the loss of her own colonies in the East whose inhabitants might follow the course of the Filipinos - throw off the colonial yoke and establish a republic?

Philippine Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon thought so when he said:

"I should not be surprised if Britain, France and Holland would be pleased to see the American flag continue to fly over these islands in perpetuity. But to those nations I will say a word in all friendship. It is this: What their subject peoples ultimately do will not be determined by anything which happens in the Philippines." (Bell, 5)

Surely, more light on this issue should be forthcoming.

How the 1898 Treaty of Paris was railroaded

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

Is it not rather unusual that the United States had to pay $20 million to Spain in order to effect the annexation of the Philippine Islands. If the spoils of war are the prerogative of the victor, as the saying goes, why pay? This article attempts to examine the motivations that led to the consummation of the Treaty of Paris in December 10, 1898.

The Treaty of Paris was preceded by a Peace Protocol that ended the Spanish-American war. The protocol was signed in August 12, 1898 at Washington DC by Secretary William R. Day of the U.S. State Department and French Ambassador Jules Cambon, who acted as plenipotentiary of Spain.

Article I of the Peace Protocol provided for the relinquishment by Spain of all rights and sovereignty over Cuba which paved the way for the establishment of an independent Cuba. Article II provided for the cession of Puerto Rico and several other islands in the West Indies and in the Ladrones by Spain to the United States, and these territories became possessions of the United States.

However, the status of the Philippines was not clearly defined in the Peace Protocol. A vague provision gave the United States the right to occupy the bay, harbor and city of Manila, as follows:

"Third. On similar grounds, the United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the city, bay and harbor of Mania, pending the conclusion of the a Treaty of Peace, which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."

The control, disposition and government of the Philippines was finally determined and contained in what is now referred to as the Treaty of Paris. Article III of the treaty provides as follows:

"Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, comprehending the islands lying within the following line: ...

"The United States will pay Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratification of the present treaty."

In the course of the negotiations between the American and Spanish commissioners it became clear that the United States wanted to take over from Spain control of the Philippines. The Spanish Commissioners rejected the American position on the basis that the Peace Protocol of Washington merely provided for temporary possession and occupancy of the city, bay and harbor of Manila and did not admit the possibility that the United States would in any way claim any sovereignty over the Philippine Island.

The parties were deadlocked and unable to agree. Spain proposed to take the issue to arbitration. The prospect of subjecting the treaty to unnecessary delay was not acceptable to the American Peace Commissioners. Therefore, to this Spanish proposition, the American side made a counter offer to pay $20 million to Spain, which the Spanish Commissioners viewed as a “take it, or leave it” offer, accompanied by a threat to renew the hostilities, as can be gleaned from the following reply issued by the Spanish Commission:

“…The Spanish Commissioners are now asked to accept the American proposition in its entirety and without further discussion, or to reject it, in which later case, as the American Commission understands, the peace negotiation will end and the peace Protocol of Washington will, consequently, be broken.” (Treaty, 213)

The American gambit worked and Spain yielded, expressing its total surrender to the United States position in the following terms:

"The government of Her Majesty, moved by lofty reasons of patriotism and humanity, will not assume the responsibility of again bringing upon Spain all the horrors of war. In order to avoid them it resigns itself to the painful strait of submitting to the law of victory, however harsh it may be, and as Spain lacks material means to defend the rights she believes are hers, having recorded them, she accepts the only terms the United States offers her for the concluding of the Treaty of Peace." (Treaty, 213)

Thus, the Treaty of Paris was signed and the United States took possession of the Philippines Islands under questionable circumstances. What follows is a question and answer on this very unusual treaty:

Q-1 - The American commissioners heard several testimonies from the American generals assigned in the Philippines, from experts on natural resources and from the famous English author, John Foreman, but not from a Filipino, viz:"

The testimony of no Filipino, nor representative of that people, appears to have been taken by American commissioners at Paris, who had summoned before them witnesses from all over the globe to testify about the islands and the people there. The treaty was signed, and then came the demand upon the Filipinos for immediate and absolute allegiance to the United States." (Thomas, 61)

Felipe Agoncillo, the Filipino official handpicked by President Emilio Aguinaldo to represent the Filipinos in the conference, was refused recognition and barred from presenting the case for the Filipinos. In contrast, the credentials of the representative of the Catholic Hierarchy, Bishop Placido Chapelle, were recognized and he was given the opportunity to work out a special provision in the treaty, i.e., Article VIII, which provided for the protection of the property and rights of the Catholic Church in the Philippines. Why were the Filipinos ignored and barred from the conference?

