Aguinaldo - a tarnished hero

Josephine Bracken: the rebel

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Very little is written in Philippine history books about Josephine Bracken, the alleged widow of Dr. Jose Rizal, the national hero of the Filipinos. The few pages devoted to her usually pictures a very silent and reserved lady, a lady that briefly came and suddenly went, a lady lost into oblivion after the execution of Rizal. Not many know that Josephine joined the revolutionaries of Cavite where she cared for the sick and wounded and eventually took to the frontlines and killed a Spanish officer.

Josephine’s rendezvous with the Filipino revolutionaries happened in the afternoon of December 30, 1896, the day Rizal was executed by firing squad at the Luneta. She and Paciano and Trining (Rizal’s brother and sister) immediately proceeded to San Francisco de Malabon, Cavite and met the Supremo of the Katipunan, Andres Bonifacio. Trining mentioned that her brother left a poem, which he hid inside a lamp and Bonifacio borrowed it so he could translate the poem from Spanish to Tagalog, which the Supremo did (Alvarez, 72). After meeting the Supremo, Josephine, Trining and Paciano stayed in Cavite and served the revolution.

The following are various accounts of the exploits of Josephine from Filipino, British and American sources – Ricarte, Younghusband, Foreman and Wildman. The account by Wildman is in first person, i.e., Josephine herself talking, while the rest are all third person accounts. Their accounts are not exactly the same, but they all agree on the common thread regarding Josephine taking to the frontlines.

George J. Younghusband:

“Her brief married life thus abruptly ended, Madame Rizal, stirred by the hot Irish blood of her forefathers, swore that she would be avenged on the Spaniards for what she could only consider the judicial murder of her husband. Acting on this determination she, together with Jose Rizal's sister, went over to the insurgent camp and actively espoused the rebel cause. The sister apparently contented herself with such non-combatant duties as nursing the sick and wounded, but Madame Rizal, with fine intrepidity, insisted on taking her place in the firing line, armed either with a revolver or a rifle. In this lady's first engagement it is narrated that she picked off, with unerring aim, the Spanish officer who was leading the troops to the attack, and during this engagement she is said to have fired forty rounds, and to have excited the admiration of those around her by her excellent shooting. For many weeks this brave woman fought in the ranks of the insurgents, and certainly by the tenets of the Mosaic law, an eye for an eye and a life for a life, she must have amply avenged the loss of her husband. Not content with combat at long ranges, Madame Rizal is reported to have even faced the stern ordeal of hand-to-hand conflict, and to have led charges with the bowie knife as a weapon of offence against dumbfounded bodies of Spaniards. Finding that lack of arms of precision in sufficient quantities prevented the insurgents from gaining a decisive success, Madame Rizal escaped to Japan and afterwards to America to procure arms, and these have since undoubtedly, prohibition or no prohibition, been steadily flowing into the country. Prevented by her friends from again returning to the Philippines, where death as a rebel, if not as a combatant, assuredly awaited her, Madame Rizal settled down in Hong Kong, where she still lives, awaiting the development of events.” - (Younghusband, 133-134)

Edwin Wildman:

“On the 3d of January I (Josephine) left Manila on foot, and after three days and three nights traveling over the hills and through the jungle reached Imus. Every one allowed me to pass when I told them who I was, and when I arrived I met Aguinaldo and told him that I came to help him in the revolution. I took a rifle and went into the field and led a charge against the Spaniards in Zapote, killing one Spanish officer with my own rifle. It was Aguinaldo's fault that the Spanish then took Imus and drove us back. He was in a house disputing with his men when the attack was made, and quibbling over little matters of money. Then we fought at San Francisco de Malabon, and I took part in the engagements, but the Spanish drove us back thirty-two miles, and I had to swim the rivers and travel by foot. Then I was taken very ill with fever on account of passing days and nights without food and suffering the hardships of the march. As we were low in ammunition, and were unable to get word to Manila, I volunteered to undertake the journey, and arranged for a supply.

"My brother-in-law, Paciano, who was in charge of the forces, objected to my taking the risk; but my will triumphed, and I left Talisay on the 8th of April. I passed from town to town on foot, and every one welcomed and greeted me with honor when I told them I was the widow of Dr. Rizal. Several Spanish officers stopped me, but I gave them a few dollars and they let me pass. When I arrived in Manila, as I was the adopted daughter of an American, I went to the American Consul and sought his interest in our cause and his protection. He told me to report my presence to the governor general, and tell him the truth of the situation. I went directly to the governor, and he asked me if I had come for pardon. I told him that I had nothing to fear, and that I lived at Calle Azcaraga, No. 3; he could find me there at any time. Every day the governor sent for me to question me, and set spies to watch my movements. Finally the governor banished me to Hong Kong and gave me $200. My money soon disappeared. The Filipinos in Hong Kong neglected me and left me to starve, so I went into the Civil Hospital as a nurse." (Wildman, 37-38)

John Foreman:

"Then Josephine started off for the rebel camp at Imus. On her way she was often asked, "Who art thou?" but her answer, "Lo! I am thy sister, the widow of Rizal!" not only opened a passage for her, but brought low every head in silent reverence.

"Amidst mourning and triumph she was conducted to the presence of the rebel commander-in-chief, Emilio Aguinaldo who received her with the respect due to the sorrowing relict of their departed hero. But the formal tributes of condolence were followed by great rejoicing in the camp. She was the only free white woman within the rebel lines. They lauded her as though an angelic being had fallen from the skies; they sang her praises as if she were modern Joan of Arc sent by heaven to lead the way to victory over the banner of Castile. But she chose, for the time being, to follow a more womanly vocation, and, having been escorted to San Francisco de Malabon, she took up residence in the convent to tend the wounded for about three weeks.

"Then, when the battle of Perez Dasmarinas was raging, our heroine sallied forth on horseback with a Mauser rifle over her shoulder, and - as she stated with pride to a friend of mine who interviewed her - she had the satisfaction of shooting dead one Spanish officer, and then retreated to her convent refuge. Again, she was present at the battle of Silan, where her heroic example of courage infused new life into her brother rebels. The carnage on both sides was fearful, but in the end the rebels fell back, and there, from a spot amidst mangled corpses, rivulets of blood, and groans of death, Josephine witnessed many a scene of Spanish barbarity - the butchery of old inoffensive men and women, children caught up by the feet and dashed against the walls, and the bayonet-charge on the host of fugitive innocents.

"The rebels having been beaten everywhere when Lachambre took the field, Josephine had to follow in their retreat, and after Imus and Silan were taken, she, with the rest, had to flee to another province, tramping through 23 villages on the way. She was about to play another role, being on the point of going to Manila to organize a convoy of arms and munitions, when she heard that certain Spaniards were plotting against her life. So she sought an interview with the Gov. General, who asked her if she had been in the rebel camp in Imus. She replied fearlessly in the affirmative, and, relying on the security from violence afforded by her sex and foreign nationality, there passed between her and the Gov. General quite an amusing and piquant colloquy.

"’What did you go to Imus for?’ inquired the General. ‘What did you go there for?’ rejoined Josephine. ‘To fight,’ said the General. ‘So did I,’ answered Josephine. ‘Will you leave Manila?’ asked the General. ‘Why should I?’ queried Josephine. ‘Well,’ said the General, ‘the priests will not leave you alone if you stay here, and they will bring false evidence against you. I have no power to overrule theirs.’

"’Then what is the use of the Gov. General?’ pursued our heroine; but the General dismissed the discussion, which was becoming embarrassing, and resumed it a few days later by calling upon her emphatically to quit the colony. At this second interview the General fumed and raged, and our heroine too stamped her little foot, and, woman-like, avowed "she did not care for him; she was not afraid of him.

"It was temerity born of inexperience, for one word of command from the General could have sent her the way many others have gone, to an unrevealed fate. Thus matters waxed hot between her defiance and his forbearance, until visions of torture - thumb-screws and bastinado - passed so vividly before her eyes that she yielded, as individual force must, to the collective power which rules supreme, and reluctantly consented to leave the fair Philippine shores in May, 1897, in the s.s. Yuensang, for a safer resting-place on the British soil of Hongkong." (Foreman, 536-538)

Artemio "Vibora" Ricarte:

“The widow of Dr. Rizal, Josephine, who hailed from Hongkong, showed solidarity with the aspirations of the people, for which her husband, full of love, strength and joy, had laid down his life. Josephine gave everything she can and served the revolution in the midst of hardships and want. At her request, she lived in the plantation house at Teheros (San Francisco de Malabon) which was converted into a hospital for the rebels, and night and day she took care of the wounded. She also took time to drum up the morale of the soldiers who were visiting their wounded comrades. When the Spaniards took San Francisco de Malabon, Josephine asked to be transferred to Naik, thence to the mountains of Maragondon; and from here to Laguna de Bay in the company of some native folk and G. Paciano Rizal, they cross mountain passes, oftentimes without any shoes, sometimes laden on a carabao hand-led by Paciano. Upon arrival at Bay she was received by a Katipunero, Venancio Cueto, who arranged for her journey to Manila. From Manila she secured a passage to Hongkong where she died in 1902.” (Translated from Tagalog in Ricarte, 37-38)

Aftermath of the Filipino-American war

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In 1904, while Macario Sakay, Felizardo, Montalan and several other "ladrones" (the label used by the Americans on remnants of Filipino revolutionary forces) were still actively roaming the Philippine countrysides, and, once in while, conducting raids on isolated American garrisons, the conditions in the Philippines were described as one of desolation wrought by war.

Photo source: University of Michigan digital library

U.S. Major General Nelson A. Miles - highly decorated civil war hero, famous Indian war conciliator, bloodless taker of Puerto Rico- visited the islands in 1903 and wrote this observation in his report to the Secretary of War:

“In going from Calamba to Batangas … I noticed that the country appeared to have been devastated, large sections lying waste, and in the thirty-eight miles ride I did not notice any of the large fields under cultivation. Small patches of ground were being cultivated, but I should not think enough to supply food for the people that I saw along the road. It was all open country, and easy of observation. The people appeared to be more depressed than in any other section of the archipelago. There were but very few men along the road. (Miles, 6)

General Miles regretted he came in too late in Philippine affairs as it was no longer possible for him to do something to prevent the conflict with the Filipinos. After his retirement, General Miles became an active member of the American Anti-Imperialist League.

Another visitor to the islands made this remark:

“I drove through Albay Province, and I found 300,000 people reconcentrated, hemp rotting in the fields, homes empty, and not a human being outside the lines - all-punished because some 300 men are in the mountains as ladrones or insurrectos. I submit that this was not justice - that it was not even a justifiable war measure. (Doherty[2],16)

A more in-depth analysis was rendered by Prof. H. Parker Willis, of Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Va., and published in the New York Evening Post of October 28, 1904, which was made an appendix to the speech of Senator H.E. Carmack of Tennessee in the Senate of the United States, December 10, 1904 (Carmack, 1). Willis' report attributed the appalling conditons to economic prostration, depressed agriculture, reconcentration, severe penal and judicial practices, exesses of the native constabulary, control of the press by intimidation, and the maintenance of the most expensive administration the islands have ever known.

Here is the report of Prof. Willis referred above:

PHILIPPINE CONDITIONS

The prominence given by Secretary Taft to the Philippine question, and his assurance that satisfactory progress toward better things is being made in the Islands may lead persons who have not closely examined this subject to believe that Insular conditions are all that they should, or at least all that they can be. A recent visit to the islands, extended through some four months and covering a wide field of observation, has not only led to a conviction on my part that this opinion is unfounded, but, further, I am satisfied that it is in all essential respects at variance with the facts. They are otherwise than as Secretary Taft represents them to be - quite otherwise.

This statement is not intended to reflect on Mr. Taft's sincerity, but is made in the belief that the principles on which the Philippine Commission is organized necessarily prohibit its members, and particularly its head, from either coming into close touch with the natives or fully realizing the nature of conditions for which they themselves are responsible.

There can he no doubt that the general public of the United States is under grave misapprehension concerning the situation in the Philippines. Erroneous statements as to what has actually been done in the archipelago have been constantly put before them from many sources. They may well be described as "given to strong delusion, wholly believing a lie." If they could realize the state of affairs in those Islands now prevailing, they would be terrified at the desolation wrought by war and disgusted at the failure of our "civil government" to lay even the foundation for improvement.

Photo source: University of Michigan digital library

ECONOMIC PROSTRATION

The Philippine Islands are to-day absolutely prostrated economically and politically. Hardly any undertaking is being successfully conducted. According to unpublished figures furnished by the internal revenue office of Manila, about 5,000 licences to do business have been issued to American individuals and firms during the period of our occupation. Of these firms and individuals all except some 800 have failed or withdrawn from business, or about 84 per cent of the total. The survivors include chiefly the very smallest establishments, such as boarding houses, saloons, etc. It appears that hardly more than half a dozen American firms of recognized capital are at this time actually doing business in Manila. The population of the city, formerly same 266,000 persons, has fallen (census 1904) to 219,900, owing largely to depressed business. Simultaneously with this decline a heavy decrease in the American population has occured (from 6,462 in 1901 to 4,389 in 1904). During this past summer at least three of the chief American business enterprises either failed or withdrew from the field. A steady and positive decline in all branches of trade with the United States is now in progress, as partially illustrated by the fact that for the seven months ending July, 1904, the shipments of domestic merchandise from the United States to the Philippines were $2,530,899, as against $2,593,924 for the correspdoning months a year earlier, while the shipments merchandises from the Philippines to the United States were $5,978,148 for these same seven months, as against $7,337,532 a year earlier. Relations between the United States and the Philippines under the tariff act passed by Congress in 1902 are so diftiult that there is no reason to anticipate the building up of any satisfactory trade between the islands and the United States either now or in the future. Recent shipping legislation has depressed the interisland trade still further, both actively and by anticipation. To-day a large fleet of Philippine steam vessels is anchored off Cavite with absolutely no occupation. The fleet is daily growing in size.

While the conditions in trade with our own country are thus discouraging, there is not warrant for the belief that the general outlook is more favorable. Much have been said by American administrators of a recent growth in exports and imports as indicating increased prosperity, but there is certainly no such inference to be drawn from the figures. Bewteen 1899 and 1903 gross improts of merchandise increased about two and one-half times, but imports of food and animals quadrupled, the growth in this item being due to rice purchases for the support of the starving peasants and draft animals designed to replace those destroyed by war and rinderpest. Manufactured goods imported fell off largely between 1901 adn 1903, showing a decline in productive business and articles of luxury, etc., more than doubled between 1899 and 1903, showing nothing more than a demand for such goods made by government employees of the islands. The growth in exports (chiefly hemp) is due simply to a partial restoration of peace and consequent resumption of regular dealings.

The trade conditions observable at Manila and other ports are merely a reflection ofr what may be witnessed in the interior. A journey through the provinces can not help giving a most discouraging impression. Many towns, formerly well built, and destroyed during the war by some of the various armies, have been only partially, and even then hardly, rebuilt. Churches are in ruins; whole villages here and there lie waste. In many part of Luzon the roads and trails, nearly impassable, are daily falling into worse condition. Barring one initial appropriation of about $1,000,000 and some recent appropriations from the Congressional relief fund, nothing has been done by the central government in road making except to sink some $800,000 in attempting what seems to be an impossible road to the summer resort at Benguet. The bridges blown up or otherwise destroyed have in few instances been replaced. It is the common opinion that land travel is more difficult and slower than ever before.

CONDITION OF AGRICULTURE

The increasingly depressed state of agriculture in these rice growing islands can be realized by a review of the importations of rice during the past four years. These have been as follows (Report 1904, p. 48)
1901 ...........................................................$3,113,423
1901 ............................................................5,400,958
1902 ............................................................6,578,481
1903 ...........................................................10,061,323

This growth in the imports of rice is attributed by Philippine farmers not to changes in agriculture, initiated by Governor Taft, but to three causes: (1) The almost total loss of their farm animals (estimated officially at 90 per cent due to war and rinderpest; (2) injury done to irrigation systems during the war; (3) the scarcity of adult male labor as a result of the war. The "disproportionate number of women and children" consequent upon the war is still noticeable. Most of these farmers are now drawing on their savings or are borrowing at rate averaging at least 20 per cent in order to get subsistence and pay their taxes. The imposition of heavy land taxes in the provinces by the Commission has led to a general expropriation in some quarters. In others the suffering has been so intense that the Commission has had to suspend the tax in default of putting up for sale the bulk of the landed property of the province. In somes provinces hundreds of pieces of property, many of them not exceeding 2 acres each, have been scheduled for sale. No machinery for providing loanable capital has been introduced by the Commission, and the requirement that land shall be registered at a heavy fee in order to prove titles is working great immediate hardship.

The depression in rice culture is paralleled for a different reason in the growth of sugar. Sugar could be raised with much less reliance on animal labor than could rice; but the American tariff situation absolutely forbids the possibility of making a profit on it. Planters state that under present tariff duties they can barely cover the cost of production. Tobacco is in a suffering condition, owing to new tariff duties in several eastern countries. Hemp is the only article in which prosperous conditions of production now exist; but its cultivation must always be narrowly limited to certain soils and localities. Parallel with the bad trade and agricultural outlook has come a great increase in cost of living, which is now fully double its former amount in come places. So hard has it been to get even a bare subsistence that the population has become greatly reduced in vitality and has fallen an easy prey to the series of terrible epidemics of the past three years. The Philippine tariff on imported commodities is so arranged as practically forbid imports of agricultural machinery, and the Commission professes to be unable to change it without Congressional consent.

SUFFERING AND DISSATISFACTION

Partly owing to the bad industrial prospect, to actual suffering, and to intense and permanent dissatisfaction with existing political arrangements the unrest of the country continue to increase. When President McKinley sent the Philippine Commission to the islands he furnished a certain clear-cut instructions as to the line of conduct it should pursue.

"The Commission," he wrote (April 7, 1900), "should bear in mind *** that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom; *** that there are also certain practical rules of government which we have found to be essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and that these principles and these rules of government must be established and maintained in the islands. *** Upon every division and branch of the government of the Philippines, therefore, must be imposed these inviolable rules;

"That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecution the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistnace of counsel for his defence; that excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; *** that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or of the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and petition free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."

Have these instructions been fufilled? Although the islands have now for about three years been under the full control of what is technically known as a "civil government" there are certain facts which indicate that the term "civil" is a misnomer. It is further true that this term is becoming progressively less and less applicable to the administration of the Philippines. Notwithstanding that in the beginning many of the provinces were organized as civil governments, it has been thought necessary now and again to substitute a politico-military government, and to-day at least six of the provinces are still organized on that basis. Extreme military methods for controlling the population are provided for by law and their application in certain cases authorized. Of these the most marked is what is known as " reconcentration."

