McKinley's imperialist policy

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

America was a latecomer in the age of imperialism when powerful nations of Europe looked down on tropical nations as objects of colonization. During this period, peoples of tropical regions were classified as lower races to be controlled by the supposedly higher races, or those people inhabiting the temperate regions. America entered this age with its more influential Wall Street decision makers sharing this imperialist idea and dictating on the course of American foreign policy.

Policy of acquisition

As America looked beyond its shores in late 19th century, it saw the Philippines as a prized possession for its unexploited natural resources, for its harbors well suited for coaling stations and repair of ships, and for its strategic location for control of the commerce in the east. U.S. republican President William McKinley effected the conquest of the Philippines under the guise of a humanitarian mission to uplift, educate and prepare the unwilling Filipinos for self-government.

Acquiring the Philippines as a possession, not as new member of the American Union, was the underlying policy of the McKinley administration. Previous acquisition of territories by the United States such as Louisiana and Texas were made through adhesions to the American Union, making the inhabitants American citizens. In the case of the Philippine Islands, the McKinley administration applied the traditional European imperialist model. There was no intention of making the Philippine islands part of the United States, nor granting citizenship to the Filipinos. Rather, the purpose of the acquisition was to hold the Philippine islands as a colony, which meant keeping its inhabitants in bondage.

However, this acquisition policy was in direct contravention of the constitution of the United States and the Declaration of Independence, which upholds the right of all men to freedom, democracy and liberty. McKinley managed to wiggle out of this constitutional restraints by assuming a profile of a disinterested party, claiming that the involvement of the United States in the Philippines was humanitarian - uplifting, educating, and preparing a savage race for self-government, and not for profit.

McKinley's defining policy

President McKinley publicly announced his acquisition policy in a melodramatic tone in an interview at the White House on November 21, 1899, when he said:

"When next I realized that the Philippines had dropped into our laps I confess I did not know what to do with them. I sought counsel from all sides Democrats as well as Republicans - but got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way - I don't know how it was, but it came:

"(1) That we could not give them back to Spain - that we would be cowardly and dishonorable;

"(2) That we could not turn them over to France or Germany - our commercial rivals in the Orient - that would be bad business and discreditable.

"(3) That we could not leave them to themselves - they were unfit for self-government - and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and

"(4) That there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace, do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men from whom Christ also died.

"And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly, and the next morning I sent for the chief engineer of the War Department (our map-maker), and told him to put the Philippines on the map of the United States (pointing to a large map on the wall of this office); and there they are, and there they will stay while I am President." (Olcott, 110-111)

It is not true that President McKinley did not know what to with the Philippines when it "dropped" on America's lap as a result of the Spanish war. There are evidences to prove that the McKinley administration was keenly interested on the Philippine Islands as far back as October, 1897, which is months before the USS Maine blew up at Havana harbor which the Americans blamed on the Spaniards, and the reason for the Spanish-American war. [Research conducted by the History Channel of the United States revealed that the protrusion of the damaged metal of the ship was outward, indicating that the explosion originated from the inside. It was theorized that the stock of coal must have self-ignited. - author]

Perhaps, the reason why President McKinley mentioned his invocation of Divine Providence was because his audience at the time were ministers of Protestant Churches. But it cannot be denied that he wanted the message to sink into the minds of the American people - the humanitarian mission of the United States. And there was no question that his statements were the official pronouncement of his policy regarding the Philippines.

That being the case, the alternatives McKinley presented are being tested in the light of the facts obtaining at the time, as follows:

First alternative: "That we could not give them back to Spain - that we would be cowardly and dishonorable."

Aguinaldo had already crushed the Spanish army and held 9,000 prisoners of war. Spain had weakened; no reinforcements were coming. Practically all towns and cities outside Manila were in the hands of the Philippine government. The remnants of the Spanish army that sought refuge inside the city numbering less than 2,000 would not be able to put up a credible fight against the 30,000 strong Filipino army. That the Filipino forces had not moved in to take the city was a monument to the naiveté of Aguinaldo for overly trusting the Americans and a credit to Admiral Dewey who convinced Aguinaldo to wait until the main bulk of American land forces had arrived. McKinley knew this first alternative was not acceptable not because it was cowardly or dishonorable, but rather, Spain was no longer in a position to hold the Philippines given Aguinaldo's growing strength.