A-1 - It seems the answer is very obvious.

Q-2 - The United States annexed Puerto Rico and the Philippines, but granted Cuba its independence. Why the difference in treatment?

A-2 - It must be borne in mind that the United States prided itself as the land of the free, the bastion of democracy, and enshrined the proposition that all men are created equal. Accordingly, in dealing with the issue of acquisition of foreign territories, the administration of U.S. president William McKinley had to reckon with the constitutional restraint and libertarian tradition of the American people, lest the United States is branded a neo-colonialist or accused of being unfaithful to its democratic heritage. Be that as it may, it is now possible to speculate why the Peace Protocol was framed in such a way that Spain ceded Puerto Rico and freed Cuba, but was indecisive as far as the Philippine Islands was concerned.

The Cuban people were in a state of rebellion against Spain and, therefore, had clearly expressed their desire to be free and independent. To hold Cuba as a colony against the wishes of the Cuban people would be viewed as an act of imperialism. Hence, Article I of the Peace Protocol provided for relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba which led to its independence from foreign rule.

In the case of Puerto Rico, the people were not in the state of rebellion against Spain and did not express their desire to be free and independent. Leaving the territory in the hands of Spain or without a functional government would be irresponsible. Hence, the annexation of Puerto Rico as provided in Article II of the Peace Protocol was justifiable because temporarily holding the territory until the Puerto Ricans finally decide what they want for themselves would be viewed as humanitarian.

A different case presents itself for the Philippine Islands. The Filipinos have already thrown off the Spanish yoke and established a government of their own with full knowledge of the representatives of the U.S. government and, presumably, McKinley and Washington officials. Not only did the Filipinos express their desire to be free and independent, but they were, in fact, already administering the country and the remnants of Spanish authority were hopelessly holed up in an area called Intramuros in the besieged capital of Manila.

If the United States were true to her libertarian and democratic traditions the direction for the Philippines was no other than an independent republic. However, at this time, the idea of a colony was already being considered by the American commissioners. Attached to the treaty documents forwarded by President McKinley to the U.S. Congress were item no. 14, "Protectorates, colonies and non-sovereign states", and item no. 15,"The Federated Malay States: A sketch of growth and political organization by Francis B. Forbes. Apparently, an independent Filipino republic would be anathema to the English and inconsistent with the interest of big American business interests who saw a golden opportunity for commercial expansion in the east, which was already being entertained at the time.

A way out of the predicament was to write Article III of the Peace Protocol that would hold the status of Philippines in abeyance until it was successfully resolved at the Treaty of Paris in favor of annexation. In the meantime, the administration of President William McKinley would have already perfected the clever ploy – convince the American people that the Filipinos were savages and unfit for self government and the United States was coming to educate and prepare them, which meant securing a license to keep the Philippines as a colony.

Balangiga - victory in guerrilla warfare

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

In September 29, 1901, an American garrison in the town of Balangiga, Samar was attacked by a force of Filipino guerrillas assisted by villagers and led by Eugenio S. Daza, who was operating under the command of Filipino General Vicente Lukban. Of the 74 American soldiers from Company C of the 9th U.S. Infantry, 50 were killed or died later of wounds while 24 were able to escape, of which 20 were wounded.

The attack was precipitated by the use of forced labor in cleaning the town that the officer in command of the American troops imposed on the villagers. Able-bodied men were canvassed from their homes and made to work for days, under guard in the heat of the sun and were not allowed to go home. They were given little food and water and slept in two tents which were very cramp and damp. Then, at the suggestion of the presidente (town headman), some eighty men were enlisted from a nearby village who indicated they wanted to work without pay provided the time they spend would be applied to their tax obligations. The American officer consented, not realizing that he was being set up for an entrapment because the men were from the guerrilla organization of Lukban.

While the Americans were having breakfast in the morning of September 29th, they were surprised by the guerrillas and a horde of bolo-wielding villagers. It was carnage - blood, entrails, brains and dead bodies were strewn all over the encampment.

The aftermath was a grim retaliation by the Americans. Apart from burning the town of Balangiga and killing every Filipino in sight, General Jacob H. Smith undertook to revenge the death of the American soldiers upon the whole population of Samar which, according to the American Encyclopedia, had in 1881, a population of over 250,000 persons and an area of 5,000 square miles. Smith ordered the scorching of Samar and turning it into a howling “wilderness where not even a bird could live.”