Photo source: University of Michigan digital library

RECONCENTRATION

The use of this plan for reducing a population to submission is authorized by section 6 of the Commission's act No. 781, further organizing the constabulary, in the following words:

"In provinces which are infested to such an extent with ladrones or outlaws that the lives and property of residents in the outlying barrios are rendered wholly insecure by continued predatory raids, and such outlying barrios thus furnish to the ladrones or outlaws their source of food supply * * * it shall be within the power of the civil governor, upon resolution of the Commission, to authorize the provincial governor to order that the residents of such outlying barrios be temporarily brought within stated proximity to the poblacion or larger barrios."

It is a fact that no recent year has passed without the application of this policy on a large scale. In 1902 it was undertaken in the region about Lake Taal, comprising parts of Laguna and Batangas provinces. It then affected not less that 100,000 people, according to the report of Colonel Wagner, who inspected the camps (S. Doc. 331, 37th Cong. 1st Sess. pt. 3 p. 2873), each of which included from 8,000 to 14,000 persons. During 1903 the same plan was pursued in Albay, where very large areas were entirely deprived of population, the inhabitants being herded in camps like those of Batangas. During the current year reconcentration has been ordered for Samar (executive order of August 15) throughout a region including about 20,000 inhabitants.

Besides the official application of the policy on a large scale, other instances have occurred. Several camps now exist in Cavite, and, not long since, reconcentration was tried in Tayabas, without official authority, according to Ex-Governor Taft. It is beyond the question, from the testimony of both natives and Americans who are conversant with the workings of reconcentration, that its effects are most disatrous, causing widespread suffering. In the camps food is distributed only when extreme want requires it, work on the roads being sparingly furnished to those who are able thus to supply themselves with rations. The lack of house accomodations and the scarcity of food, as well as the overcrowding of the inmates of the camp, have invariably caused marked increase in mortality. At the same time there has been a tremendous loss of crops and houses throughout the districts in which reconcentration has taken place. The hemp losses chargeable to reconcentration in Albay are estimated by Mr. Taft at from 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 pesos, or $5,000,000 to $6,000,000 United States (Report, 1901, p. 32), an enormous loss when the limited character of native resources is considered.

Even this estimate is certainly too low, and would have to be largely increased if other commodities besides hemp should be considered. A vastly larger loss was unquestionably inflicted upon the province of Batangas, which has the appearance of being wholly ruined, owing to the destruction of coconut and other trees. The authorities speak of the treatment accorded to this province as a "severe lesson," and there is in the Philippines none of the familiar pretense that reconcentration operations can be carried on without hardship of the most terrible character.

Total losses of crops left without tendance in the reconcentrated districts, of houses burned by the careless or malicious soldiery, and general ruin to fixed capital, necessarily result in most serious suffering when the inmates of the camps are released and find themselves deprived even of the scanty support furnised them while in confinement. The natives had become so accustomed to the use of reconcentration by the Spaniards that they regarded it as a matter of course in time of war. They resent very bitterly, however, the pretense that civil government exist when such methods are employed; and this is the first complaint usually made by intelligent Filipinos, when questioned concerning reconcentration. They feel that Mr. McKinley's "rules" ordering that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation," have been violated.

Photo source: University of Michigan digital library

SEVERE LEGISLATION

The readiness of the Commission to make the whole population suffer for the acts of a small body of insurgents or ladrones is further shown in the operations under act No. 378 and its subsequent modifications. The act imposes the penalty of death, or at least twenty years' imprisonment, for membership in a ladrone band, providing that "to prove the crime *** it shall not be necessary to adduce evidence that any member of the band has in fact committed robbery or theft. A further provision (Sec. 4) specifies taht "Every person knowingly aiding or abetting such a band of brigands *** by giving them information *** or by securing supplies of food, clothing, arms orammunition *** shall *** be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten years." This legislation has been carried further by Act No. 1121, which enlarges the number of commodities, theft of which constitute "highway robbery," and gives a broader scope to the kinds of assistance that may be rendered to such a band. It is not now safe to give even the traditional cup of cold water to a suspected ladrone. The object of this whole series of acts, like the use of the reconcentration policy, has been to bring into subjection an unsympathetic population, and to render peaceful people responsible for the acts of a less submissive element. It is the testimony of capable American lawyers in Manila that under existing law it is entirely possible to convict any human being in the archipelago of "bandolerismo" (the local name for membership in or assistance to organized bands of insurrectionists), without regard to guilt. That such conviction can be secured is, in fact, the open boast of some constabulary officials. Filipinos believe that these statutes are inharmonious with the "great principles of government *** which we deem essential to the rule and the maintenance of individual freedom."

How effective this legislation has been may be seen from the situation in the Bilibid prison. From September 1, 1902 to September 1, 1903, there was a growth of nearly 100 per cent in the population of this institution, the number confined on the latter date being 3,184. On a recent date (May 23, 1904) this number had risen to 4,420, a growth in less than nine months of 1,236 persons, or about 40 per cent. The net inward movement was then estimated by the authorities at 8 to 10 persons per day, which would mean a gross annual increase of 2,800 to 3,500. The total number of persons confined August 31, 1903, on charges of "aiding insurrection, brigandage, conspiracy, highway robbery, illegal custody of arms, rebellion, sedition, violation of oath of allegiance, violation of laws of war, violation of articles of war, and treason," was 1,093. These offenses do not include such crimes as murder, homicide, or theft, but represent the number of men confined for what we consider strictly political offenses. In other words, about one-third of all these prisoners were confined becuase of their connection with revolutionary movements. Supposing that the rate of increase in this class of prisoners had been the same as the ratio of growth in the total prison population, and eliminating 414 petty police-court offenders, it appears that fully 50 per cent of all long-time convicts now in Bilibid are confined for such political offenses. On a recent date the number of men confined in Bilibid who had been sentenced and were awaiting capital punishment was 100.

Photo source: University of Michigan digital library

STATE OF JUDICIARY

In bringing about these convictions, and in harshly enforcing the harsh legislation already referred to, responsiblity must be divided between the judiciary and the constabulary. The judges have for the most part been under the thumb of the Commission, or incompetent and disposed to convict without sufficient evidence.

The defective character of the judiciary of the islands has been fully recognized by authoritative writers. Mr. Colquhoun, the English author of a recent book, Greater America, speaks of it (p. 343) as a well-known fact, and other foreigners fully agree with him. We, in fact, took to the islands a body of judges for the lower courts, many of whom knew little American, and no Spanish, law; who were ignorant of the Spanish language, and who had never heard the native dialects. The evil features of the present situation seem to be as follows:

(1) The judiciary act (No. 136) contains no provision for the length of tenure of judges in courts of first instance, and no process by which they may be publicly impeached and removed from office. They hold their places subject to the will of the Commission.

(2) Few of them speak and understand Spanish, and they are consequently able to follow the testimony in the courts only with great difficulty. This is a notorious fact.

(3) A system of venal or incompetent interpreters has been developed, through whose errors or corruption many innocent men are brought into jeopardy. Numerous cases of the sort can be cited.
(4) The Commission has assumed the privilege in some cases of suggesting to the judge in advance the direction to be taken by his verdict. Cases of this kind are vouched for by two high officers of the Philippine government, by one ex-judge, by prominent lawyers in Manila, and by intelligent natives.

(5) No legislation or precedent exists whereby judges are distributed according to a known system, so that it is customary to bring a judge of well known ultra administration sympathies to try a case where a certain kind of verdict is wanted. Some judges have been permanently transferred to another district as a kind of penalty for anti-administration verdicts. Some have been asked to resign; others have been ostracized, and thereby forced to resign and leave the islands. A review of the names of the judges appointed during the last three years and their later history fully illustrates this statement. It should be added that in revising the Spanish substantive law we have eliminated most of its characteristics features and have left it a medly of heterogeneous provisions drawn from American State systems, and roughly put together for a bench most of whose members knew no Spanish law. In Americanizing the law of the islands we have, however, omitted the principles of trial by jury, and other protections to individual rights. The present confusion is keenly felt by the best Spanish and Filipino lawyers and by the most informed of our judges. No more drastic criticism on the work of our legal revisionists could be penned that the "Notes to the Spanish Civil Code," lately published by Judge Willard, formerly of the Philippine bench. The bad judicial and legal situation was fully presented to Mr. Taft before he left the islands by eminent members of Manila bar, but he failed to take action, suggesting political motives for the criticisms.

Photo source: University of Michigan digital library

CONSTABULARY SITUATION

In close connection with the status of the judiciary should be considered some of the recent developments in the organization of the native constabulary. In organizing this force (Act No. 175) it was provided that its members should be drawn from the province where stationed, thus giving it the character of local police. This policy is highly praised by Governor Wright in his most recent report as secretary of commerce and police. The plan has, however, been entirely vitiated by the act of congress passed January 30, 1903, whereby the use of the Philippine Scouts under command of the chief constabulary, was ordered. These scouts are chiefly Macabebes and Ilocanos, and they have uniformly been stationed in provinces toward which they feel strong racial antipathy. Moreover, the rule that the constabulary should be recruited in the provinces where they were to serve seems to have been frequently violated. As time has gone on, too, the constabulary has approximated much more closely to the military type, and has lost its original character as a police force. Its members have ceased to live among the people or in their own homes, have been gathered into barracks, placed upon a basis of military pay and rations, and are now substantially a military force like the scouts. They are described as "peace officers," but are authorized to arrest men "without warrant." Constabulary officers are to two classes – old soldiers elevated from the ranks of the regulars, and young, inexperienced men brough from the United States. Under the first class of officers serious abuses and hardships have been inflicted upon the population. Under the second class evils of disorganization and laxity have become prevalent.

At various points the constabulary or scouts have inflicted torture, as in Cavite; done violence to women, as in Isabela Province, and committed cold-blooded murder, as also in Isabela; arrested men without warrant and instituted unreasonable searches and seizures, as in Cavite; have stolen personal property, or taken it wihtout payment, as in Masbate and elsewhere, or have grossly violated public order, as in Cebu. The foregoing practices are mentioned because the abuses in each and every case there referred to can be established by the testimony of reliable eyewitnesses. Trustworthy Philippine lawyers affirm that there are hundreds of men all over the islands who are confined by the constables without any warrant of law. It is certain that the irritation aroused among the people by constabulary outrages is nearly universal. In fact, the uniform reply to questions concerning the constabulary situation is that the force is "as bad as the Guardia Civil" of Spanish time – a verdict than which none more severe could be imagined. It deserves to be added that the hardships inflicted by the constabulary have not been directed against the ladrones, but against the peaceful inhabitants. Ladronism still continues in different regions, apparently in some cases through the connivance of the constabulary. The constables have been vastly move active in campaigning against insurrectos that against those ladrones whose only motive was robbery. In the former case, they have when able to surround a small band, often butchered them without quarter, as in the case of the force of General San Miguel, which was literally cut to pieces toward the end of 1903. General Allen, chief of the constabulary, states, in conversation, that the records of this bureau are "filled with complaints against the force," but he never finds that the charges have any foundation. This is attributable to the fact that constabulary abuses are always investigated and reported upon by constabulary officers, usually belonging to the very locality where the abuses complained of have been committed. It is only by outside investigators that the facts can be established. This makes it the more to be regretted that the Commission has almost uniformly refused to investigate charges of this sort directly.

CONTROL OF PUBLIC OPINION

The great difficulty encountered in correcting abuses prevalent in the Philippines to-day probably lies in the absence of freedom of speech or of the press. Act No. 292, known as the 'sedition act," provides that "if two or more persons conspire to overthrow, put down, or destroy by force the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands *** such persons shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 and by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for a period not more than six years." Under this act, and by the use of the constabulary spies, it has become unsafe for private persons to attend social gatherings, or express political opinions in their homes. Expressions by letter are usually dangerous owing to the searching of the mail – a process which, it is thought by Senior del Pan, of Manila bar, in his argument on the recent Lukban case, has been carried vastly further, and has been more arbitrarily used, than under the Spanish administration. While prosecutions under the sedition act are chiefly directed against natives, restraint of the Americans is mainly carried under Act No. 227, known as the "criminal libel act." This law defines a libel as a "malicious defamation," and specifies that the truth of the libel shall not constitute a defense unless it shall be shown that publication was made "with good motives and for justifiable ends," a point not easily to be established before Philipine courts. The provision of this act, taken in connection with those of the sedition act, are such as to make it practically impossible to express an opinion adverse to the administration or any member of it without becoming liable to prosecution.

In cases where a critic is too influential, or where his criticisms and charges are too carefully phrased to admit of prosecuting him, a process of ostracism takes place which is usually very effective, as Manila society consists chiefly of officeholders who take their bias directly from those in authority. An American bishop stationed in Manila expresses in conversation the opinion that the "impatience of criticism shown by the Commission" is one of the most disastrous features of the present Philippine situation. The hostility of the higher authorities, he asserts, is visited upon preachers who venture to criticize a member of the Commission or any of its policies. In the recently concluded "O'brien libel case" the two defendants, who conducted a newspaper in Manila, were sent to prison on the ground that they had published a report of some court proceedings containing statements unfavorable to the defendant, who happened to be a member of the Commission. It was admitted that the report was correct; but the technical point was made that the headlines did not accurately describe the substance of the article.

In recent decisions handed down by courts of first instance in Manila, heavy penalties, including both fine and imprisonment, have been awarded not only to the author and producer, but even to the actors in the play, "Hindi Aco Patay," a dramatic production of an allegorical character, in which Philippine independence was hinted at.

A process of buying the good will of publications through the award of Government advertising and other favors has been used to supplement the methods of intimidation already suggested. The expression of opinion through the agency of political parties has also been placed under severe restrictions. The Nationalist party, which attained a considerable degree of strength about two years ago, was destroyed by prosecutions directed against important men in the organization. Under purely technical attacks in the form of its constitution, a workingmen's union was recently driven out of existence because of the belief that its purpose "was primarily political." These statements are vouched for by the prosecuting officers of our Government in Manila, who freely admit the ulterior purpose of the prosecutions in question. During the past summer efforts were made to recast the platform of the Federal party in such wise as to demand independence. The revised draft was shown to members of the Commission as a precaution, and these gentlement requested its suppression on the ground that "it would embarass Mr. Taft just at this time." The platform never appeared in print.

Do these conditions agree with President McKinley's "rule" that "no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or of the rights of the people peaceably *** to petition the Government for a redress of grievances?"

Photo source: University of Michigan digital library

COST OF ADMINISTRATION

The system of government just described has not been the merit of economy. It is by far the most expensive government the island has ever known. The Schurman Commission (Report, vol. 1, p. 80) gave the annual receipts of the Spanish Government in 1894-95 as $13,379,900 Mexican, of which sum about $9,000,000 was derived from internal taxes. The new internal revenue law of the Philippines just passed is estimated to produce from $10,000,000 to $11,000,000 and is apologized for by its authors as "no worse than the Spanish." The Schurman Commission quotes (page 79) expenditures of the Spanish Government in 1894-95 as $13,280,130, of which sum $4,045,061 was for war and $2,450,176 for navy, the balance – some $6,700,600 – being civil outlay. As against this sum it may be noted that our outlay for the year 1903 on strictly civil expenses was about $22,000,000 Mexican currency. To this should also be added probably $2,000,000 for the cost of provincial administration and a somewhat greater sum deducted for permanent improvements. Conversely, there should be large reductions in the "civil outlay" noted above for the Spanish Govenment, as that figure includes the cost of carrying on the church, some diplomatic expenses and other items. Withoug going into these changes in the accounts in detail, it may be stated that the cost of our civil administration is from three to five times as heavy as that of the Spaniards – yet the Schurman Commission complained of the Spanish administration on the ground of "costliness."

Nor can the indictment of the expense incident to Philippine administration stop with local conditions in the islands. The Philippines are tremendously expensive to the United States. According to Gen. George W. Davis (Report Div. of Phil., 1903, p. 50), the annual cost of the army and navy in the Philippines in actual cash is at least $21,000,000 gold. This estimate was based upon a force (scouts and Americans) of about 23,000 men. As the present force is probably 3,000 men smaller, a reduction of corresponding amount must be made. This, however, is far more than offset by the cost of the Philippine mail service,which falls largely on the United States; of the army transports, both trans-Pacific and interisland; by the facts that tropical service counts double time toward retirement for enlisted men; that claims for pensions are more numerous as a result of such service; that many army officers are now serving in the Philippine government at the cost of the United States; and that in a variety of ways, the islands are a continous draft on our Treasury. Conservative estimators place tha present annual money cost of the Philippines to the United States at not less than $25,000,000.

Nor does the money laid out for civil expenses "go largely to Filipinos." as often claimed. A review of the personnel of the government, during the past three years shows that the number of Americans holding civil offices in 1903 was 3,458, as against 2,777 in 1902, and 2,044 in 1901, while the number of Filipinos for these three years was 3,318, 2697 and 2562, respectively. In other words, there were employed in 1901 25 per cent more natives than American, while in 1902 the natives were about 3 per cent less numerous than the Americans and 4 per cent less numerous in 1903. In the latter year the 3,318 Filipino employees drew aggegate salaries of $1,497,610, while the 3,455 Americans drew $4,284,482.

GENERAL SUMMARY

As General Davis mildly states the situation (Report, 1903, p. 31): "Americans in the Philippnes have not so far been an unmixed blessing to the native inhabitants." We have, in fact, destroyed the public buildings of the country, inflicted continous crop losses, during a period of six years; ravaged and burned large sections of territory; produced conditions leading to the death of most of the farm animals and to serious human and animal epidemics; brought foreign trade to an unprofitable condition by our tariff legislation; inaugurated a tremendously expensive government for the benefit of foreign officeholders; established a partisan judiciary; crowded the prisons, and deported or sent to the gallows the best and most patriotic of the native leaders.

Agoncillo's failed diplomatic missions

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In August 26, 1898, Felipe Agoncillo, the head of the Filipino junta in Hongkong, was instructed by Aguinaldo to proceed to Washington to gain support of president William H. McKinley for the new Philippine government.
Agoncillo's mission was to participate in the peace negotiations between the United States and Spain and he needed McKinley's accreditation as the official Filipino government representative.

(Photo source: University of Michigan digital library)

The mission was doomed from the very start because Agoncillo was going to deal with the administration of U.S. President William McKinley whose policy favored the acquisition and colonization of the Philippines. Agoncillo was not received by McKinley in Washington as a duly constituted representative of the Philippine government, neither was he accorded official representation to enable him to participate in the Paris conference.

Failing to get accreditation from McKinley, he rushed to Paris to present the case of the Filipinos before the peace commissioners. However, he was barred from participating. After submitting a protest to the peace commissioners on behalf of the Philippine government, which was ignored and not acknowledged, Agoncillo went back to Washington and met with several United States senators and prominent Americans who were sympathetic to the Filipino cause. He submitted to the State Department a document entitled, “MEMORIAL TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES”. This document suffered the same fate as the protest Agoncillo submitted in Paris. It was not acknowledged received by the State Department and ignored by the McKinley administration. He stayed in Washington a few days more, then suddenly disappeared before the outbreak of the war in February 4, 1899, having left hurriedly for Europe to escape what he thought was a threat of arrest by the Americans. According to Felipe Buencamino, Agoncillo telegrammed Aguinaldo that he was not received by President McKinley and advised that preparations be made for war. (Buencamino, 2)

The two documents prepared by Felipe Agoncillo, the MEMORIAL and the PROTEST and submitted to the United States State Department and Paris Peace Commission, respectively, are presented in the following:

MEMORIAL TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
presented by D. Felipe Agoncillo
to the U.S. Secretary of State,
January 30, 1899.