Second alternative:" That we could not turn them over to France or Germany - our commercial rivals in the Orient - that would be bad business and discreditable."

The concern that other powers were interested in the Philippine Islands was not an overstatement. According to Dewey among the early arrivals of foreign men-of-war, besides the British ships Linnet (May 2) and Immortalite (May 7), were the French cruiser Brieux (May 5), the Japanese cruiser Itsukushima (May 10), and the German cruisers Irene (May 6) and Cormoran (May 9). Assuming the United States turned over the Philippines to one of the powers, that power would meet a more difficult and arduous campaign than the kind of war that the American army faced. When the war with the Filipinos broke out, the Americans were already mobilized on land and strategically positioned. But if peaceable disembarkation and mobilization was not provided the American army such as they had under friendly terms with Aguinaldo, if they had to mobilize troops and war materiel from the sea under conditions of belligerency, the story of the American intervention in the Philippines would have taken a different course. The same difficulty would certainly have applied to the succeeding power.

Third alternative: "That we could not leave them to themselves - they were unfit for self-government - and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was."

This statement contradicted all impartial testimonies thus far expressed, most especially by the very representatives of the United States government.

The first to express admiration for the Filipinos was Admiral Dewey himself when he said:

"In my opinion, these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races. "(Dewey, 312)

General Charles King, who fought the Filipinos, made the following comment:

"The capability of the Filipinos for self government cannot be doubted; such men as Arellano, Aguinaldo, and many others whom I might name, are highly educated; nine tenths of the people read and write; all are skilled artisans in one way or another; they are industrious, frugal, temperate, and, given a fair start, could look out for themselves infinitely better than our people imagine. In my opinion they rank far higher than the Cubans or the uneducated negroes to whom we have given the right of suffrage." (Leonidas, 129-130).

Two navy men from Admiral Dewey's squadron, Sargent and Wilcox, toured northern Luzon and their report spoke favorably of the Aguinaldo government, as evident from these statements:

"As a tribute to the efficiency of Aguinaldo's government and to the law-abiding character of his subjects, I offer the fact that Mr. Wilcox and I pursued our journey throughout in perfect security, and returned to Manila with only the most pleasant recollections of the quiet and orderly life which we found the natives to be leading under the new regime." (Government, 6).

John Barrett, formerly United States minister to Siam (Thailand), and well known as an able public speaker, was all praises for the Aguinaldo government when he said:

"The government which was organized by Aguinaldo at Cavite and continued first at Bakoor and later at Malolos developed into a much more elaborate affair than its most ardent supporters had originally expected. By the middle of October, 1898, he had assembled at Malolos a congress of one hundred men who would compare in behavior, manner, dress, and education with the average men of the better classes of other Asiatic nations, possibly including the Japanese. These men, whose sessions I repeatedly attended, conducted themselves with great decorum and showed a knowledge of debate and parliamentary law that would not compare unfavorably with the Japanese parliament. The executive portion of the government was made up of a ministry of bright men who seemed to understand their respective positions. Each general division was subdivided with reference to practical work. There was a large force of under secretaries and clerks, who appeared to be kept very busy with routine labor." (Government, 22)

There is also a testimony from Gen. Wesley Merritt, Commander of American forces in the Philippines, who was replaced by General Otis. He said:

"For myself and officers and men under my command I can say that we have conceived a high respect for the ability and qualities of the Filipinos, and if called upon by the Government to express an opinion, it will be to that effect."(Government, 39).