To quote from Mr. Root's (Secretary Root of the U.S. War Department) letter to the President of July 12, General Smith gave the following oral instructions:

"I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn: the more you kill and burn, the better you will please me," and, further, that he wanted all persons killed who were capable of bearing arms and in actual hostilities against the United States, and did, in reply to a question by Major Waller asking for an age limit, designate the limit as ten years of age.”

Here is a first hand account of the Balangiga incident:

“The 9th U. S. Infantry had but recently returned from the China expedition. It had performed signal service there; had taken part in the capture of Tientsin, and had been among the first to rush the walls of the Imperial City at Peking. With the cessation of the Boxer activities in China, it had returned to the Philippines and had been scattered in small garrisons throughout the Islands. On August 11, 1901, Company C had been sent to Samar and had occupied without opposition, the small coastal village of Balangiga. The officials of the town professed friendship for the Americans. The company, whose strength consisted of seventy-four men, was housed in the public buildings. The company commander, Captain Thomas W. O'Connell, was a West Point graduate in the class of 1894. Lieutenant E. C. Bumpus, second in command, had served throughout the Insurrection in Luzon and had accompanied the regiment to China. Major Richard S. Griswold, attached to the company as surgeon, had seen service throughout the Insurrection. The company itself consisted mainly of veterans; a few had gone through the campaign in Cuba-many through the Insurrection in Luzon, and all through the Boxer campaign. One man had been a member of the crew of the Olympia during the battle of Manila Bay.

“It was known that the die-hard leader, Vicente Lucban, was active throughout the Island of Samar, but since he had confined his activities to the regimentation of the hapless natives in the interior of the Island, or the attack of small patrols of American troops, no particular trouble was expected from him.

“Established comfortably in Balangiga, Captain O'Connell set out to clean up the town. He directed the local Presidente to assemble the citizens and put them to work sweeping up the years old accumulation of rubbish and trash scattered throughout the streets and clearing the underbrush which had been permitted to grow unrestricted under houses and in the streets. In response to a complaint from the Presidente that he was unable to get the people to volunteer for work, the company canvassed the town and forced some one hundred able-bodied men to work under guard. A short time later, the town Presidente and the chief of police suggested that since several natives in the hills close to the town were supposed to work out their taxes, that it would be a good idea to assemble them in Balangiga to assist in the work. O'Connell assented and a couple of days later, eighty natives were brought in and lodged in conical tents in the vicinity of the soldier's barracks. As was later determined, these men were picked bolomen from the guerrilla force of General Lucban.

“In the evening of September 27, 1901, Lieutenant Bumpus with a detail of men, returned from the town of Basey, some twenty miles away, with the company mail. Basey was just across the narrow Sanjuanica (San Juanico) Straits from the larger town of Tacloban on the Island of Leyte. With Tacloban it contained a fairly large garrison. Company C of the 9th Infantry had received no mail for four months and the men were overjoyed at the large sack which Lieutenant Bumpus brought back with him. Also, they learned for the first time of the assassination of President McKinley, some three weeks previous.

“By 6:30 the following morning, the company was up and about, the men anxious to read their mail. The native workmen were lining up near the barracks under the supervision of the civilian chief of police. On guard were three sentries. The remainder of the company was at breakfast at an outdoor kitchen about thirty yards from the barracks. The only time that the soldiers were permitted to move out of their barracks without a loaded rifle was while actually messing.

“While everything was apparently quiet and according to routine, the native chief of police walked up to one of the sentries and without warning snatched the rifle from his hands and felled him with the butt. Immediately the bells in the town church rang, conch (sic) shells blew from the hills, and the entire male populace of Balangiga, assisted by the bolomen from Lucban's force, rushed Company C.

“The few survivors of this massacre were able to give vivid details of what actually happened. The three sentries armed with rifles were dispatched in the twinkling of an eye. A native group hidden in the town church rushed the officers' quarters, which were in the convent across the street from the barracks. Captain O'Connell, caught in his pajamas, jumped from the second story window of his room, started to cross to the barracks, was beset by twenty to thirty bolomen, and hacked to death. Lieutenant Bumpus was surprised sitting in a chair in his room, his mail in his lap; a bolo cut on the bridge of the nose severed the entire front part of his head. He was found in this position by the survivors. The surgeon, Major Griswold, was overwhelmed and stabbed to death without having a Chinaman's chance.