The interest of my country requires, because of the pendency of the Peace Treaty before your Honorable Body, that I present to you some considerations bearing upon the relations between the United States and the Philippine Islands.

It would be impertinent in me, and I shall not attempt, to make any suggestions relative to the treatment of the document in question. At the same time, I must be understood as protesting as the representative of the independent Philippine Republic that the United States has no jurisdiction, natural or acquired, through any of its agencies to adjudicate in any manner upon the rights of my country and people. The fact remains, however, that action is contemplated, which, we are informed is proposed, if deemed necessary, to be the basis of military operations against the latest addition to the republics of the world, such action being, as I shall herein point out, without foundation in justice.

Lest it may be thought that, in addressing you, I am exceeding the just rights of those whom I have the honor to represent, I may be pardoned for calling your attention to the fact that the Constitution of the United States provides in substance that no person, however humble he may be, shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property except by due process of law - meaning after the preferment of charges, their careful examination by a tribunal competent and of acknowledged authority to deal therewith, and at a trial where the accused or defendant may be present in person or by attorney. This constitutional declaration is not the origin, but the expression of a principle - a right inherent in the nature of things - and which receives no added moral sanction because of its recognition in written documents, and is of no less application because circumstances require it to be called into play by a nation seeking the recognition of its independence.

I cannot believe that in any possible action on the part of the American Republic towards my country, there is an intent to ignore, as to the ten millions of human beings I represent, the right of free government which America preserves to the lowliest of her inhabitants; but rather prefer to think that, in the rush of arms, this right for a moment may have been obscured in the minds of some of America's liberty-loving and enlightened citizens.

My justification for addressing you is that I am solicitous lest by inadvertence or omission of my own, as specious foundation may be laid, by virtue of which the rights of my countrymen may be prejudiced and injuries inflicted thereupon, redounding thereafter, with added force, against the well-being of America.

In presenting the considerations desire now to submit, it seems necessary for me first to refer to the historical fact that a large number of my countrymen have never been subdued by Spanish power, and as against their liberties, the oppressive arm of Spain has never been able to sustain itself; that the remainder of the inhabitants, because of their adhesion to the cause of liberty, have been in almost constant insurrection against the Government of Spain, these conflicts existing continuously with greater or less fury for the past hundred years.

The impression has been created in America that at the time of the declaration of war between America and Spain, the Philippine Revolution no longer existed. Upon this point, I may not appeal to the authority of my countrymen for contradiction but prefer to invite your attention to a letter written by Mr. Williams, U.S. Consul General at Manila, under date of March 19, 1898:

"Rebellion never more threatening to Spain. Rebels getting arms, money and friends and they outnumber the Spaniards, resident and soldiery, probably a hundred to one."

Again on March 21, 1898, he wrote referring to the then condition of the conflict:

"British shipmaster there (at Cape Borneo) at the time reports about forty killed and forty wounded. After surrender, the Spanish put the dead and wounded together in a house and by burning cremated all."

Under the same date, he writes of the desertion of an entire regiment of the Spanish forces to the insurgents, saying further:

"Now five thousand armed rebels, which for days have been in camp near Manila and have been reinforced from the mountains, plan to attack the city tonight. All is excitement and life uncertain."

On April 28, 1898, Mr. Pratt wrote a letter to Mr. Day, in which he speaks of "learning from General Aguinaldo the state and object sought to be obtained by the present insurrectionary government, which, though absent from the Philippines, he was still directing."

Without additional authority, it must be evident to your Honorable Body that an extensive revolution existed in the Philippine Islands at the time of the declaration of war by America against Spain.

This revolutionary movement found at its head, General Aguinaldo, now President of the Philippine Government, of whom Mr. Pratt wrote to Mr. Day: "General Aguinaldo impressed me as a man of intellectual ability, courage, and worthy of the confidence that had been placed in him," while again he said that "no close observer of what has transpired in the Philippines during the past four years could have failed to recognize that General Aguinaldo enjoyed, above all others, the confidence of the Philippine insurgents and the respect alike of the Spanish and foreigners in the Islands, all of which vouched for his justice and high sense of honor;" and Mr. Williams wrote Mr. Moore on July 18, 1898, "General Aguinaldo, Agoncillo, and Sandiko are all men who could all be leaders in their separate departments in any country."

The purpose of the Filipino partriots in conducting this revolution was to secure the complete independence of their country, and in this effort they received the encouragement of the United States; and were never informed that the attainment and preservation of such independence would be regarded as a hostile act by America and they never believed that their struggle in such a cause would lead to enormous aggregation of American armies and navies at their doors.

As early as May 20, 1898, Mr. Pratt forwarded to Mr. Day the Manifesto of the Filipinos beginning as follows:

"Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach, and in a way a free and independent nation could hardly wish for."

Had the United States desired or intended that the Victory of the Filipinos when gained should, like the Dead Sea fruit, turn to ashes in their grasp, surely at this moment America ought not to have been reticent.

Later, and on June 10, 1898, General Aguinaldo appealed directly to President McKinley, his letter having been forwarded under date of July 8, urging that the United States should make no endeavor to deliver the possession of the Philippines to England, but leave his country "free and independent, even if you make peace with Spain."

Again, General Aguinaldo was not informed that it was the purpose of America, if possible, to purchase the Philippine Islands from an expelled tyrant without consulting the wishes of the inhabitants, who had established and were maintaining successfully a government satisfactory to them.

On June 8, 1898, and before the declaration of independence of the Filipinos, the Filipinos of Singapore presented a petition to Mr. Pratt, the American consul, in which they said:

"Our countrymen at home and those of us residing hererefugees from Spanish misrule and tyranny in our beloved nativeland - hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humane policy, will efficaciously second the program arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this part of Singapore, and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States."

Consul Pratt did not dissent from this understanding of his compact with General Aguinaldo. The State Department was informed of this affair before July 20, 1898, and directed caution on the part of Mr. Pratt, but did not disavow his action to the parties most concerned, permitting them to continue to believe, as they had already an ample reason for believing, that the result of their struggle would be the independence of their native land.

In addition to the facts already enumerated, for the period of four months in and out of the harbor of Manila, vessels passed floating the flag of the Philippine Republic, saluting and being saluted by American men-of-war, and these acts continued without let-up or hindrance until the month of October, 1898.

I have taken occasion, in a communication to the Secretary of State, to point out that by the rules of international law maintained exception by the American Government, the Philippine Republic has been for many months entitled to national recognition, possessing, as it was, since June 1898, a government both de facto and de jure, capable of enforcing its laws at home, of carrying out its undertakings with foreign governments, and of maintaining itself against Spain.

Before the appointment of the Peace Commissioners on September 13, 1898, American officials had fully recognized and had communicated to their Government the fact that it was possession of the Philippines, a point most essential to be considered in determining whether a new, independent nation should be recognized.

In a memorandum concerning the Philippine Islands, made August 27, 1898 by General F. V. Greene, he states:

"The Spanish Government is completely demoralized, and Spanish power is dead, beyond the possibility of resurrection. Spain would be unable to govern those Islands if we surrender them."

Under date of August 29, Major J. F. Bell reported to General Merritt as follows:

"I have met no one cognizant of the conditions now existing in these Islands and in Spain who believe that Spain can ever again bring the Philippines under subjection to its Government."

From the foregoing, it must appear that the Philippine Nation had achieved its independence free from any danger of losing it at the hands of the Spaniards, even prior to the signing of the protocol. This is shown by the Executive Agreement No. 62, now before the Senate, which document contains much testimony concerning the productive capacity of the Philippine Islands, and their mineral and agricultural wealth, but little evidence touching the probability of maintaining the American Government in those Islands irrespective of the desires of their people, and no direct testimony whatever as to the wishes of the people themselves, although it does contain evidence that the American Government had known from the beginning that the Filipinos were struggling for independence and with success, and includes copies of the declaration of independence of the Philippine Republic and of the laws passed pursuant thereto, and showing that the government knew that there was in existence a regularly organized and constituted republican government controlling the Islands and having General Aguinaldo at its head.

I have already alluded to the fact that Spain had no power to deliver possession to the United States of the Philippine Islands, having been driven from these Islands by the just wrath of their inhabitants; and by way of illustration of this point, I venture to file herewith a map of the Philippine Archipelago, designating the principal islands under the control of the respective nations, and showing that America is in actual possession at this time of 143 square miles of territory, with a population of 300,000, while the Philippine Government is in possession and control of 167,845 square miles, with a population of 9,395,000, and only a few scattered Spanish garrisons are to be found in islands having an area of 51,630 square miles, with a population of 305,000. The figures as to the Spanish possessions should be diminished, and those of the Philippine Government increased, by virtue of the fact that the inhabitants of the Islands where Spanish troops yet remain have practically confined such troops to the narrow quarters of their garrison towns.

Spain, therefore, having been driven away, as I have stated, and the inhabitants having established a government satisfactory to themselves and maintaining order throughout the territories under its control, what justification can any other nation advance for interfering with my country or refusing to extend to it the obligations of international law? Could Spain give to any nation a better right than she possessed? She could not confer possession, for she did not enjoy it, and any former right of possession, claimed by her had been extinguished by the destruction of her sovereignty over my country. She could not create, by treaty or otherwise, as against the Philippine Islands, any right, except it be the right to conquer them, and if such right be claimed, it exists, not because of cession on the part of Spain, but because of its own inherent force, and must be as powerful on behalf of any other nation, as it is on behalf of the United States. If, therefore, America claims the right to make war upon my countrymen for the purpose of conquering them, and thus destroying another republic, so equally may Germany, France, and England, or any other powerful nation, claim the same right.

It may be said that the United States has purchased from Spain by treaty "all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property, which in conformity to law, belong to the Crown of Spain." But it was not possible for Spain to yield any right as to property of this nature as against the Government of the Philippine Islands, for, by all authorities upon the subject of international law, public property goes to the captor of the country, and may not be transferred by an expelled nation to a foreign government against the right of the nation which had gained possession of the country by conquest. It therefore follows that the public buildings, etc. recited as ceded by Spain to the United States, could not have been so ceded, but of right and by international law belong to the successor of the Spanish power in the Philippines; that is to say, to the Philippine Government representing the independent people of those Islands.

In the further discussion of the question whether the American Government could acquire any right in the Philippines from Spain by treaty, I am fortunately able to invite your attention to several notable and great American precedents, and I could ask for my country no better fortune than to have the Republic of America, as at present constituted, adhere to the teachings of international law as laid down by some of its founders, to whom we appeal with the utmost confidence.

When it became necessary, as it did in 1792 for the American Government to appoint Commissioners to negotiate a treaty with the Crown of Spain, Mr. Thomas Jefferson, under date of March 18, 1792, among other things, wrote as follows:

"Spain was expressly bound to have delivered up the possessions she had taken within the limits of Georgia (during the Revolutionary War as an ally of the United States) to Great Britain, if they were conquests of Great Britain, who was to deliver them over to the United States; or rather she should have delivered them to the United States themselves, as standing quoad hoc in the place of Great Britain. And she was bound by natural right to deliver them to the same United States on a much stronger ground, as the real and only proprietors of those places which she had taken possession of in a moment of danger, without having had any cause of war with the United States, to whom they belonged, and without having declared any; but, on the contrary, conducting herself in other respects as a friend and associate." Vattel, 1, 3, 132....

It is still more palpable that, a war existing between two nations as Spain and Great Britain, could give to neither the right to seize and appropriate the territory of a third, which is even neutral, much less which is an associate in the war, as the United States were with Spain,(1) citing Grotius, Puffendorf, and Vattel.

Again, Mr. Pinckney, on August 10, 1795, wrote to the Duke of Alcudia, among other matters, as folows:

"But it has been said (referring to the contention Spain that she was entitled to retain territory within the limits of the United States, the possession of which was obtained by her during the war against Great Britain) that Spain had pretensions for possessing the limits above mentioned by the right of conquest, her troops having, during the war, seized a certain portion of territory beyond that limit; but the answer to this pretension is a simple and as conclusive as that just developed, which is, that the territory conquered must have belonged, before the war, either to the United States or to Great Britain. If it belonged to the United States it is very clear that Spain could have no right to make conquests on a nation with whom she was not at war, and I will not, for a single moment, admit an idea so disrespectful to Spain as to imagine that she could pretend to be the friend of the United States; to have helped them in the war; to have even lent them money for maintaining it at the same time she was depriving them of their property."2

As will be seen on a careful examination of the foregoing citations, the cases cited are to all intents parallel with that before us. Spain was, during the American Revolution, engaged in warfare with Great Britain, from which country the United States was seeking independence, as were the Filipinos in the recent war with Spain, and she had by her arms obtained possession of portions of the United States. Her right to them was denied successfully by America. The only possible difference between the two cases is that in the first, possession was claimed by virtue of conquest, and as to the Philippines, the United States claims possession by virtue of cession from an expelled power; but whether the apparent title be based upon conquest or cession, it is clearly shown by Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Pinckney that it is contrary to the law of nations for one nation engaged in a common cause with another to despoil its associate. Mr. Pinckney thought the idea of such a thing disrespectful to Spain, and was unable to imagine that she could pretend to be a friend of the United States and to have helped them while at the same time, she was seeking to rob them of their property(2).

That the view taken by Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Pinckney was the correct view is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United Slates in the case of Harcourt v. Gailliard, 12 Wheaton, p. 523:

"War," says the Supreme Court, "is a suit prosecuted by the sword, and where the question to be decided is one of original claim to territory, grants of title made flagrante bello by the party that fails, can only derive validity from treaty stipulation."

We have before us a case of a grant of territory undertaken to be made by Spain during the existence of a war between her and the Philippine Islands, such a grant as the Supreme Court of the United States, under parallel circumstances stated, could only derive validity by reason of treaty stipulation, meaning, in the case before the Supreme Court, treaty stipulation between England and America, and meaning as to the present case, treaty stipulation between the Philippine Islands and Spain.

I venture to summarize the foregoing as follows:

1. The United States, not having received from the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands authority to pass laws affecting them, its legislation as to their welfare, I respectfully submit, possesses no binding force as against my people.

2. American authorities herein cited demonstrate that the Philippine Revolution was never more threatening than immediately before the breaking out of the Spanish-American War, 5,000 revolutionists being encamped near Manila three weeks before the American declaration of war, this army acting (though he was personally absent) under the direction of General Aquinaldo, in whom the consular representatives of the United States reposed the highest confidence.

3. The purpose of the revolution was independence, and, understanding this, the United States encouraged the revolutionists to believe their desires would attain fruition. This is shown by citations from the archives of the State Department and the incidents above related.

4. The Philippine Republic was entitled to receive from the United States recognition as an independent nation before the signing of the protocol with Spain, that Government knowing that Philippine independence had been proclaimed in June, a Government de facto and de jure established, laws promulgated, and Spain's further domination impossible, being acquainted with all these facts immediately upon their happening, through documents and written reports submitted to it by its officers.

5. The American Government for months has had in its possession, as herein shown, evidence of the actual independence of the Filipinos.

6. Spain could not deliver possession of the Philippines to the United States, being herself ousted by their people, and in fact at the present moment the United States holds only an entrenched camp, controlling 143 square miles, with 300,000 people, while the Philippine Republic represents the destinies of nearly 10,000,000 souls, scattered over an area approaching 200,000 square miles.

7. Spain having no possession (except minor garrison posts), and no right of possession in the Philippines, could confer no right to control them.

8. American purchase of buildings, etc. in the Philippine Islands was ineffective, because the Islands, having been lost by Spain to the Philippine Republic, the last named Government had already by conquest acquired public property.

9. Secretaries of State of your country (including Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Pinckney) have denied the right of an ally of America to acquire by conquest from Great Britain any American territory while America was struggling for independence. The United States Supreme Court has sustained this view. We deny similarly the right of the United States to acquire Philippine territory by cession from Spain while the Filipinos were yet at war with that power.

I conclude this communication with the expression of the earnest hope that the representations I have thus ventured to make to you, will receive your serious consideration before you finally act upon the treaty that contains so much of consequence to my people, and if you do this, as I cannot for a moment doubt you will, in the spirit that has ever characterized your deliberations when discussing questions affecting the lives and liberties of individuals or of nations, I am assured that the just and high aspirations of my countrymen will receive the prompt recognition and approval of your honorable body.

Respectfully submitted
FELIPE AGONCILLO

Footnotes:
(1)American State Papers, Foreign Relations Vol. 1, p. 252.
(2)American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. 1, p. 538.

(English text)
Official protest against the Paris Peace Treaty, December 12, 1898.

PARIS, 12th of December, 1898.

Their Excellencies, the Presidents and Delegates of the Spanish American Peace Commission, Paris.

The very noble and gallant General Emilio Aguinaldo, President of the Philippine Republic, and his Government have honoured me with the post of Official Representative to the very Honourable President and Government of the United States of America, devolving on me, at the same time, the duty of protesting against any resolutions contrary to the independence of that country which might be passed by the Peace Commission in Paris.

This has already terminated its sessions, and the resolutions passed cannot be accepted as obligatory by my Government, since the Commission has neither heard, nor in any wise admitted to its deliberations, the Philippine nation, who held an unquestionable right to intervene in them, in relations to what might affect their future. I fulfill, therefore, my duty, when I protest, as I do in the most solemn manner, in the name of the President and the National Government of the Philippines, against any resolutions agreed upon at the Peace Conference in Paris, as long as the juridical, political, independent personality of the Filipino people is entirely unrecognized, and attempts are made in any form to impose on these inhabitants, resolutions which have not been sanctioned by their public powers, the only ones who can legally decide as to their future in history.

Spain is absolutely devoid of a status and power to decide, in any shape or form, the aforementioned matter. The Union of Spain and the Philippines, was founded solely on two historical facts, in which the exclusive right of the Filipinos to decide their own destiny was implicitly recognized.

First: - The Blood Compact" (Pacto de Sangre) of the 12th of March, 1565, entered into between the General Don Miguel Lopez de Legazpi and the Filipino sovereign, Sikatuna, a compact which was ratified and confirmed on the one side, by the King of Spain, Philip II, and, on the other side, by the Monarchs of Mindanao, Bisayas and Luzon and by the Supreme Chief of that Confederation, the Sultan Lacandola; proclaiming as a consequence, the autonomous nationality of the Kingdom of "New Castile", formed by the Philippine Islands, under the sceptre of the King of Spain.

Second: - The so-called "Constitution of Cadiz", in the discussion, vote, promulgation and execution of which the Deputies and Filipino people took an active part; and by which Constitution the nationality of "The Spains" was made effective.

But from the very first moment in which the Peninsular Public Powers attempted to impose their absolute sovereignty on the Islands, the Filipinos protested energetically by force of arms, and from the first attempt in 1814, the struggle in defense of their political personality was implanted.