Here is a very revealing discovery by an American officer of the machinery of the Philippine government after Santa Ana, a town near Manila was overran on the second day of the war by advancing American troops:

"When we reached the headquarters at Santa Ana another surprise awaited us, for here was found some of the machinery of Aguinaldo's government. Among the papers scattered about in confusion by the retreating officials were telegrams, letters, and commissions, showing something of their system. One letter was from a township governor asking relief from his duties; a surgeon's certificate was inclosed. It had been forwarded through official channels to Aguinaldo's secretary of state and returned with abundant indorsements approved. With it was an order to the governor of the province to have a new election. Another letter was a complaint made against another local governor for mal-administration. It stated the charges in real legal form, and was duly signed. The numerous papers concerning school teachers' appointments showed that the Filipinos had already perfected arrangements for the education of the youth on a large scale. I might also mention the deeds of property, records of births, deaths, etc., to show that Aguinaldo's organization is at least not a laughable farce. I might mention also meteorological and other scientific instruments and records to show that the Filipinos didn't neglect science during those busy, warlike times. Letters dated February 4 from Malolos showed that they had a good courier system. A book on tactics, engravings of the several uniforms, beautiful topographical maps, copies of the declaration of independence and the revolutionary constitution, military and state seals, and other articles all went to show that labor and intelligence were united in their production. " (Atkinson, 44-45)

And finally, in answer to McKinley's assertion that anarchy and disorder will prevail if the Filipinos were left to themselves, here is a report of a U.S. newspaper correspondent on the take over by Filipino forces of Iloilo City on December 24, 1898 which the Spaniards abandoned after a siege of the city . He said:

"...they entered the city in the most perfect order, scattered their forces in various public buildings, policed the streets and maintained the peace and quiet of the town in a manner that would have done credit to a most highly civilized nation. There was no looting, no insult to men or women, no robbery, no drunkenness or disorder..." - (Calvin, 3)

Did all these affirmations of Filipino competence and capability for self-government fell on deaf ears at Washington, or was it reasonable to conclude that the administration of President McKinley was predisposed to acquiring the Philippines as a colony, regardless of the state and condition of the people? Obviously, the answer would be yes.

Fourth alternative: "That there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace, do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men from whom Christ also died. "

This fourth alternative masqueraded the colonization plan as a humanitarian mission - America was rich and therefore needed no colonies; the Filipinos were savages and America was coming to educate, uplift and civilize them. However, succession of events confirmed that the acquisition of the Philippines was not an afterthought, but consisted of well-studied actions of the McKinley administration that started earlier than it was possible for America to get involved in Philippine affairs. Enumerated below are incidence of such well-studied actions dating as far back as the last quarter of 1897:

(1) On October 21, 1897, or four months before the U.S.S. Maine incident, orders were issued to Commodore George Dewey as follows: "... to sail for Nagasaki, Japan, and there take command of the Asiatic squadron. Before he sailed, the policy of the administration was outlined to him and he was given instructions regarding the course to pursue in the contingency of a war with Spain. He began at once to collect information regarding the Spanish forces in the Philippines."(Olcott, 39)

(2) On the 24th day of April, 1898, even before the U.S. Congress had formally declared war on Spain, another order was given as follows: "War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy them. Use utmost endeavors." (Brooks, 9).

(3) During the framing of the August 12, 1898 Peace Protocol which gave the United States the right to occupy the bay, harbor and city of Manila (not the whole Philippine islands), the United States wanted to use the word possession in completing the third article referring to the Philippine question, revealing the intention of taking over the Philippines. But Spain insisted that the word disposition be used instead because Spain did not intend to relinquish control of the Philippine islands to the United States (Brooks, 4-5)

(4) At the Paris peace conference in the last quarter of 1898, the United States peace commissioners demanded from Spain the cession of the whole archipelago with a payment of $20 million. Spain initially refused and cited the provisions of the Peace Protocol that limited the right of the United States to the bay, harbor and city. In the end, the American demand succeeded in view of what Spain considered a threat of an imminent resumption of hostilities if she refused. (Brooks, 6).

(5) As soon as the Peace Treaty was signed and without waiting for the ratification of the treaty by the United States Senate, McKinley sent instructions to General Otis to extend the military government maintained in the city of Manila to the whole of the ceded territory. McKinley could not have been unaware that the Philippine Republic was already administering all the towns and provinces outside of the city of Manila. Perhaps, he underestimated the determination of the Filipinos. He probably thought Aguinaldo would meekly submit, roll over and hand to General Otis the whole country on a silver platter.