“Across the street the majority of the company were seated at the mess tables and most of them were killed before they could get on their feet. The First Sergeant was caught in the act of washing his mess kit and had his head split in two by a blow from an axe. One Sergeant's head was completely severed from his body and fell in his plate. In his hands were grasped a knife and a fork. The company cook, one of the few survivors, had fortunately a few weapons at his disposal. He threw a pot of boiling coffee at the first group of natives who rushed him and then held them off by hurling all the canned goods he could reach. When these were exhausted, he grabbed a meat cleaver and fought his way to the barracks where the rifles were located.

“The few men who had gained their feet and survived the first onslaught grabbed any weapon they could lay their hands on and tried to reach the barracks-picks, shovels, baseball bats, clubs, a bolo wrenched from a native's hand. Three men mounted a rock pile and defended themselves with rocks. Sergeant George F. Markley, a man of herculean proportions, though he was wounded, managed to reach the barracks by swinging his arms like a flail and kicking natives in the stomach. He obtained a rifle and began pumping Krag-Jorgenson bullets into the natives surrounding him. One soldier reached the barracks, but was grabbed by three natives who threw him down under a shower of bolo cuts. His arm reaching out in a last effort, touched a pistol thrown on the floor in the melee, and he was able to save his life by shooting his assailants.

“Hopelessly outnumbered, the Americans were butchered like hogs. American brains and entrails strewed the plaza and barracks. A few who sought flight in the water nearby were hunted down in boats and boloed to death.

“Fifteen minutes after the attack started, all but five of the seventy-four men of the company had either been killed or wounded. Of those wounded, twelve were able to be on their feet, and under the protection of Sergeant Markley's fire had managed to unite and gain possession of rifles. This small group, despite the disparity in numbers, firing their rifles until they became too hot to hold, were finally able to drive the bolomen away from the immediate vicinity of the barracks.

“A quick check indicated that the small group could not expect to hold the town. So a decision was made to escape by boat to the nearest American garrison. Under fire from the natives who had retired to a respectful distance, the senior survivor, Sergeant Bentron, loaded the group on five barotas (small dug-out canoes) which were found in the vicinity, and started towards Basey. The dead, fifty-six rifles, and several thousand rounds of ammunition were left at Balangiga. Before leaving, at the cost of two more casualties, the survivors hauled down the American flag which flew over the city hall, and took it with them.

“The trip of the survivors to Basey was nearly as harrowing as the massacre itself. The barotas, small, narrow, canoe-like craft, whose equilibrium was maintained by outriggers, could be rowed only at a snail's pace. A short distance out, one barota containing four men, filled up with water and slowly drifted back to shore. Then two wounded men were boloed to death. The other two, by running for their lives and then hiding, finally managed to find another boat and put to sea where they were picked up the following day by a steamer.

“Another boat containing two men floated away from the rest and drifted into shore where its occupants were butchered to death. The other three boats contained enough unhurt men to row, and gradually worked their way along the coast toward Basey. At noon the water supply became exhausted and drinking salt water only increased the suffering of the wounded. Boats put out from shore containing natives armed with spears and bolos. They intended to board the barotas but were held off only by the rifle fire of the few who were able to shoot. Several attempts to land were prevented by the appearance of large numbers of natives on the shore armed with spears and a few rifles. A school of sharks, attracted by the blood dripping from the boats, followed the beleaguered fleet. With only one man able to talk, the survivors reached Basey at 3:30 the following morning. Of the twenty-six survivors, twenty-two were wounded. Two had died enroute.

“Company G of the 9th Infantry, under Captain Edwin V. Bookmiller, was stationed at Basey. Bookmiller obtained the services of the steamer 'Pittsburg,' which was at Tacloban, and with fifty-five men of his company, immediately proceeded to Balangiga, arriving there at noon the same day. The Insurgents were driven from the town without difficulty, but the sight which met Bookmiller's eyes was not pretty to see. The barracks were on fire, consuming the bodies of the American soldiers there. Other bodies had been thrown down a well. The body of a Sergeant and the company dog were found in the kitchen covered with flour. The eyes of the dog had been gouged out and replaced by stones. The body of Lieutenant Bumpus was found with his eyes gouged out and his face smeared with jam to attract ants. The bodies of American soldiers not burned in the barrack's fire were denuded of clothes and mutilated in one way or another. Captain Bookmiller buried the bodies of the three officers and twenty-nine enlisted men in the plaza, burned the town and returned to Basey. Yet, surprised though they were, the Americans had sold 202 their lives dearly.” (Herman, 197-202)