When, in 1837, the violent deprivation of their rights was consummated, the Filipinos again protested Spain sustaining against them a fratricidal and inhuman struggle, which has lasted from that time onwards up to the present day.

Falsehood, which always characterized the actions of the Peninsular authorities, constantly hid from the world the fact of the real situation of force, which has lasted almost a hundred years.

At length, at the end of the present century, the Spanish forces have been completely routed by those of the natives, and Spain cannot now even allege the possession by her of the Islands; because the permanency of a handful of Peninsular soldiers, (approximately 400) who are holding out, besieged in one or two fortresses in the south of the Archipelago, cannot constitute such a right. The Spanish Government has ceased to hold any dominion by deed and by right; and the only authority which exists there and preserves order, is that constituted by the Filipinos, with the solemn sanction of their votes, the only legal fount of positive modern power.

Under such conditions, the Spanish Commissioners in Paris have not been able, within the principles of the law of nations, to give up or transfer what, if they ever had, they have totally lost before the signing of the Protocol of Washington and the arranging of the terms of the Peace Treaty in Paris.

The Filipino people who consented to the "Blood Compact" and the "Constitution of 1812," annulled those conventions, by reason of Spain not complying with her undertakings, and renewed their sovereignty by the solemn proclamation of the Philippine Republic on the 1st of August, 1898, and by the establishment of a Government and a regular and wellordered administration, created by the decisive votes of the natives.

If any juridical effect can be attributed to the Spanish action in the Peace Treaty, within the principles of International Law, it is the explicit renunciation of all future pretention over the land, the dominion and pos session of which she has lost, and therefore is only of use to make the recognition of the corporate body of the Filipino nation, and that of their rights to rule effectively in respect of their future.

The United States of America, on their part, cannot allege a better right to constitute themselves as arbitrators as to the future of the Philippines.

On the contrary, the demands of honour and good faith impose on them the explicit recognition of the political status of the people, who, loyal to their conventions, were a devoted ally of their forces in the moments of danger and strife. The noble General Emilio Aguinaldo and the other Filipino Chiefs were solicited to place themselves at the head of the suffering and heroic sons of that country, to fight against Spain and to second the action of the brave and skillful Admiral Dewey.

At the time of imploring their armed co-operation, both the Commander of the 'Petrel' and Captain Wood, in Hong Kong, before the declaration of war, the American Consuls General Mr. Pratt, in Singapore, Mr. Wildman, in Hong Kong, and Mr. Williams, in Cavite, acting as international agents of the great American nation, at a moment of great anxiety, offered to recognize the independence of the Filipino nation, as soon as victory was attained.

Under the faith of such promises, an American man-of-war, the 'McCulloch' was placed at the disposal of the said leaders, and which took them to their native shores; and Admiral Dewey himself, by sending the man-of-war; by not denying to General Aguinaldo and his companions the exacting of his promises, when they were presented to him on board his flagship in the Bay of Manila; by receiving the said General Aguinaldo before and after his victories and notable deeds of arms, with the honours due to the Commander-in-Chief of an allied Army, and Chief of an independent State; by accepting the efficacious cooperation of that Army and of those Generals; by recognizing the Filipino flag, and permitting it to be hoisted on sea and land, consenting that their ships should sail with the said flag within the places which were blockaded; by receiving a solemn notification of the formal proclamation of the Philippine nation, without protesting against it, nor opposing in any way its existence; by entering into relations with those Generals and with the national Filipino authorities recently established, recognized without question the corporate body and autonomous sovereignty of the people who had just succeeded in breaking their fetters and freeing themselves by the impulse of their own force.

And that recognition cannot now be denied by the honourable and serious people of the United States of America, who ought not to deny nor discuss the word given by their officials and and representatives in those parts, in moments so solemn in gravity for the American Republic.

To pretend to put now in question the attributes of such public functionaries, after the danger, would be an act of notorious injustice, which cannot be consented to by those who have the unavoidable duty of preserving unstained the brilliant reputation of the sons of the great nation founded by the immortal Washington, whose first glory was, and has always been, the constant fulfillment of their word of honour.

It must be remembered here that the Filipinos did not fight as paid troops or mercenaries of America. On their arrival, they only received a reduced number of arms, which were delivered to them by the order of Admiral Dewey. The arms, ammunition and provisions, with which the Filipinos have since sustained the war against the Spanish forces, were acquired, some by their gallantry, and others bought with their own funds, these latter being exclusively provided by the Filipino patriots.

And it would not be noble to deny now, after having used the alliance, the courage, loyalty and nobility of the Filipino forces in fighting at the side of the American troops, lending them a decided support, both enthusiastic and efficacious.

Without their co-operation and without the previous siege, would the Americans have been able so easily to gain possession of the walled city of Manila?

They could, who can deny it? have destroyed it by bombardment, but without the foregoing armed deeds, and without the rigorous circle in which the Spanish army was enclosed, the pretence of the attack and surrender which took place could not absolutely have been realized.

Admiral Dewey gloriously destroyed the Spanish squadron, but he had no disembarking forces, and could not inconsiderately dispose of his ammunition and provisions; and under such conditions, the support, which, as companions in arms, was lent to him by the Filipino Generals and their forces, is a positive and undeniable advantage. Without them, General Anderson's troops and those which afterwards were disembarked, probably would not have been able to have arrived at Manila before the suspension of hostilities and the signing of the Protocol of Washington.

Now, if the Spaniards have not been able to transfer to the Americans the rights which they did not possess; if the former have not militarily conquered positions in the Philippines; if the occupation of Manila was a resulting fact, prepared by the Filipinos; if the international officials and representatives of the Republic of the United States of America offered to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the Philippines, solicited and accepted their alliance, how can they now constitute themselves as arbiters of the control, administration and future government of the Philippine Islands?

If in the Treaty of Paris, there had simply been declared the withdrawal and abandonment by the Spaniards of their dominion - if they ever had one - over the Filipino territory; if America, on accepting peace, had signed the Treaty, without prejudice to the rights of the Philippines, and with the view of coming to a subsequent settlement with the existing Filipino National Government, thus recognizing the sovereignty of the latter, their alliance and the carrying out of their promises of honour to the said Filipinos, it is very evident that no protest against their action would have been made. But in view of the terms of the 3rd Article of the Protocol, the proceedings of the American Commissioners, and the imperative necessity of safeguarding the national rights of my country, I make this protest, which I wish to comprise for the aforementioned reasons, but with the corresponding legal restrictions, as against the whole action taken and the resolutions passed by the Peace Commissioners at Paris, and in the Treaty signed by them. And in making this protest, I claim, in the name of the Filipino nation, in that of their President and Government, the fulfillment of the solemn declaration made by the illustrious William McKinley, President of the Republic of the United States of North America, that, on going to war, he was not guided by any intention of territorial expansion, but only in respect to the principles of humanity, the duty of liberating tyrannized people, and the desire to proclaim the unalienable rights of sovereignty of the countries released from the yoke of Spain.

God keep your Excellencies many years.

FELIPE AGONCILLO

Why the U.S. destroyed the Malolos republic

2008-12-29T06:45:00.000-08:00

Every Filipino who went through high school would have learned that there once existed an earlier Filipino republican government, the first Filipino republic and the first in Asia, the so-called Malolos republic, with Emilio Aguinaldo as its president. But that awareness is oftentimes superficial and wanting in in-depth knowledge.

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

Not many Filipinos know that the so-called Malolos republic was a functioning government. Congress enacted laws and elected officials administered the functionaries of government in the towns and provinces. It collected taxes, customs duties and war assessment; floated bonded indebtedness, and even issued a paper currency. It maintained an army and navy and provided services in education, commerce, science, health, justice and foreign service. It operated for more than a year from its proclamation in July 3, 1898 up to its destruction by the Americans in November 12, 1899, when the last capital at Bayambang, Pangasinan was overran by American forces.

Here is a description of the establishment of the Malolos Congress:

In conformity with the organic decree of June 23, made effective by decrees of September 4 and 10, the Revolutionary Congress convened in the church of Barasoain, near Malolos, Bulacan, on September 15, 1898. Eighty-five deputies, among the ablest men of the Archipelago, responded to the summons, although the list printed with the official edition of the political constitution of the Philippine Republic contains the names of ninety-two members, later raised to one hundred and ten. Some members were elected and some appointed. Naturally the legal profession was most largely represented. While a few delegates were graduates of European Universities, they had little or no knowledge of matters political and constitutional. Nevertheless, F. D. Millet, a well-known journalist writing from personal observation, states that all "were exceptionally alert, keen, and intelligent in appearance." And John Barrett says that they "would compare in behavior, manner, dress and education with the average men of the better classes of other Asiatic nations, possibly including the Japanese. These men, whose sessions I repeatedly attended, conducted themselves with great decorum and showed a knowledge of debate and parliamentary law that would not compare unfavourably with the Japanese Parliament."

The following description of the opening of the Revolutionary Congress at Malolos was written the day after. September 16, 1898, by Mr. Millet, one of the two foreign correspondents present:

"At the large basilica of Barasoain (Malolos) we found a large number of the delegates already assembled, and the guards drawn up to receive the expected cortege of the President and his suites. The bald interior of the church was sparsely relieved by crossed palm-leaves and wreaths fastened to the columns which divide the nave from the aisles, and on the great bare spaces between the windows. In the middle of the nave were two bentwood chairs; on either side and behind these, in the aisles, were seats and benches for spectators. To the left of the chancel a long table, draped with blue and red, was arranged for the secretaries, and opposite it were special seats for invited guests, and in the front one next to the chancel rail we were assigned our places. The chancel was hung with a great white drapery, rudely painted to represent ermine, and a broad border of red cloth with palm-leaves and wreaths framed in this curtain. Crossed insurgent flags ornamented the pilasters on each side, and in the middle of the chancel, under the imitation ermine, was a long table draped with light blue and crimson, and behind this three large carved chairs. While we were waiting for the functionaries to arrive, we had an excellent opportunity of studying those who had come from all over the islands to assist in the foundation of a republic-for this was their professed purpose. Every man was dressed in full black costumes of more or less fashionable cut, according to his means or his tastes.

"At last, to the sound of the national march, the delegates moved in a body to the door and then back again, divided, and then Aguinaldo, looking very undersized and very insignificant, came marching down, bearing an ivory stick with gold head and gold cord and tassels. A group of tall, fine-looking generals and one or two dignitaries in black accompanied him, and half surrounded him as they walked along. Mounting the chancel steps, Aguinaldo took the middle seat behind the table, the Acting Secretary of the Interior took the place on his right, and a general occupied the carved chair on his left. Without any formal calling to order, the secretary rose and read the list of delegates, and sat down again. Then Aguinaldo stood up, and after the feeble vivas had ceased, took a paper from his pocket, and in a low voice, without gestures and without emphasis, and in the hesitating manner of a schoolboy, read his message in the Tagalo language. Only once was he interrupted by vivas, and that was when he alluded to the three great free nations-England, France and America-as worthy models for imitation. He next read a purported translation in Spanish with even more difficulty, and when he had finished there was quite a round of cheers, proposed and led by the veteran general Buencamino, for the President, the republic, the. victorious army, and for the town of Malolos. Then Aguinaldo arose and declared the meeting adjourned until it should re-assemble prepared to elect officers and to organize in the regular manner. The long-talked-of and ever-memorable function was over."

The Spanish version of the message of the President reads in translation as follows:

"Representatives:-The work of the revolution being happily terminated and the conquest of our territory completed, the moment has arrived to declare that the mission of arms has been brilliantly accomplished by our heroic army and now a truce is declared in order to give place to councils which the country offers to the service of the government in order to assist in the unfolding of its programme of liberty and justice, the divine message written on the standards of the revolutionary party.

"A great and glorious task, an undertaking within the capacity of every class of patriots, is it for undisciplined troops to fight and to break lances in opposition to the injustice done to those whom they defend and protect. But this is not all.

"It remains for us, further, to solve the grave and supereminent problems of peace for those for whom our fatherland demanded from us the sacrifice of our blood and of our fortunes and now at the present time calls for a solemn document, expressive of the high aspirations of the country, accompanied by all the prestige and all the grandeur of the Filipino race, in order to salute with this the majesty of those nations which are united in accomplishing the high results of civilization and progress.

"To these great friendly nations, whose glorious liberty is sung by the muse of history was addressed the sacred invocation which accompanied our undertaking in its incredible acts of valor, to these nations the Filipino people now sends its cordial salutations of lasting alliance.

"At this opening of the temple of the laws, I know how the Filipino people, a people endowed with remarkable good sense, will assemble. Purged of its old faults, forgetting three centuries of oppression, it will open its heart to the noblest aspirations and its soul to the joys of freedom; proud of its own virtues without pity for its own weaknesses, here in the church of Barasoain, once the sanctuary of mystic rites, now the august and stately temple of the dogmas of our independence, here it is assembled in the name of peace, perhaps close at hand, to unite the suffrages of our thinkers and of our politicians, of our warlike defenders of our native soil and of our learned Tagalo psychologists, of our inspired artists and of the eminent personages of the bench, to write with their votes the immortal book of the Filipino constitution as the supreme expression of the national will.

"Illustrious spirits of Rizal, of Lopez Jaena, of Hilario del Pilar! August shades of Burgos, Pelaez and Panganiban! Warlike genuises of Aguinaldo and Tirona, of Natividad and Evangelista! Arise a moment from your unknown graves! See how history has passed by right of heredity from your hands to ours, see how it has been multiplied and increased to an immense size to infinity by the gigantic strength of our arms, and more than by arms, by the eternal, divine suggestion of liberty which burns like a holy flame in the Filipino soul. Neither God nor the fatherland grants us a triumph except on the condition that we share with you the laurels of our hazardous struggle.

"And you, representatives of popular sovereignty, turn your eyes to the lofty example of the illustrious patriots!

"Let this example and their revered memory, as well as the generous blood spilled on the battlefields, be a potent incentive to arouse in you a noble spirit of emulation to dictate with the great wisdom your high mandate demands, the laws which in this fortunate era of peace are destined to govern the political destinies of our country."

Following the procedure outlined in the decree of June 23, the Congress was organized with Pedro A. Paterno as President, Benito Legarda as Vice President, and Gregorio Araneta and Pablo Ocampo, secretaries.68 On September 17th Congress listened to an eloquent address e by its president, Paterno, and elected its committees. The rules of the Spanish Cortes, slightly modified, were temporarily adopted. Subsequent to organization and ratification of a declaration of independence, the principal work became the discussion and adoption of a constitution. The Congress is also said to have passed other laws. Unfortunately no official record was kept of the poceedings. After the promulgation of the constitution, the outbreak of hostilities necessarily neutralized further effective labors by the legislature.(Malcolm, 134-140)

Yes, the Philippine-American war destroyed the Malolos republic. But a question may be asked - why was it not allowed to exist by the Americans? If war is merely an expression of political objectives, then Washington officials, with their commitment to human rights and libertarian heritage, could have easily halted the war to let the Filipinos go on their own. Instead, U.S. president William McKinley forcibly annexed the Philippines, destroyed the Filipino republic and imposed American sovereignty over the unwilling inhabitants of the islands. Why?

U.S. military officers - Dewey, Anderson, Lawton and several other who had a first hand acquaintance with Filipinos provided the U.S. State Department with favorable impressions on the Filipinos and their capability for self government. Even U.S. president McKinley was reported to have indicated no immediate interest in the acquisition of the Philippines and instead placed the future of the Philippines in the hands of the peace negotiators. But during the Peace Treaty negotiations in Paris the United States commissioners surprisingly demanded from Spain the cession of the Philippines to the United States.

The motive behind the annexation of the Philippines by the United States had always been attributed by Filipino nationalist historians to American imperialism. They claim that American big business saw the Philippines as a "prized possession for its unexploited natural resources, its strategic location for commerce in the east and for its harbors well suited for coaling stations and repair of ships."

But Senator Richard F. Pettigrew of the United States, a prolific critic of McKinley, gave an inkling of the more plausible motive. He said England influenced the decision of the United States to keep the Philippines as a colony because a new republic in the orient might encourage the English colonies to establish their own.

Here is the revealing statement of Senator Pettigrew:

“At first we did not intend to keep the Philippines. About the early part of June, I898, the English papers began to publish articles urging the Americans to keep the Philippines. England became alarmed at the prospect of a republic being set up in the Orient. It would be like starting a prairie fire among her Malay subjects in Borneo, Singapore, Hongkong, and her other East India possessions. Hence President McKinley did not wish to start another Paul Kruger to set a bad example to the subjects of the Empress of India. The ‘London Spectator’, on the Philippines, hoped the United States would keep them, saying: 'The weary Titan needs an ally, and the only ally whose aspirations, ideas, and language are like his own is the great American people." (Pettigrew, 607)
[The name Paul Kruger is associated with the First Boer War. After the British annexed South Africa in 1877, Kruger led a war of resistance against the British who were defeated in the decisive battle at Majuba in 1881 and an independent republic was established. ]

The prospect of antagonizing the British on one hand and offending the democratic idealism of the American people on the other perhaps explains the evolving nature of McKinley's policy towards the Philippines. This policy was initially announced as a hands-off policy and eventually evolved into a policy of annexation.

The change in policy can be gleaned from the succession of events following the declaration of war with Spain in April 25, 1898. At this time, U.S. President McKinley had no clear-cut position about American intentions in the Philippines. While the United States granted the Cubans their independence after liberation from Spain and the same policy being expected by the Filipinos for themselves, nothing of the sort came about. The fact is, the Filipinos willingly sided with the Americans because they considered the Cuban experience as a manifestation of the good intentions of the Americans. But a period of non-decision prevailed on the Philippine question, which McKinley himself admitted he agonized on it.

After the defeat of Spanish fleet at Manila Bay, a Peace Protocol between Spain and the United States was signed in August 12, 1898. Even at this time, the intention to annex the Philippines was absent. The protocol merely gave the United States the right to hold the city, the bay and harbor for coaling purposes. There was no mention about cession of the archipelago, nor a takeover of island of Luzon or another Philippine island.

Believing that the Americans would let them enjoy an independent government under an American protectorate, the Filipinos cooperated with the Americans in most cordial manner. Aguinaldo secured the initial cache of arms from Commodore Dewey. Two U.S. cruisers, the Raleigh and the Concord, effected the surrender of the Spanish garrison in Subic Bay and the 1,200 Spanish prisoners were turned over by Dewey to Aguinaldo. Dewey also sent his cruisers to seek out the German cruiser Irene which challenged the identity of a Filipino steamer, the Filipinas, on the basis that the Filipino flag it was flying did not represent a country recognized as a belligerent. Dewey defended the act of flying of the Filipino flag by the Filipino vessels saying he tolerated it. This friendly American attitude towards the Filipinos continued until about the arrival of the first expedition of American troops in mid 1898.