(6) The first attempt at a peaceful American take over of the country was made in December, 1898 when General Otis, under orders from Washington, sent an expedition of 2,500 men under the command of Gen. Marcus Miller with orders to occupy the city of Iloilo. The Filipino government in Iloilo resisted and refused to allow the disembarkation of American troops. The impasse was referred by General Otis to Washington and the order was to hold the use of force and await further instructions. If Gen. Miller took the city after a fight, this action would be viewed as an aggression, something that McKinley did not want to project to the American people.

(7) A second attempt at the same objective was made by General Otis himself when he presented to Aguinaldo early the following year a modified version of the same McKinley's proclamation omitting the strong words sovereignty. The Otis version of the proclamation required all the inhabitants to recognize American military authority in consequence of the Treaty of Paris and those who did would have their life and property protected and those who did not would face terrible consequences. The Filipinos rejected the proclamation and tore down the posters. Similarly, the American forces did not react but held in check their guns and artillery. Again, McKinley did not want to appear to the American people as the aggressor.

(8) On February 4, 1899, an opportunity for McKinley to unleash the dogs of war came when hostilities between American and Filipino forces were opened which the Americans blamed on the Filipinos. Aguinaldo pleaded to stop the hostilities and sit down to thresh out the conflict, but the Americans refused, confirming the claim that the war was actually forced on the Filipinos on the eve of the U.S. Senate vote in order to force the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. McKinley needed the ratification of the treaty to provide him with the stamp of approval to proceed with the colonization of the Philippines.

(9) Finally, in his book, The American Conquest of the Philippines, Moorefield Storey cites President McKinley's conversation with Admiral Dewey in the White House on October 3, 1899:

"... there appears a facsimile of a memorandum written in Mr. McKinley's own handwriting and recording a conversation which he had with Admiral Dewey. The piece of paper used by the President was of the White House stationery, and it bore the date of October 3, 1899. "What is our duty? was one of the President's questions. And as Admiral Dewey answered, McKinley wrote his memorandum, as follows: "Keep the Island permanently. Valuable in every way." followed questions regarding the number of troops and ships needed for this permanent occupation. And as if to assure himself of his position, the President finally asked: "Should we give up the Islands?" And then follows this grim reply: 'Never, never. " (Storey, 123-124)

Aguinaldo reechoed McKinley's reason for keeping the Philippines when he said:

"Oh, dear Philippines! Blame your wealth, your beauty for the stupendous disgrace that rests upon your faithful sons. You have aroused the ambition of the Imperialists and Expansionists of North America and both have placed their sharp claws upon your entrails! " (Aguinaldo, 56).

McKinley succeeded in his grand design of acquiring the Philippines as an American colony and the American people rewarded him with a reelection. However, an assassin shot McKinley at the Pan American Exhibition at Buffalo on September 6, 1901 and he died eight days later. The vice president, Theodore Roosevelt, succeeded and espoused a Philippine policy identical to McKinley's, as can be gleaned from Roosevelt's biased impression about the Filipinos:

"Many of their people are utterly unfit for self-government and show no signs of becoming fit. Others may in time become fit, but at present can only take part in self-government under a wise supervision at once firm and beneficent. We have driven Spanish tyranny from the islands. If we now let it be replaced by savage anarchy, our work has been for harm and not for good." (Banks, 331)

Either Roosevelt was completely in the dark as to the true state of affairs in the Philippines or he was covering up for McKinley. Up to the very end, U.S. administration officials refused to acknowledge the capability of the Filipinos for self-government. The picture that McKinley created of the Filipinos at the beginning - savages who lived among scattered tribes throughout the islands - was passed on from one administration to another, possibly, as a justification to the American people of the need to keep the Philippines longer than necessary. Why it took the United States more than 50 years before giving in to the independence demands of the Filipinos can be explained by the imperialist's policy enunciated by President McKinley. The fact that no apology was ever offered to the Filipinos indicated that this McKinley policy was condoned by the United States government and recognized as appropriate up to the present time.