However, from August to the later part of 1898, the United States policy on the Philippines swayed towards annexation. The new policy revealed itself during the Treaty of Paris negotiations. The United States demanded cession of the whole Philippine archipelago. This demand had gone beyond what was originally specified in the Peace Protocol, which merely allowed the United States to hold the city, the bay and harbor. And as events later confirmed, the might of the U.S. military was called upon to effect the complete subjugation of the Filipinos notwithstanding their heroic resistance.

Among the papers annexed to the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain were 51 pages of documents comprising the section labeled Protectorates, Colonies, and Non-Sovereign States (Treaty), which were detailed description of how the British administered their possessions.

Did the United States follow the advice to hold the Philippines as a colony because England fear the loss of her own colonies in the East whose inhabitants might follow the course of the Filipinos - throw off the colonial yoke and establish a republic?

Philippine Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon thought so when he said:

"I should not be surprised if Britain, France and Holland would be pleased to see the American flag continue to fly over these islands in perpetuity. But to those nations I will say a word in all friendship. It is this: What their subject peoples ultimately do will not be determined by anything which happens in the Philippines." (Bell, 5)

Surely, more light on this issue should be forthcoming.

The day the Catholic Church almost died

2007-06-27T19:45:00.000-07:00

The story of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, otherwise known as the Philippine Independent Church, also known as the Aglipayan church, is intertwined with the war of independence against Spain and the subsequent war of resistance against the United States of America.

A rebellion of the Filipino clergy against the Vatican at the turn of the 20th century triggered the birth of the independent church and threatened the very existence of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philipppines.

(Source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

The principal reason for this schism was hatred of the friars, which was also the primary cause of the Philippine revolution. When friars were captured by the Filipino rebels they were killed. The first three priests secured by Aguinaldo in his first battle were roasted on bamboo spits, smeared with oil and burned, and minced to pieces. Not a nice, civilized, or Christian thing for the natives to do, remarked an observer, but what deep-rooted hatred it displayed. (Percy Grant, 72)

Archbishop Bernardino Nozaleda of Manila, the titular head of the Philippine Roman Catholic church supported the friars and kept them in the parishes with the approval of the Pope, despite the persitent demand for their expulsion. The native Filipino clergy led by Fathers Gregorio Aglipay, Isidoro Perez, Panciano Manuel, Jose Evangelista, and Adriano Garces, actively agitated for the replacement of the friars by secular priests. Father Gregorio Aglipay also participated actively in the Philippine revolution and utimately became the head of the schismatic church.

Archbishop Nozaleda did not show any sympathy for the plight of the people and the Filipino clergy in particular. When the 1896 Philippine revolution broke out, Nozaleda demanded that the Spanish authorities exterminate the Filipino rebels by "fire, sword, and wholesale executions. (Foreman, 365). But Governor General Ramon Blanco hesitated to take the offensive until reinforcement from the home government arrived. For his inaction, Blanco was replaced by Camilo G. de Polavieja through the intercession of Nozaleda.

The inclination of Nozaleda to use drastic means towards the Filipino natives was also exhibited in the incarceration and eventual execution of Dr. Jose Rizal. While in prison, Rizal was quoted as saying that if Archbishop Nozaleda's sane view had been taken and Noli Me Tangere not preached against, he would not have been in prison, and perhaps the rebellion would never have occurred (Craig, 239).

However, when news came that Admiral Dewey's fleet was sailing to Manila in May 1898, Nozaleda and the worried Governor General Basilio Agustin made a desperate and urgent appeal to the Filipino people to help the Spaniards drive the Americans out of the Islands. The Filipinos were told that the Americans would take away their liberties and enslave them; that this Protestant nation would destroy their churches and uproot Christianity. However, the Filipinos wavered because the false promises of the peace pact of Biac-na-Bato were still fresh in the Filipinos' memory (Briggs, 71).

In desperation, Nozaleda sent an emissary to the rebel camp in Cavite to convince the Filipinos to take sides with the Spaniards with promises of reforms and positions for Filipino leaders in a proposed Spanish-sponsored autonomous government. The emissary was Father Gregorio Aglipay. But instead of convincing the rebels to join ranks with the Spaniards against the Americans, Father Aglipay became a strong adherent of the revolution and Aguinaldo eventually commissioned him as the First Chaplain and Vicar General of the Philippine Revolutionary Army. For his involvement in the revolution, Father Aglipay was excommunicated by an ecclessiastical tribunal that Archbishop Nozaleda convened in April 29, 1899.

The second phase of the Philippine revolution was marked by a succession of victories against the Spanish army by the better armed and organized Filipino army whose number rose to 30,000 men by end of June, 1898. With admiral Dewey in control of the bay and assisting Aguinaldo, the Filipino army took 9,000 Spanish prisoners and raised the Filipino flag in practically all towns and cities outside of Manila - Luzon, the Visayas and parts of Mindanao. The hated friars were taken prisoners and the property of the Catholic church – rich farm lands, church buildings and convents were confiscated by the Filipino government and used by the Filipino army. Several captured friars were even made household servants to the military and civilian officials of the Malolos government.

During the brief period of Filipino administration of the islands after the declaration of independence in June 1898 up to the capture of Aguinaldo in March 1901, the Filipino clergy was mandated to take over the parishes and fill the spiritual needs of the populace while the blessing of the Vatican was being secured. Aguinaldo designated Isabelo delos Reyes to this important mission – to intercede with the Pope for the appointment of Filipinos bishops. However, the papal delegate disdained the idea saying, "Not if all the friars are beheaded will Rome appoint Filipinos as bishops."(Laubach[2], 71-72)

So, Isabelo de los Reyes returned to the Philippines in 1901, burning with indignation and determined to start a separate independent church.

After the fall of Manila to the Americans in August 13, 1898, Nozaleda fled to Shanghai and remained there until the Treaty of Paris was signed in December 10, 1898. During the treaty negotiations, the Vatican sent Bishop Placido L. Chapelle of New Orleans to Paris who adeptly maneuvered and lobbied to obtain concessions favorable to the Catholic church. The Americans, who did not want to antagonize the Pope, spared the Church from decimation by inserting Article VIII into the treaty which provided for the protection of Church properties and rights. The role of the Catholic church in the treaty negotiation is better described by Laubach, viz:

“Suddenly the friars abandoned the game of seeking Aglipay's support and loudly announced themselves as pro American - for they had won a bigger game in Europe. Spain had signed the Treaty of Paris with the United States (December 10, 1898). It had been a defeat for Spain, but it was a victory of the friars, who outwitted the American Government. Archbishop Chapelle of New Orleans was present at the negotiations. He insisted that the United States should purchase the Islands for $20,000,000 while President McKinley insisted by cable that the United States should secure her title by conquest. The church having more at stake, persisted longer - and won. Technically therefore, the Philippines were purchased instead of being conquered and they were not purchased with a clear title. For article VIII says about the church property (which as already stated now constituted one tenth of the improved property of the Philippines), ‘The... cession... cannot in any respect impair the property rights.. of... ecclesiastical... bodies.’…” (Laubach, 130-131)

Upon his return to Manila, Archbishop Nozaleda suddenly announced that he was now pro-American.

As Aguinaldo's loose alliance with the Americans against Spain turned into a war between the two former allies, Father Aglipay continued to serve the Filipino army in the war of resistance against the Americans. He helped recruit Ilocano guerrillas and persistently harassed American garrisons in the Ilocos region. Even after Aguinaldo's capture in March, 1901, Father Aglipay continued the fight until he saw the hopelessness of the cause. He surrendered to the Americans in May 1898, took the oath of allegiance to the United States and returned to his calling in the Catholic Church, hoping for forgiveness from the Pope.

Meanwhile, de los Reyes made good his plan by establishing a church in July, 1901 and appointed Father Aglipay as its head. Father Aglipay publicly refused the appointment and disowned the movement. He and several other Filipino members of the clergy continued to fight for the removal of the friars from the parishes. However, Nozaleda and the newly arrived papal delegate, Bishop Chapelle, who was tasked by the Pope to resolve the complaints of the native clergy, sided with the friars.

Felipe Calderon mentioned two incidents that revealed the bias of the church hierarchy in favor of the friars and the religious corporations, as follows:

"We had, together with the apostolic delegate (Bishop Chapelle), organized a reception in one of the houses of the Calzada de San Miguel. I being a member of the committee on arrangements for that function. The house was sumptuously decorated and illuminated; among the decorations there were several transparencies with the name of Filipino bishops ad prominent Filipino priests, and on the front of the house there anchored between the lights the names of Burgos, Gomez, and Zamora. This reception was attended by large crowds among them the Archbishop of Manila (Nozaleda) and the provincials of nearly all the religious corporations, some of whom, by the way, carried big rattan canes, although they had come to a peaceful reception. After the reception, a group of residents of Tondo asked the Delegate to listen to an address of welcome to be pronounced by a young lady on behalf of the residents mentioned. Almost at the very beginning of the address, reference was made to the animosity of the Filipinos against the religious corporations, whereupon Mr. Chapelle told the young lady to stop. The people present became very excited, and shortly afterwards, without my knowing how it started, shouts of ‘Away with the friars!’ and ‘Death to Nozaleda!’ resounded throughout the room, to such an extent that General Otis, who was among the crowd, began to calm everybody. This was not all: when Mr. Nozaleda left the place, a number of people pursued him and several stones struck his carriage. The other incident occurred at a meeting of Filipino priests held at the residence of the Delegate, Mr. Chapelle, at which meeting the priests requested that their legitimate rights be recognized and that with regard to the matter of the parish priests, the common canonical law govern in the Philippine Islands, and not special laws by virtue of which the parishes in the Philippines are administered by members of the regular clergy. Mr. Chapelle disbanded the meeting in a manner anything but prudent and informed those present that he could not tolerate that such requests be made. In view of all these things and of the attitude of the apostolic delegate, who showed marked preference for the religious corporations, great excitement prevailed, not only among the Filipino clergy, but among the other Catholics, who saw that a break between the Delegate and the Archbishop on one side and the people and the clergy on the other was imminent." (,KalawT[2], 632-633)

U.S. President Roosevelt, in an effort to diffuse the tense atmosphere of discontent, sent Governor General William Howard Taft to Vatican to negotiate with the Pope for the resolution of two thorny issues, namely: the purchase of the friar lands, and the removal of the friars from the parishes. The first issue was accomplished after paying a very handsome price, in the words of Felipe Calderon, "a large amount of money has left the Philippine islands and gone into the treasury of the religious corporations instead of remaining in the possession and being expended for the benefit of the Apostolic Catholic Roman Church" (KalawT[2], 635). But the second, the expulsion of the friars, was not successfully resolved. The Pope refused to remove the friars from the parishes. (Laubach, 140)

With the dismal news of Taft's failure to secure the eviction of the friars, Father Aglipay saw it as a clear demonstration of the discrimination against the native priests and the futility of the struggle of the Filipino clergy. Accordingly, in a bold decision in October 17, 1902, Father Aglipay broke off with Rome and accepted the position of Obispo Maximo of the new church. His move created a stampede of priests and the faithful to the new church bringing with them the control of Catholic church properties. Here is how an observer saw it:

"The excitement rose higher than it had been when Aglipay said his first mass. There was a landslide into the schismatic church. In Ilocos Norte only three priests remained true to Rome. All the Filipino priests on the Island of Panay, sixty in number, left the Catholic Church. The poor, the oppressed, and the radical, clamored for freedom. In general, the more the communities had been touched by unrest, the greater was the number of those who broke from Rome. Indeed Aglipay and his fellow bishops were swamped. The movement was one of the people even more than of the priests. In no case did a priest go into the new movement without the support of his congregation. In many instances parts of congregations broke away from the priest who refused to go with them. The new church was embarrassed for want of priests and bishops." (Laubach, 144)

Unable to stave off the exodus of the faithful, Archbishop Nozaleda asked the government to intervene and "... demanded ... that the churches be restored to their bishops by armed interference of the constabulary" (Barrows, 10). But the American-colonial government required the matter to take its way in the courts. And so the Aglipayan church retained possession of the Catholic Church properties under a policy of peaceable possession enunciated by Governor General Taft, which allowed the property to remain with the possessor, i.e., the Aglipayan Church, until the courts have decided on whose favor the properties should go.

The Aglipayan Church, was widely received all over the islands and enjoyed its highest mark in 1904. Riding on the crest of nationalism, the new church immediately gained adherents especially among the masses. One author describes the dramatic spread of the new church in this manner:

"A Filipino priest, Father Serrondo, at Pandacan, Manila, made some insulting references to Bishop Aglipay. When Father Serrondo came out of church he was assaulted by a mob of women. They tore his cassock in shreds, rolled him in the dirt, and let him go, glad to escape with his life. Members of the congregation sent for the new Archbishop Aglipay to come and say mass in the Pandacan church. This he did before a vast crowd. Two hundred irate women took their bedding and cooking utensils and slept in the churchyard to prevent the regular priest from again entering the building. Other churches invited Aglipay to use their building and the city was in a furor." (Laubach, 142)

Before the exodus to the new church, there were about six or seven million Roman Catholics. After the religious upheaval only about one million remained with the Catholic Church. The newly arrived American Protestant missionaries, who thought of using the Aglipayan Church as a stepping stone, provided the new church with Protestant Bibles. The direction of the new Church was separation from the Vatican, thus:

"The schismatic church therefore bent its energies to inducing Filipino priests to abandon Rome. The great majority of priests hesitated for a time. Then they were almost stampeded into revolt by the arrival of a new Apostolic delegate to the Philippines, Monsignor Guidi, as successor of Archbishop Chapelle of New Orleans. These papal delegates were always making false steps. This time the blunder was to publish an encyclical letter written by the Pope to the Filipinos. It was published on December 2nd. There was an immediate upheaval. Filipinos saw in the letter a clear intention on the part of the papacy to fasten the friars upon them forever. It was condemned by every native priest in the Islands. Monsignor Guidi sought to placate the Filipinos by replacing former Spanish prelates with American bishops, but in the present excitement this made matters worse. Aglipay expressed the general feeling when he said: 'We resent the sending of French, Italian, Hottentot, American or any other friar-controlled priests to rule us.' Aglipay declares, and Filipino priests commonly believe, that 'Guidi deliberately changed the recently printed promise to appoint four Filipino bishops by appointing foreign bishops in their stead." (Laubach, 144)

The Aglipayan Church initially maintained most of the Catholic rituals, sainted Dr. Jose Rizal, accepted the Protestant doctrines of a scripture-based teachings and did away with Mariolatry. Isabelo de los Reyes, who had been working on an idea about the religion of the Katipunan which revolved around the supreme being Bathala, also contributed his intellectual prowess and translated the Protestant Bible into Ilocano, in cooperation with the British Bible Society. He eventually rewrote the Protestant Bible, more likely with the help of Aglipay. He ascribed scientific explanations to many events in the Bible and finally produced a revised version which was published under the title Biblia Filipina. The Aglipayan Church was grooming itself to become like the Church of England.

However, in December 1906, the Aglipayan Church was struck by a big blow. The Supreme Court overturned the peaceable possession policy of Governor Taft that allowed the Aglipayans the possession of Catholic Church properties. The Court gave no credence to the contention of the Aglipayans that the church buildings truly belonged to the Filipino people who erected them with their own sweat and labor and financed them with money contributed by the native faithful. The court's decision effectively restored the ownership of the church buildings to the Vatican, and ordered the Aglipayan hierarchy to return these to the Roman Catholic Church.

The Supreme Court decision deprived the Aglipayans of the possession of the church buildings and were forced to make do with makeshift structures of bamboo and nipa. The pathetic picture of Aglipayan faithful performing liturgical services in deplorable conditions brought widespread demoralization and led many priests and followers trekking back to the fold of the Catholic Church.

But Bishop Aglipay was unfazed and did not give up. To the surprise of the Roman Catholic Church, the Aglipayan church recovered and by the census of 1918 it had 1,417,466 members or 13.7 per cent of the entire population of the Islands. The Christian-influenced doctrines of the new Church were overhauled with the release on May 8, 1926 of a monograph entitled Novenary of the Motherland authored jointly by Gregorio Aglipay and Isabelo de los Reyes. The new teachings rejected the Catholic doctrines of divinity of Jesus, original sin, immaculate conception, the trion God, and heaven and hell. The Darwinian concept of the origin of man, together with subsequent anthropological findings were accepted in support of creation, while the principles of physics, more particulalry the indestructible properties of matter, of the transformation of gas, liquid and solid, were ascribed to the phenomena of physical death and resurrection. The teachings of Rizal, Bonifacio, the Katipunan and Mabini were incorporated in the novena and prescribed as regular daily prayer of the members. The Aglipayan Church was groomed to become the "scientific National Church" (Aglipay, 20).

One of the chief lessons which Rizal had learnt in Europe was that a priest-ridden nation is a nation bound over hand and foot to degeneration and decay, and many of his writings were directed against this unwholesome influence, which nowhere has had such pernicious effects as in the Philippines. (Younghusband, 129) Today, whatever the current state of the Aglipayan church is does not diminish its contribution to the growth and development of the purest of Filipino spirit and the noblest of aspirations - to be free and independent.

How the 1898 Treaty of Paris was railroaded

2007-06-26T21:16:00.000-07:00

Is it not rather unusual that the United States had to pay $20 million to Spain in order to effect the annexation of the Philippine Islands? If the spoils of war are the prerogative of the victor, as the saying goes, why pay? This article attempts to examine the motivations that led to the consummation of the Treaty of Paris in December 10, 1898.

(Photo courtesy University of Michigan Digital Library)

The Treaty of Paris was preceded by a Peace Protocol that ended the Spanish-American war. The protocol was signed in August 12, 1898 at Washington DC by Secretary William R. Day of the U.S. State Department and French Ambassador Jules Cambon, who acted as plenipotentiary of Spain.

Article I of the Peace Protocol provided for the relinquishment by Spain of all rights and sovereignty over Cuba which paved the way for the establishment of an independent Cuba. Article II provided for the cession of Puerto Rico and several other islands in the West Indies and in the Ladrones by Spain to the United States, and these territories became possessions of the United States.

However, the status of the Philippines was not clearly defined in the Peace Protocol. A vague provision gave the United States the right to occupy the bay, harbor and city of Manila, as follows:

"Third. On similar grounds, the United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the city, bay and harbor of Mania, pending the conclusion of the a Treaty of Peace, which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."

The control, disposition and government of the Philippines was finally determined and contained in what is now referred to as the Treaty of Paris. Article III of the treaty provides as follows:

"Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, comprehending the islands lying within the following line: ...

"The United States will pay Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratification of the present treaty."

In the course of the negotiations between the American and Spanish commissioners it became clear that the United States wanted to take over from Spain control of the Philippines. The Spanish Commissioners rejected the American position on the basis that the Peace Protocol of Washington merely provided for temporary possession and occupancy of the city, bay and harbor of Manila and did not admit the possibility that the United States would in any way claim any sovereignty over the Philippine Island.

The parties were deadlocked and unable to agree. Spain proposed to take the issue to arbitration. The prospect of subjecting the treaty to unnecessary delay was not acceptable to the American Peace Commissioners. Therefore, to this Spanish proposition, the American side made a counter offer to pay $20 million to Spain, which the Spanish Commissioners viewed as a “take it, or leave it” offer, accompanied by a threat to renew the hostilities, as can be gleaned from the following reply issued by the Spanish Commission:

“…The Spanish Commissioners are now asked to accept the American proposition in its entirety and without further discussion, or to reject it, in which later case, as the American Commission understands, the peace negotiation will end and the peace Protocol of Washington will, consequently, be broken.” (Treaty, 213)

The American gambit worked and Spain yielded, expressing its total surrender to the United States position in the following terms:

"The government of Her Majesty, moved by lofty reasons of patriotism and humanity, will not assume the responsibility of again bringing upon Spain all the horrors of war. In order to avoid them it resigns itself to the painful strait of submitting to the law of victory, however harsh it may be, and as Spain lacks material means to defend the rights she believes are hers, having recorded them, she accepts the only terms the United States offers her for the concluding of the Treaty of Peace." (Treaty, 213)

Thus, the Treaty of Paris was signed and the United States took possession of the Philippines Islands under questionable circumstances. What follows is a question and answer on this very unusual treaty:

Question No. 1 - The American commissioners heard several testimonies from the American generals assigned in the Philippines, from experts on natural resources and from the famous English author, John Foreman, but not from any Filipino, viz:"

The testimony of no Filipino, nor representative of that people, appears to have been taken by American commissioners at Paris, who had summoned before them witnesses from all over the globe to testify about the islands and the people there. The treaty was signed, and then came the demand upon the Filipinos for immediate and absolute allegiance to the United States." (Thomas, 61)

Felipe Agoncillo, the Filipino official handpicked by President Emilio Aguinaldo to represent the Filipinos in the conference, was refused recognition and barred from presenting the case for the Filipinos. In contrast, the credentials of the representative of the Catholic Hierarchy, Bishop Placido Chapelle, were recognized and he was given the opportunity to work out a special provision in the treaty, i.e., Article VIII, which provided for the protection of the property and rights of the Catholic Church in the Philippines. Why were the Filipinos ignored and barred from the conference?

Answer: (No comment. The answer is very obvious.)

Question No. 2 - The United States annexed Puerto Rico and the Philippines, but granted Cuba its independence. Why the difference in treatment?

Answer: It must be borne in mind that the United States prided itself as the land of the free, the bastion of democracy, and enshrined in its constitution the proposition that all men are created equal. Accordingly, in dealing with the issue of acquisition of foreign territories, the administration of U.S. president William McKinley had to reckon with the constitutional restraint and libertarian tradition of the American people, lest the United States is branded a neo-colonialist or accused of being unfaithful to its democratic heritage. Be that as it may, it is now possible to speculate why the Peace Protocol was framed in such a way that Spain ceded Puerto Rico and freed Cuba, but was indecisive as far as the Philippine Islands was concerned.

The Cuban people were in a state of rebellion against Spain and, therefore, had clearly expressed their desire to be free and independent. To hold Cuba as a colony against the wishes of the Cuban people would be viewed as an act of imperialism. Hence, Article I of the Peace Protocol provided for relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba which led to its independence from foreign rule.

In the case of Puerto Rico, the people were not in the state of rebellion against Spain and did not express their desire to be free and independent. Leaving the territory in the hands of Spain or without a functional government would be irresponsible. Hence, the annexation of Puerto Rico as provided in Article II of the Peace Protocol was justifiable because temporarily holding the territory until the Puerto Ricans finally decide what they want for themselves would be viewed as humanitarian.

A different case presents itself for the Philippine Islands. The Filipinos have already thrown off the Spanish yoke and established a government of their own with full knowledge of the representatives of the U.S. government and, presumably, McKinley and Washington officials. Not only did the Filipinos express their desire to be free and independent, but they were, in fact, already administering the country and the remnants of Spanish authority were hopelessly holed up in an area called Intramuros in the besieged capital of Manila.

If the United States were true to her libertarian and democratic traditions the direction for the Philippines was no other than an independent republic. However, at this time, the idea of a colony was already being considered by the American commissioners and the Philippines came as a very attractive addition to American territory.

However, the cards were stacked against the Filipinos. For one, the British did not favor the idea of an independent Filipino republic because it would be like setting a bush fire that could spread all throughout the British empire in the orient. Attached to the treaty documents forwarded by President McKinley to the U.S. Congress were item no. 14, "Protectorates, colonies and non-sovereign states", and item no. 15,"The Federated Malay States: A sketch of growth and political organization by Francis B. Forbes.

The protection of the interest of the Catholic church was the other major factor. To the Vatican, the independence of the Filipinos would mean the confiscation of its rich farm lands, the destruction of the religious orders and perhaps the slaughter of its members. Accordingly, Cardinal Gibbons and Archbishop Ireland were instructed to move to Washington while Bishop Chapelle was sent to Paris. As later events showed these moves brought positive results most favorable to the Vatican because President McKinley was influenced to retain the Philippines as an American territory and the property and interest of the Catholic church were protected from seizure through a provision in Article VIII of the peace treaty.

The pressure brought to bear upon the United States by the British and the Vatican were the principal factors that shaped Article III of the Peace Protocol that would hold the status of Philippines in abeyance until it was successfully resolved at the Treaty of Paris in favor of annexation.

In the meantime, the administration of President William McKinley would have already perfected the clever ploy – convince the American people that the Filipinos were savages and unfit to govern themselves, and the United States was coming to educate and prepare them for self-government. This course of action was successfully executed with the implied consent of the American people, which meant like securing a license to keep the Philippines as a colony, which was what McKinley wanted in the first place.

McKinley's imperialist policy

2007-03-07T20:59:00.000-08:00

America was a latecomer in the age of imperialism when powerful nations of Europe looked down on tropical nations as objects of colonization. During this period, peoples of tropical regions were classified as lower races to be controlled by the supposedly higher races, or those people inhabiting the temperate regions. America entered this age with its more influential Wall Street decision makers embracing this imperialist idea and dictating on the course of American foreign policy.

As America looked beyond its shores in late 19th century, it saw the Philippines as a prized possession for its unexploited natural resources, for its harbors well suited for coaling stations and repair of ships, and for its strategic location for control of the commerce in the east.

U.S. republican President William McKinley effected the conquest of the Philippines under the guise of a humanitarian mission to uplift, educate and prepare the unwilling Filipinos for self-government.

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

Policy of acquisition

Acquiring the Philippines as a possession, not as new member of the American Union, was the underlying policy of the McKinley administration. Previous acquisition of territories by the United States such as Louisiana and Texas were made through adhesions to the American Union, making the inhabitants American citizens. In the case of the Philippine Islands, the McKinley administration applied the traditional European imperialist model. There was no intention of making the Philippine islands part of the United States, nor granting citizenship to the Filipinos. Rather, the purpose of the acquisition was to hold the Philippine islands as a colony, which meant keeping its inhabitants in bondage.

However, this acquisition policy was in direct contravention of the constitution of the United States and the Declaration of Independence, which upholds the right of all men to freedom, democracy and liberty. McKinley managed to wiggle out of this constitutional restraints by assuming a profile of a disinterested party, claiming that the involvement of the United States in the Philippines was humanitarian - uplifting, educating, and preparing a savage race for self-government, and not for profit.

McKinley's defining policy

President McKinley publicly announced his acquisition policy in a melodramatic tone in an interview at the White House on November 21, 1899, when he said:

"When next I realized that the Philippines had dropped into our laps I confess I did not know what to do with them. I sought counsel from all sides Democrats as well as Republicans - but got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way - I don't know how it was, but it came:

"(1) That we could not give them back to Spain - that we would be cowardly and dishonorable;

"(2) That we could not turn them over to France or Germany - our commercial rivals in the Orient - that would be bad business and discreditable.

"(3) That we could not leave them to themselves - they were unfit for self-government - and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and

"(4) That there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace, do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men from whom Christ also died.

"And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly, and the next morning I sent for the chief engineer of the War Department (our map-maker), and told him to put the Philippines on the map of the United States (pointing to a large map on the wall of this office); and there they are, and there they will stay while I am President." (Olcott, 110-111)

It is not true that President McKinley did not know what to with the Philippines when it "dropped" on America's lap as a result of the Spanish war. There are evidences to prove that the McKinley administration was keenly interested on the Philippine Islands as far back as October, 1897, which is months before the USS Maine blew up at Havana harbor which the Americans blamed on the Spaniards, and the reason for the Spanish-American war.

Perhaps, the reason why President McKinley mentioned his invocation of Divine Providence was because his audience at the time were ministers of Protestant Churches. But it cannot be denied that he wanted the message to sink into the minds of the American people - the humanitarian mission of the United States. And there was no question that his statements were the official pronouncement of his policy regarding the Philippines.

That being the case, the alternatives McKinley presented are being tested in the light of the facts obtaining at the time, as follows:

First alternative: "That we could not give them back to Spain - that we would be cowardly and dishonorable."

Aguinaldo had already crushed the Spanish army and held 9,000 prisoners of war. Spain had weakened; no reinforcements were coming. Practically all towns and cities outside Manila were in the hands of the Philippine government. The remnants of the Spanish army that sought refuge inside the city numbering less than 2,000 would not be able to put up a credible fight against the 30,000 strong Filipino army. That the Filipino forces had not moved in to take the city was a monument to the naiveté of Aguinaldo for overly trusting the Americans and a credit to Admiral Dewey who convinced Aguinaldo to wait until the main bulk of American land forces had arrived. McKinley knew this first alternative was not acceptable not because it was cowardly or dishonorable, but rather, Spain was no longer in a position to hold the Philippines given Aguinaldo's growing strength.

Second alternative:" That we could not turn them over to France or Germany - our commercial rivals in the Orient - that would be bad business and discreditable."

The concern that other powers were interested in the Philippine Islands was not an overstatement. According to Dewey among the early arrivals of foreign men-of-war, besides the British ships Linnet (May 2) and Immortalite (May 7), were the French cruiser Brieux (May 5), the Japanese cruiser Itsukushima (May 10), and the German cruisers Irene (May 6) and Cormoran (May 9). Assuming the United States turned over the Philippines to one of the powers, that power would meet a more difficult and arduous campaign than the kind of war that the American army faced. When the war with the Filipinos broke out, the Americans were already mobilized on land and strategically positioned. But if peaceable disembarkation and mobilization was not provided the American army such as they had under friendly terms with Aguinaldo, if they had to mobilize troops and war materiel from the sea under conditions of belligerency, the story of the American intervention in the Philippines would have taken a different course. The same difficulty would certainly have applied to the succeeding power.

Third alternative: "That we could not leave them to themselves - they were unfit for self-government - and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was."

This statement contradicted all impartial testimonies thus far expressed, most especially by the very representatives of the United States government.

The first to express admiration for the Filipinos was Admiral Dewey himself when he said:

"In my opinion, these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races. "(Dewey, 312)

General Charles King, who fought the Filipinos, made the following comment:

"The capability of the Filipinos for self government cannot be doubted; such men as Arellano, Aguinaldo, and many others whom I might name, are highly educated; nine tenths of the people read and write; all are skilled artisans in one way or another; they are industrious, frugal, temperate, and, given a fair start, could look out for themselves infinitely better than our people imagine. In my opinion they rank far higher than the Cubans or the uneducated negroes to whom we have given the right of suffrage." (Leonidas, 129-130).

Two navy men from Admiral Dewey's squadron, Sargent and Wilcox, toured northern Luzon and their report spoke favorably of the Aguinaldo government, as evident from these statements:

"As a tribute to the efficiency of Aguinaldo's government and to the law-abiding character of his subjects, I offer the fact that Mr. Wilcox and I pursued our journey throughout in perfect security, and returned to Manila with only the most pleasant recollections of the quiet and orderly life which we found the natives to be leading under the new regime." (PIS-V3N01, 39).

Here is a very revealing discovery by an American officer of the machinery of the Philippine government after Santa Ana, a town near Manila was overran on the second day of the war by advancing American troops:

"When we reached the headquarters at Santa Ana another surprise awaited us, for here was found some of the machinery of Aguinaldo's government. Among the papers scattered about in confusion by the retreating officials were telegrams, letters, and commissions, showing something of their system. One letter was from a township governor asking relief from his duties; a surgeon's certificate was inclosed. It had been forwarded through official channels to Aguinaldo's secretary of state and returned with abundant indorsements approved. With it was an order to the governor of the province to have a new election. Another letter was a complaint made against another local governor for mal-administration. It stated the charges in real legal form, and was duly signed. The numerous papers concerning school teachers' appointments showed that the Filipinos had already perfected arrangements for the education of the youth on a large scale. I might also mention the deeds of property, records of births, deaths, etc., to show that Aguinaldo's organization is at least not a laughable farce. I might mention also meteorological and other scientific instruments and records to show that the Filipinos didn't neglect science during those busy, warlike times. Letters dated February 4 from Malolos showed that they had a good courier system. A book on tactics, engravings of the several uniforms, beautiful topographical maps, copies of the declaration of independence and the revolutionary constitution, military and state seals, and other articles all went to show that labor and intelligence were united in their production. " (Atkinson, 44-45)

And finally, in answer to McKinley's assertion that anarchy and disorder will prevail if the Filipinos were left to themselves, here is a report of a U.S. newspaper correspondent on the take over by Filipino forces of Iloilo City on December 24, 1898 which the Spaniards abandoned after a siege of the city . He said:

"...they entered the city in the most perfect order, scattered their forces in various public buildings, policed the streets and maintained the peace and quiet of the town in a manner that would have done credit to a most highly civilized nation. There was no looting, no insult to men or women, no robbery, no drunkenness or disorder..." - (Kimball, 3)

Did all these affirmations of Filipino competence and capability for self-government fell on deaf ears at Washington, or was it reasonable to conclude that the administration of President McKinley was predisposed to acquiring the Philippines as a colony, regardless of the state and condition of the people? Obviously, the answer would be yes.

Fourth alternative: "That there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace, do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men from whom Christ also died. "This fourth alternative masqueraded the colonization plan as a humanitarian mission - America was rich and therefore needed no colonies; the Filipinos were savages and America was coming to educate, uplift and civilize them. However, succession of events confirmed that the acquisition of the Philippines was not an afterthought, but consisted of well-studied actions of the McKinley administration that started earlier than it was possible for America to get involved in Philippine affairs. Enumerated below are incidence of such well-studied actions dating as far back as the last quarter of 1897:

(1) On October 21, 1897, or four months before the U.S.S. Maine incident, orders were issued to Commodore George Dewey as follows: "... to sail for Nagasaki, Japan, and there take command of the Asiatic squadron. Before he sailed, the policy of the administration was outlined to him and he was given instructions regarding the course to pursue in the contingency of a war with Spain. He began at once to collect information regarding the Spanish forces in the Philippines."(Olcott, 39)

(2) On the 24th day of April, 1898, even before the U.S. Congress had formally declared war on Spain, another order was given as follows: "War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy them. Use utmost endeavors." (Brooks, 9).

(3) During the framing of the August 12, 1898 Peace Protocol which gave the United States the right to occupy the bay, harbor and city of Manila (not the whole Philippine islands), the United States wanted to use the word possession in completing the third article referring to the Philippine question, revealing the intention of taking over the Philippines. But Spain insisted that the word disposition be used instead because Spain did not intend to relinquish control of the Philippine islands to the United States (Brooks, 4-5)

(4) At the Paris peace conference in the last quarter of 1898, the United States peace commissioners demanded from Spain the cession of the whole archipelago with a payment of $20 million. Spain initially refused and cited the provisions of the Peace Protocol that limited the right of the United States to the bay, harbor and city. In the end, the American demand succeeded in view of what Spain considered a threat of an imminent resumption of hostilities if she refused. (Brooks, 6).

(5) As soon as the Peace Treaty was signed and without waiting for the ratification of the treaty by the United States Senate, McKinley sent instructions to General Otis to extend the military government maintained in the city of Manila to the whole of the ceded territory. McKinley could not have been unaware that the Philippine Republic was already administering all the towns and provinces outside of the city of Manila. Perhaps, he underestimated the determination of the Filipinos. He probably thought Aguinaldo would meekly submit, roll over and hand to General Otis the whole country on a silver platter.

(6) The first attempt at a peaceful American take over of the country was made in December, 1898 when General Otis, under orders from Washington, sent an expedition of 2,500 men under the command of Gen. Marcus Miller with orders to occupy the city of Iloilo. The Filipino government in Iloilo resisted and refused to allow the disembarkation of American troops. The impasse was referred by General Otis to Washington and the order was to hold the use of force and await further instructions. If Gen. Miller took the city after a fight, this action would be viewed as an aggression, something that McKinley did not want to project to the American people.

(7) A second attempt at the same objective was made by General Otis himself when he presented to Aguinaldo early the following year a modified version of the same McKinley's proclamation omitting the strong words sovereignty. The Otis version of the proclamation required all the inhabitants to recognize American military authority in consequence of the Treaty of Paris and those who did would have their life and property protected and those who did not would face terrible consequences. The Filipinos rejected the proclamation and tore down the posters. Similarly, the American forces did not react but held in check their guns and artillery. Again, McKinley did not want to appear to the American people as the aggressor.

(8) On February 4, 1899, an opportunity for McKinley to unleash the dogs of war came when hostilities between American and Filipino forces were opened which the Americans blamed on the Filipinos. Aguinaldo pleaded to stop the hostilities and sit down to thresh out the conflict, but the Americans refused, confirming the claim that the war was actually forced on the Filipinos on the eve of the U.S. Senate vote in order to force the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. McKinley needed the ratification of the treaty to provide him with the stamp of approval to proceed with the colonization of the Philippines.

(9) A facsimile of a memorandum written in Mr. McKinley's own handwriting and recording a conversation which he had with Admiral Dewey. The piece of paper was of the White House stationery, and it bore the date of October 3, 1899. The notes read: “SELF GOVERNMENT, - are they capable? No and will not be for many, many years. The United States must control and supervise giving Filipinos participation as far as capable. WHAT DOES AGUINALDO REPRESENT in population and sentiment? He has no more than 40,000 followers of all kinds out of 8 or to millions WHAT IS OUR DUTY? Keep the islands permanently. Valuable in every way HOW MANY TROOPS NEEDED? 50000 HAVE WE SHIPS ENOUGH? Ought to send some more. Recommends that Brooklyn go and smaller vessels. SHOULD WE GIVE UP THE ISLANDS? Never – never.” (Olcott, 96(a))

10. Finally, McKinley revealed the commercial purpose of retaining the Philippines in his September 16, 1898 instructions to the American Peace Commissioners who were to meet with their Spanish counterpart in Paris on October 1, 1898, viz:
“Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship can not be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade.. “ (US Papers, 7)

Aguinaldo reechoed McKinley's reason for keeping the Philippines when he said:

"Oh, dear Philippines! Blame your wealth, your beauty for the stupendous disgrace that rests upon your faithful sons. You have aroused the ambition of the Imperialists and Expansionists of North America and both have placed their sharp claws upon your entrails!" (Aguinaldo, 56).

CONCLUSION

McKinley succeeded in his grand design of acquiring the Philippines as an American colony and the American people rewarded him with a reelection. However, an assassin shot McKinley at the Pan American Exhibition at Buffalo on September 6, 1901 and he died eight days later. Sarah Vowell, in her book, Assassination Vacation, mentions that the assassin, Leon Czolgosz, found disparaging the fact that the Philippine-American war erupted over U.S. Occupation of the Philippines, saying “It does not harmonize with the teaching in our schools about our flag”.

In his book, Imperialism and Liberty, Morrison Swift makes these bold assertions:

"... McKinley recorded and pledged himself in now famous and memorable language. Said he: "I speak not of forcible annexation, because that is not to be thought of, and under our code of morality that would be criminal aggression."

But one year later, ...this man on his own initiative, without the authority of Congress or the people, more than a month before the Treaty of Peace was ratified by the Senate, and when there was no certainty that it would be ratified, issued the following astounding proclamation to the Filipinos: [text of proclamation omitted]

This proclamation drove the Filipinos into war against the United States. There was nothing left for them to do unless they consented to national enslavement. It was not only natural but right that they should go to war against us. Our Chief Man had notified them by arbitrary decree that if they did not submit to the usurped authority of the United States - "the absolute domain of military authority," he called it - they would be forced into submission by shell and grapeshot. "Honest submission," or death: they had their choice. "Honest submission," or "forcible annexation." All who did not honestly submit to the proclamation of the tyrant were to be "brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be." On the 5th of February that firmness began to be applied and 4000 heroic Filipinos who could not honestly submit to the self-made despot were killed. The man who killed them was William McKinley. The death of each one of them was groundless manslaughter, McKinley was their murderer. He was their self-condemned murderer, convicted by his own words of one year before. "I speak not of forcible annexation, because that is not to be thought of, and under our code of morality that would be criminal aggression."

Under the light of this solemn promise and its bloody repudiation McKinley reveals himself to be the crowning fraud and hypocrite of the age, who has no right to respect from any honest man in the United States. He originally declared a true American principle, that we cannot take any form of authority over a people that is opposed to that authority without criminal aggression and breaking our code of morality; this code holds of Cuba, of the Philippines, and of every foot of ground not our own under the sun that our cupidity might be disposed to seize. The breaking of this code, consciously held and publicly announced, was therefore an act of detestable piracy, bringing shame and dishonor upon the whole nation.

The administration and the imperialist press have striven to convince our people that the Filipinos are responsible for the war. This is one of the lies that we must tell each other to save a last remnant of our self-respect. But it is nevertheless a lie with no mitigation. McKinley declared war in his Proclamation, and the Filipinos began hostilities. The feeble McKinley doubtless honestly hoped that they would honestly submit to his declaration that they were to be as a conquered and subject people to the United States, without the sad necessity of being obliged to forcibly conquer them. The subterfuge did not work. They had never acknowledged the sovereignty of the United States: for the United States to declare sovereignty was therefore for the United States to declare war.

After the "criminal aggression" of McKinley's proclamation that a state of virtual war already existed, that they must submit or be killed, there was nothing for them to do but to fight. And every true American who resents this dastardly aggression by the president upon a harmless race of barbarians, should be deeply thankful that they did fight, and must hope that our arms will not be able to subdue them. No honorable American can uphold the criminal attempt of American potentates to deprive a weak race of its liberty in the name of liberty. As liberty-loving American citizens it is our duty to uphold the Filipinos in their righteous and patriotic attempt to keep our yoke from falling on them. - (Swift, 39-41)

Why Filipinos are not a patriotic people

2007-03-07T20:05:00.000-08:00

It is truly amazing that Filipinos are not a patriotic people. Yet, a decade and a hundred years ago this country teemed with great heroes.

Men like Sancho Valenzuela, Flaviano Yenko, Ananias Diokno, Maximo Abad, Luciano San Miguel, Eugenio Daza, Julian Santos, Faustino Guillermo, Ambrosio Flores, Simeon Ola, Arcadio Maxilon, Martin Delgado, Urbano Lacuna, Juan Cailles, Licerio Geronimo, Sixto Lopez, just to name a few of the unheralded. But today ineptitude, helplessness, indifference and disregard for law and order prevail. Seekers of favor, privilege and position outnumber those who are willing to make sacrifices for the country. And not one among contemporary public officials show any real interest in leading the people out of poverty, ignorance and apathy. The puzzle becomes even more pronounced whenever the question is asked why the likes of Aguinaldo, Rizal, Bonifacio, Jacinto, Del Pilar, Luna, Lopez Jaena, Mariano Ponce are nowhere to be found. Did something unusual happen then that we are not told today?

"Ang isang lahi na walang marangal na gunita hinggil sa sarili ay isang lahing
madalîng alipinin at patuloy na may isip-alipin kahit bigyan ng kalayaan." - Virgilio Almario.

( Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

Revisiting the Aguinaldo era

A diligent student of Philippine history could use the internet to get to the facts that would lead to the solution of the puzzle much faster. With some luck, he might find himself in a gold mine of information, The student would find books, pamphlets and documents containing unfamiliar accounts and events, facts that an average Filipino student could not have encountered in his school days or professional career. Indeed, so much had been deliberately missed out in Philippine school textbooks concerning the events that took place after the United States succeeded Spain as the colonial master of these islands at the turn of the twentieth century.

It will take a little while to gather the data and digest the facts, but eventually a clear scenario will form in one’s mind like several frames as in a graphical presentation. First to show would be the frame of Bonifacio, then Aguinaldo, then the battle of Manila bay, then the Filipino army and navy, then the siege of Spanish garrisons throughout Luzon, Visayas, and parts of Mindanao, then the victorious Filipino flag flying in towns and cities, then the first Filipino republic, then the armed intervention by the Americans, then the Filipino war of resistance, then the defoliation, reconcentrado and water cure, then the surrender of Filipino guerrilla fighters, then the American colonial government, then the public school system and the final frame, the new Filipino.

The student would realize no sooner that the reason why today's generation of Filipinos are not patriotic is because they are descendants of the new Filipino, or those that William Howard Taft condescendingly called the little brown brothers (Taft, 125). These were the generation of Filipinos who had undergone a process of reeducation, which the nationalist historian, Constantino, called the remaking of the Filipino. The parents were the patriotic Filipinos who fought side by side with Aguinaldo, but the offspring were taught to become subservient Filipinos of the American colonial era.

But what would likely escape notice by the unwary student is that the reeducation process was not accidental, or a result of teaching English or other American-oriented subjects. As will be proved later, the reeducation process was deliberate. It was carefully designed to erase from the memory of the Filipinos a very sad chapter in their country's history. The public school system was utilized to implement a systematic process of indoctrination in order that Filipinos will have no recollection of the horrors they went through in their heroic resistance to American occupation. That the process was successful can be gleaned from its product, the new Filipino whose descendants today are wrestling with lost national identity, unfamiliar with the blood and tears that their forefathers shed in a bitter struggle to establish a government of their own, free and independent.

McKinley's clever ploy

The story of the transformation of the Filipino from the patriotic to the subservient came about with the rise of America as a world power in late 19th century. U.S. President William McKinley wanted to take the Philippine Islands as an American colony following the British model. However, territorial expansion that ignored the rights of the inhabitants to American citizenship violated the constitution of the United States and the libertarian tradition of the American people. Nevertheless, President McKinley was obsessed and completely consumed by his imperialistic design.

He ignored the favorable opinion of Admiral Dewey and the other American generals about the capability of Filipinos for self-government and their superiority over the Cubans who the United States freed after the Spaniards were driven out of Cuba. He also refused to acknowledge the accomplishment of the Filipinos in defeating the Spaniards and establishing a de facto government that held ninety-three percent of the country and administered to ninety-four percent of the population. The so-called Philippine republic, according to Washington officials, was not recognized as a belligerent by the powers, e.g., England, United States, Germany, Japan or Russia, and therefore, for practical purposes, did not exist. But whenever the American generals needed anything from Aguinaldo - oxen, horses, wagons, timber, encampments, supplies or information, he was addressed as Commanding General of the Philippine Forces.

Rather than sympathize with a struggling people, the McKinley administration concocted a very clever ploy. The American public was made to believe that the Filipinos were savages, uncivilized, and unfit for self-government. The Filipinos were likened to the American Indians who lived among several tribes scattered all across the Philippine archipelago. McKinley presented himself as the knight in shining armor that Divine Providence had anointed to lead the Filipinos out into the bright sunlight of western civilization. (Storey, 177). But what the American public was not made privy to was the prospects of enormous profits from hemp, sugar, timber, India rubber, gold, silver and other precious metals, coaling stations, and control of commerce in the east that made the Wall Street schemers very excited about. Neither was the American public told that the Filipinos fought the Spaniards to gain their independence and will fight the Americans to defend that independence. And so McKinley's obsession to colonize the Philippines proceeded with the ayes of the members of the United States Congress and applause of the American people.

War of extermination and devastation

What Aguinaldo thought was an alliance with the Americans against Spain was eventually exposed to him as a masquerade to the real motives of the Americans. Soon after Aguinaldo had defeated the Spaniards and a large of contingent of American troops had arrived in Manila, war was commenced by the U.S. military in February 4, 1899, which influenced a wavering U.S. congress to ratify the Treaty of Paris, the treaty between Spain and the United States which ceded the Philippines to the latter, by a majority of only one vote, i.e., 57 ayes to 27 nayes. McKinley gave the Filipinos only one choice - submit to American authority or be killed. The Filipinos chose to fight a vastly superior army rather than submit to a new master. For almost a year, the Filipino army faced the superior American forces in open-field or conventional warfare only to be clobbered in each engagement. Filipino initiatives for truce were rebuffed by the Americans with a demand for an unconditional surrender of the entire Filipino army before any talks are opened. But the Filipinos refused the terms of an unconditional surrender without a clear commitment that a government under an American protectorate will be respected. And so the fighting continued.

Eventually, the succession of defeats in various battlefields forced Aguinaldo to change strategy. He issued an order to disband the 30,000 strong Filipino army in November, 1899 and constitute the officers and soldiers into guerrilla units in their home provinces. The change in strategy surprised the Americans who began to suffer heavier casualties from sneak attacks and ambuscades by Filipino guerrillas. A Washington paper printed this report, viz:

”Dispatches from Manila stating that more troops are needed and that the American army is suffering embarrassment and unnecessary losses on account of the lack of a sufficient force to occupy the territory from which the insurgents are driven, attract much attention here. “ (Swift, 257)

And from an American officer:

”Much of the news sent home by correspondents is so shamefully false that it does our cause great injury among the foreign interests here. Gen. Otis keeps sending reports that the insurrection will soon be suppressed. Nobody in the field believes such stuff. The insurgents can fight a guerilla warfare with 10,000 men, such as will keep 100,000 American troops busy for five years. In the rainy season all campaigning on a large scale must stop. Meantime the insurgents can recuperate, replenish their supplies of ammunition, go on cultivating their fields in the interior and suffer comparatively little hardship. In all the 300 years of Spanish occupation, war raged continuously in some parts of the group. The interior and larger part of Luzon never has been conquered. The volunteers have done the heavy fighting so far, and they fight all around the regulars, too. Have that Philippine strategist at Washington choked off. His articles are ludicrous. In an issue of the papers received last mail he speaks of no fighting having occurred south of the Pasig River. That is exactly where all the heaviest fighting occurred prior to the movement against Malolos. The American losses south of the Pasig River foot up over 500. “ (Swift, 261)

So the bloody conflict, the first modern guerrilla warfare in Asia, dragged on for three more years. The tenacity of the Filipinos was reflected in a statement of Teodoro Sandico, a member of the Aguinaldo cabinet, who issued a proclamation on May 16, 1899 which said in part:

“Before accepting autonomy (which we shall do only as a last resort) I think it is our duty to exhaust all our resources for war, organize all our forces, and not consider ourselves conquered until the last cartridge has been fired.” (PIS-V1N07, 21)

McKinley did not want a prolonged war because he was facing a reelection. Neither was he willing to let the American public know exactly what was happening in the Philippine islands. McKinley refused to accept General Arthur MacArthur's report that the whole Filipino nation was loyal to Aguinaldo and that practically every town served as a base of Filipino guerrilla operation with full moral and material support from the townspeople. McKinley was following a very clear objective – put the Philippines on the map of the United States. Therefore, he had to misrepresent to the American people that the war was being waged only by what he called the Tagalog tribe, and that the several other tribes were willing to accept American authority. He had to keep the American public hold on to the misconception that the Filipinos were savages and unfit to govern themselves, and justify his intrusion into their purely domestic affairs.

Accordingly, the American generals were put under severe pressure to end the war soonest because the American public might soon ask why a small savage tribe is able to resist the most powerful army in the world with 70,000 soldiers manning 500 stations by June, 1900 (Storey, 160). And it was at this point that all rules of civilized warfare were thrown aside and strict press censorship was enforced.

McKinley’s predicament and the unusually stiff resistance of the Filipino guerrillas drove the American command to adopt a counter strategy. The new strategy involved the “cutting off of the income and food of insurgents, and by crowding them so persistently with operations as to wear them out" (Ramsey, 7). The civilian population became the primary target of this new strategy who were deliberately made to suffer by such means as reconcentration, defoliation and devastation in order to force the populace deny any further support to the guerrillas and make them long for peace.

In his circular order no.22, U.S. Brigadier General Franklin Bell, in implementing his pacification campaign in Batangas province, said:

"To combat such a population, it is necessary to make the state of war as insupportable as possible, and there is no more efficacious way of accomplishing this than by keeping the minds of the people in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that living under conditions will soon become unbearable. Little should be said. The less said the better. Let acts, not words, convey the intention." (Storey 120).

Accordingly, the war turned into a war of extermination and devastation characterized by a very loopsided ratio ratio of combat prisoners vis-a-vis deaths (historical data is about 4 prisoners to 1 dead), accompanied by torture, indefinite incarcerations, indiscriminate killings, defoliation and devastation of towns and farms, and fueled mainly by racist contempt - a colored race had no right to stand up before a supposedly superior white race - accentuated by retaliation from the Filipino side.

A prominent American anti-imperialist, George Seawall Boutwell, observed that one pretext for the war, has been the assertion that the Filipinos were uncivilized, and, therefore, that they were not entitled to consideration. (Willis, 250). The Filipinos were called niggers, gugus, khakias and ladrones. As the war dragged on American loathing of Filipinos amplified to higher levels. One observer who described the conflict as a war of extermination said:

“ ...the slaughter of women and children was frightful, the Americans burning and devastating all before them, conducting a war of extermination and shooting every Filipino.” (Valentine, 18).

Torture was resorted to all throughout the islands. John Morgan Gates said that by the middle of 1900, Americans and Macabebes resorted to the water cure and other forms of terror. They seized people and forcibly filled their stomachs with water until they revealed the hiding place of guerrillas, supplies, or arms. (Gates, 175). According to Blount, the water cure was practically the only way the Americans could get a Filipino betray his own countrymen. (Blount, 204).There was no room for neutrals. Every inhabitant should either be an active friend or be classed as an enemy. (Ramsey, 49)

Reconcentration was extensively used. Civilians were herded into designated security zone and any person, animal, food, or anything useful to the guerrillas, that were found outside the security zone were either killed or destroyed. U.S. General J.W. Bell, in his report of December 6, 1901 to Washington discloses the methods he will employ to rid Batangas of rebels, viz:

"I am now assemblying in the neighborhood of 2,500 men who will be used in columns of fifty men each. I take so large a command for the purpose of thoroughly searching each ravine, valley and mountain peak for insurgents and for food, expecting to destroy everything I find outside the towns. All able-bodied men will be killed or captured... These people need a thrashing to teach them some good common sense, and they should have it for the good of all concerned." (Storey, 120)

Moorefield Storey quotes a Republican Congressman who visited the islands in 1902 expressed these observations:

"You never hear of any disturbance in Northern Luzon; and the secret of its pacification is, in my opinion, the secret of the pacification of the archipelago. They never rebel in Northern Luzon because there isn't anybody there to rebel. The country was marched over and cleaned in a most resolute manner. The good Lord in heaven only knows the number of Filipinos that were put under ground. Our soldiers took no prisoners, they kept no records; they simply swept the country, and wherever or whenever they could get hold of a Filipino they killed him. The women and children were spared, and may now be noticed in disproportionate numbers in that part of the islands." (Storey, 121-122)

The indiscriminate target of American military campaign was best described by John Rich McDill when he said:

"During our military operations in the field we saw a most beautiful country, but week after week we passed through abandoned and silent towns, villages, and fields, ... The women and children, the old and feeble, and the sick, were hiding unsheltered in the woods and mountains. We, a perfectly armed and equipped army of the most powerful republic in the world, were pursuing and killing sad-eyed little brown men and boys, who were scantily clothed, poorly nourished, and almost unarmed..." (McDill, 2).

Despite the strict censorship employed by the U.S. military on reports by U.S. national newspaper correspondents, numerous documented accounts of the use of harsh methods found their way into local newspapers from letters of American soldiers to their families in the United States. This one in San Francisco Call from a corporal of the California regiment:

"We sleep all day here, as we do duty all night walking the streets. We make every one get into his house by 7 P. M., and we only tell a man once. If he refuses we shoot him. We killed over 300 men the first night. They tried to set the town on fire. If they fire a shot from a house, we burn the house down, and every house near it, and shoot the natives, so they are pretty quiet in town now." (Swift, 249)

And this, from Capt. Elliot of the Kansas regiment as told by the Chattanooga Times:

"Talk about war being hell, this war beats the hottest estimate ever made of that locality. Caloocan was supposed to contain 17,000 inhabitants. The Twentieth Kansas swept through it, and now Caloocan contains not one living native. Of the buildings, the battered walls of the great church and the dismal prison alone remain. The village of Maypaja, where our first fight occurred on the night of the 4th, had 5,000 people in it at that day - now not one stone remains upon top of another." (Swift, 249)

And this letter from A. A. Barnes, Battery G, 3d U. S. Artillery, published first in Greensburg, Indiana., Standard:

"Last night one of our boys was found shot and his stomach cut open. Immediately orders were received from Gen. Wheaton to burn the town and kill every native in sight; which was done to a finish. About 1,000 men, women, and children were reported killed. I am probably growing hard-hearted, for I am in my glory when I can sight my gun on some dark skin and pull the trigger.... Tell all my inquiring friends that I am doing everything I can for Old Glory.... (!!! ). (Swift, 253)

Some of these letters led to investigations by the U.S. Congress. A transcript of one such investigation contained the testimony of two American soldiers, William Lewis Smith and Charles Riley (Riley), describing in detail the administration of water cure to the presidente (mayor) of Igbarras, Iloilo and three of the town’s policemen, including the subsequent burning of the whole town.

The new American strategy worked. By sowing fear, inflicting pain, causing death, or destroying property, the Americans succeeded in forcibly isolating the guerrillas from the civilian population, the main support base, and this was the principal factor that caused the weakening of the resistance and bringing it to an end. General Miguel Malvar, the last of the great Filipino generals to surrender, in explaining why he and three thousand of his men gave up in April, 1902, wrote that he could no longer bear the sufferings of the people.

The estimate of the death toll in Luzon attributed to the war was one-sixth of the population. (Storey, 121). The population of the Philippine Islands in 1900 was somewhere between eight to nine million. An American war protester made this comment:

"There is no doubt that we have caused the destruction of more lives in the last three years than the Spanish did in any century of their misrule. " (Winchester, 13).

Blot on an immaculate linen

Definitely, against the backdrop of the great American heritage, this McKinley misadventure in the Philippines was destined to become an ugly episode in the glorious pages of American history. It would be a contradiction to the long held constitutional and democratic principles of liberty that the American people hold dear - that men are created equal and have inherent rights to freedom and democracy. Certainly, American authorities would not allow the true story of Philippine conquest blemish American honor. Therefore, it would be logical to assume that steps were taken to muddle this section of Filipino history, erase it from the memory of the Filipinos, make them forget the horrors they went through, and hide it from the prying eyes of future generation.

True enough, steps were taken to make Filipinos forget!

Francis Burton Harrison, the first Democrat-appointed Governor General of the Philippine Islands, whose administration was marked by liberality and sympathy to the Filipino cause for independence, described the steps taken:

"The exhibition of the Filipino flag, under which they had fought their war against us, was made by statute a criminal offense. Patriotism was never encouraged in the schools, nor ideas which tended to arouse their own national consciousness. Everything which might help to make the pupils understand their own race or think about the future of the country was carefully censored and eliminated. Nevertheless, the good sound stock of American ideas which they received instructed them inevitably in our own democratic ideals, and in our pride in own liberties." (Harrison, 45).

The irreconcilable former General of the Filipino army, Artemio Vibora Ricarte, who took to his grave his refusal to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, preferring solitary confinement, then a self-exile in Yokohama, Japan, saw beyond the facade of American altruism an insidious design when he said:

"The truth is America taught our young people the things that commemorate the lives of Lincoln and Washington in order that we will forget in our hearts the exemplary deeds of our nation's great heroes. The Americans believe that once we are able to speak good English is proof enough that we have learned, yet in our minds is being instilled a wrong thinking, the superiority of the white race." (author's translation of Tagalog text found in Ricarte[2], 12).

Many political and military leaders of the defunct Aguinaldo government accepted generous offer of high position in the American colonial government. Those who did not and refused to take the oath of allegiance to the United States were exiled to the Marianas.

War relics and voluminous captured Filipino government records and documents officially labeled as Philippine Insurgents Records (PIR) were shipped to the United States. American teachers came to inaugurate an American-sponsored public school system. English supplanted Spanish, a language change that was not done by the Americans in Puerto Rico or Cuba, and with it went the loss of Hispanic literary and intellectual heritage, making the succeeding generation of Filipinos fertile grounds for the propagation of the good sound stock of American ideas.

Filipino schoolchildren were taught to revere America, and belittle the land of their birth. The first line of a beautiful Tagalog love song, for instance, was translated to English with emphasis on the state of being borne poor, instead of placing the focus on the demigod character of the hero, who was born on top of a mountain with the clouds as his cradle; he played with thunder and was caressed by lightning. In another case, the popular Tagalog folk song, the bahay-kubo, was translated to English as “My nipa hut is very small”, again, the emphasis on smallness. And yet this popular folk song is supposed to depict a prosperous small rural farm where all kinds of vegetables abound.

Another important step that American authorities did was discredit Aguinaldo and designate Rizal as the hero of the Filipinos. Carl Crow, says:

"Among other things the Filipino people lacked to make them a nation was a hero - a safe hero, the only safe ones, of course, being dead. Aguinaldo held the highest place in the eyes of his countrymen, as the leader of the recent insurrection, but he was ... one who might be of considerable danger to the American administration. It was expedient to establish a hero whose fame would overshadow that of Aguinaldo, and thereby lessen that leader’s ability to make future trouble. ... Governor Taft, ... at once fixed on Jose Rizal…" (Crow, 53).

The designation of Jose Rizal as the national hero was calculated not only to lessen Aguinaldo's ability to make future trouble. It had the effect also, and this is the more important, of making future generation of Filipinos identify the Spaniards as villains and the Americans as saviors. On the other hand, if Aguinaldo were the national hero, future celebration of the hero's day would not only highlight the victory over the Spaniards by the Filipinos and the government they established, but also the unjust war of conquest waged by President McKinley on the Filipinos to deprive them of their freedom. The choice of Rizal over Aguinaldo saved the Americans from being remembered as the butcher of the Filipinos, the pillager of their land, and the destroyer of their republic.

The new Filipino

From the day the American colonial administration was inaugurated in 1901 the new Filipino emerged, known today as the little brown Americans. These are Filipinos by appearance, but Americans in thought, word and deed. True to Harrison's specifications, the new Filipino spoke English very fluently, knew much about American ideals, history, arts, literature and music by heart, but have a very vague notion of their ancestors' struggle for freedom, or their sacred dreams and aspirations that drove them to arms. They would usually turn into very competent professionals, but would lack one very important trait – patriotism, thanks to the methodical classroom strategy that Harrison described.

While the legislature, the judiciary and executive cabinet positions were filipinized during the later part of American colonial government the Department of Education was kept under American control. The process of making Filipinos forget did not stop after the Americans let go of the Philippines in 1946. A Grade IV pupil in the year 1951 was still being taught to sing Star spangled banner, God bless America, etc. By the time the same child stepped into High School, he would be made to study American history on the First Year and in later years memorize the address of Lincoln at Gettysburg and the poem, The Song of Hiawatha. In other words, for more than five decades the Filipino was subjected to something that was considered in the cold war as diabolical - brainwashing.

In sum, the American conquest of the Philippines was not just a case of subjugating an unwilling people. It was also a case of making the same people forget that they were subjugated.

Conclusion

For as long as schoolchildren are taught Jack and Jill, rather than Leron Leron Sinta, and are precluded from learning or even hearing the tune of Pamulenawen or Sarumbanggi, the Filipino is doomed to national perdition. In other words, the malaise that afflicts the Filipino character will remain unrecognized and no serious steps will be taken to correct it. Unless the Filipino national character change the heavy burden of corrupted sense of identity will blur the vision of the future and the Filipino will be confused which path leads to national liberation . The salvation of the Filipino will not come from foreign aid, foreign investment, preferential treatment, free trade , or from remittances of OFWs. Rather, it would depend primarily on the rejuvenation of the Filipino mind, the rekindling the spirit of 1898 - the love of country and the aspiration to be free and independent. The best recourse of the Filipino would be to reclaim the patriotic character of the heroes held hostage by the muddled past, and to acknowledge that the Filipino race could accomplish great things just as Aguinaldo did. It will give the Filipino today the confidence, strength and courage to remedy the present and approach the future.

But a nation can only succeed if the people makes sacrifices. And without patriotism there can be no sacrifice.

Who really started the Filipino-American war?

2007-01-26T17:23:00.000-08:00

Generations of Filipinos have been taught that the bloody Philippine-American war broke out on the night of February 4, 1899 because a Filipino lieutenant and three of his men allegedly refused to heed the challenge to halt at the approach of the American post at the San Juan bridge in the outskirts of Manila and were fired upon and killed by the American sentry, Private Grayson.

(Photo source:University of Michigan digital library)

A reliable source, however, presented an entirely different story, exactly the opposite of the textbook version. Felipe Buencamino, a cabinet official of the Filipino government in Malolos, testified before the U.S. Senate that an American patrol forced its way into Filipino lines and provoked the unwary Filipinos into a fight. In the ensuing exchanges of fire that spread across a fifteen mile stretch, three thousand Filipino soldiers whose officers were mostly on leave on that night, fell dead on the first day of battle (Blount,193).

But U.S. Republican President William McKinley took advantage of the resulting conflict to place the blame on Aguinaldo, secure from the U.S. senate the ratification of the Treaty of Paris and unleash the dogs of war. What followed next was now history - the 30,000 strong Filipino army was routed by the Americans; the towns and provinces held and administered by the newly independent Philippine government were forcibly taken; the Malolos republic, the first in Asia, was dismantled, and the Filipino people was forced at gunpoint to submit to American rule.

Two versions of the incident

The textbook version of the event of February 4, 1899 being taught to this day in Philippine history class goes as follows:

"On the evening of February 4, Private Grayson, of the First Nebraska Volunteers, was standing on guard at the American end of this bridge; there was no moon, and the darkness was exceedingly dense, when there suddenly appeared on the bridge a Filipino lieutenant and three privates, all strongly armed, who advanced in perfect step toward him. In obedience to his instructions from the Officer of the Guard, he called, 'Halt!' The summons was deliberately unheeded. Crouching somewhat, with guns in hands, they stealthily moved forward. Again Grayson cried out in a challenging tone, 'Halt!' This second warning was also ignored. The Filipinos moved even more rapidly toward him than before. They were now within a few feet of him. He fired. The Filipino lieutenant fell dead." (Coursey, 72-73)

Compare the above with the following version which has yet to find its way into the pages of Philippine history books, viz:

"On the 4th of February the towns of Santa Ana and San Juan del Monte were under the command of General Ricarte and Colonel San Miguel. On this day those two commanders abandoned their posts and went to a ball, leaving a major by the name of Gray, about 26 years of age, very young and without experience, in command of about 1,800 troops. They extended along the eastern part of the outskirts of Manila and were about half a mile distant from the American troops. We took the deposition of this major, who said that about 9 o'clock p.m. the sergeant of the guard came to his headquarters and told him that a party of American troops desired to cross their lines or were attempting to cross their lines, which was opposed by the Philippine guards. At this time a shot was heard; that he could not say for certain whether the shot came from the American command or from the men under his command, but he ran to the place from which the shot appeared to come, and seeing the American troops in a belligerent attitude gave an order to fire. That is the way the hostilities began." (Buencamino, 3)

The foregoing is an account Felipe Buencamino, Sr. which was taken from the transcript of a hearing conducted by the U.S. Senate regarding the Philippine question, and could be considered the official Filipino version of the Febuary 4, 1899 incident.

[The National Historical Institute (NHI) of the Philippines removed on February 4, 2004 the historical marker that had been on the San Juan bridge for years and transferred it to a site at the corner of Sociego and Silencio streets in Sta. Mesa, Manila. Grayson mentioned Sta. Mesa and not San Juan as the village that the Nebraska regiment was ordered to occupy where the shooting incident happened.]

Who is the aggessor?

The textbook version tagged the Filipinos as the aggressors because they continued to approach the American sentry notwithstanding the challenge to halt. In the Filipino version, the aggressors were the American soldiers because they crossed into Filipino lines and the Filipino guards opposed it.

The intrusion of the Americans into Filipino-held territory was also cited by Charles E. Russell, a famous American writer-journalist, who wrote that it was the Americans who violated the demarcation lines, viz:

"On February 4, 1899, after the American lines outside the city had been advanced a mile into what was indisputably Filipino territory, an order came to push them still farther. The Filipino officer in command of that sector made the usual protest. It was reported to the American commander, Colonel Stotsenburg, of the Nebraska contingent. In response, he advised another advance in the same direction." (Russell, 92)

Private Grayson, the American soldier who fired the first shots of the war, in a letter cited by U.S. Senator Pettigrew, said that it was the "the damn bullheadedness of the officers in invading insurgent territory that was responsible for that shot." (Pettigrew, 270) Grayson’s statement contradicted the textbook version and confirmed that the American soldiers indeed crossed into Filipino lines and fired the first shots, resulting in an exchange of fire.

The loose alliance

Why would the Americans start a war with the Filipinos who considered the former an ally in the war against Spain? McKinley wanted the Philippine islands as an American colony. But the 30,000 strong Filipino Revolutionary Army stood as the main stumbling block. And war which the Filipinos themselves would start was needed to justify the use of superior force against the upstart Filipino army. McKinley was very careful in pursuing this course lest he ended up a conqueror and not the benefactor that he wanted himself viewed by the American people. He took advantage of the February 4 incident to drag Filipinos into a war, throw the blame on them and achieve his dream of putting the Philippine islands on the map of the United States.

McKinley's dream of acquiring the Philippine islands did not occur to Aguinaldo when he was sought on April 24, 1898 by Spencer Pratt, the United States Consul in Singapore. An arrangement for a general cooperation with Admiral (then Commodore) Dewey was agreed with assurances that Philippine independence would be respected. Dewey had already sailed for Manila when informed of the arrangement with Aguinaldo, but nevertheless, he agreed and cabled Consul Pratt to send Aguinaldo in.

After Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila bay on May 1, 1898, the Americans controlled the bay and harbor of Manila, in addition to the Cavite arsenal that the Spanish marines surrendered to Dewey. As the Spanish flag was still hoisted over the city, Dewey needed land forces to drive the Spaniards out. Aguinaldo came very handy for the purpose. Mr. Wildman, the American Consul in Hong Kong, facilitated the expatriation of Aguinaldo and thirteen of his staff to Cavite, assuring Aguinaldo that the United States was actuated by the same feeling for the Filipinos as it was in undertaking the war to free the Cubans from the Spain.

On May 19, 1898, Aguinaldo was brought to Cavite from Hongkong by one of Dewey's ship, the McCullough. After being assured that the United States had no intention of keeping the islands and would undoubtedly recognize its independence, Aguinaldo undertook the task of renewing the revolution against Spain. He issued three proclamations on May 24, 1898, explaining the reason why he had returned, the presence of the Americans and the need to renew the revolution. Aguinaldo's call spread like wildfire and leaders of the prior uprising rallied behind him and declared their adhesion to his cause. Donations and army enlistments flooded the headquaters of Aguinaldo in Cavite, enabling him to raise a fairly large army, including a small navy.

[Admiral (then Commodore) Dewey provided the initial cache of arms consisting of about 200 Mauser rifles and a few cannon pieces that were taken from the Cavite arsenal which the Spanish marines previously surrendered. The first shipment of arms was procured through the American Consul in Hongkong, Mr. Wildman, and consisted of 3,000 stand of breechloading Remington rifles and catridges. The shipment was paid out of the funds that Aguinaldo set aside in Hongkong for use in renewing the revolution should the Spaniards fail to implement the reforms promised under the peace treaty of Biak-na-bato. Additional arms were secured from captured Spanish garrisons and additional shipments from abroad which were handled by a group of self-exiled Filipinos that eventually became the propaganda arm called Comite Central Filipino. The soldiers were also provided with uniforms sewn from imported blue drilling cotton cloth.]

Visayan men serving in the Spanish army, notably in the 74th regiment and another regiment, defected to the rebels in late March. Native militias organized by the Spanish authorities to fight the Americans and placed under the command of a former rebel General, Pio del Pilar, similary joined Aguinaldo. These additions greatly raised the morale and fighting capability of the Filipino army. Dewey estimated Aguinaldo had about 25,000 troops, but "..they could have any number of men; it was just a matter of arming them." (Blount, 23)

In less than a month, all Spanish garrisons in the province of Cavite and surroundings were quickly overran and subsequent expeditions to the rest of Luzon, the islands of Mindoro, Palawan, Batanes, Samar, Leyte, Cebu, the provinces of Iloilio, Antique and Agusan, Cagayanes, Zamboanga, successfully hoisted the Filipino flag in those liberated provinces. By June 30, 1898, Aguinaldo had practically crushed the Spanish army, took 9,000 prisoners, declared Philippine independence, established a government, and surrounded the city of Manila. Agunaldo's fete did not escape the notice of Dewey who reported to Washington his admiration of Aguinaldo's accomplishment. But when Dewey was told that the time had come for the Filipinos to take the city of Manila, Dewey advised to hold the attack until the arrival of the bulk of American troops, to which Aguinaldo agreed.

Disowning the alliance

While the Filipinos were celebrating their succession of victories, American troops started arriving and by end of August the number swelled to more than 20,000 men. Some suspicious Filipino generals began to question the presence of American troops in view of the fact that the Spanish army was practically defeated. Aguinaldo never entertained the idea that the American army was eventually going to be used against him. He kept his trust on the Americans, assiting them in securing supplies - ponies, oxen, carts, fresh provisions. Aguinaldo even gave up large, newly liberated areas in the outskirts of the city of Manila for use as encampments of newly arrived American soldiers, including defenses and entrenchments which were built by Filipino troops in preparation for the assault of Manila. By this maneuver, the Americans gained tactical advantage, taking positions between the Filipinos and the remnants of the Spanish forces in Intramuros.

The unwary Aguinaldo did not realize he was only being used by the Americans. One American author described this American treatment of Aguinaldo as follows:

"'Play Aguinaldo for a sucker! String him along until Manila is captured - and then don't do a thing to him, but get out the Gatling guns.' This is inferential from the mutilated and asterisk bestrewed cablegrams set forth in the records of Doc. 62 and Mess. and Doc., Vols. 3 and 4. Furthermore these records show that Aguinaldo and the insurgents up to the time of the capture of Manila were treated as allies to be made use of' by the representatives of our government with the full sanction of President McKinley, and in view of the facts clearly presented to him that they were fighting for independence and expected recognition of their cause from the United States." (Thomas, 87)

The seemingly deceitful treatment of Aguinaldo by the American naval and military commanders was clearly expressed by Colonel James Russell Codman of an old, wealthy and respected family of New England, viz:

"It is an undeniable fact, proved by unquestionable evidence, accessible to any citizen who will take the pains to obtain it, that Aguinaldo's assistance in the war with Spain was solicited by United States officials; that he and his friends were used as allies by the American naval and military commanders; that, until after the capture of Manila, to which they contributed, they were allowed to believe that the independence of the Philippine Islands would be recognized by the American government; and that it was not until after the American forces in the islands had been made strong enough to be able - as was supposed - to conquer the islanders, that the mask was thrown off. Independence was then refused them, and the purpose of the president to extend the sovereignty of the United States over them by military force was openly proclaimed. That the Filipinos resisted, and that they took up arms against foreign rule, was something that ought to have been expected; for it is exactly what Americans would have done." (Codman, 1)

In the assault of Manila on August 13, 1898. U.S. General Wesley Merritt, the commanding officer of American forces, directed the operation under strict orders from Washington not to allow Filipino troops inside the city or enter into any unauthorized agreement with Aguinaldo. The Spanish authorities, through the Belgian consul, Mr. Andre, secretly worked out an arrangement with the Americans whereby a token resistance would precede the capitulation of the city for the purpose of saving the honor of Spain. The Filipinos, who were left out in the pre-arranged capitulation, assaulted from four directions. The column of General Pio del Pilar took Sampaloc; that of General Gregorio del Pilar's, Tondo, Pritil and Paseo de Azcarraga [Claro M. Recto Avenue]; that of General Noriel's, Singalong and Paco; that of General Ricarte's, Sta. Ana, and pursued the Spaniards all the way to Intramuros. (Aguinaldo, 39)

When Filipino troops attempted to enter the walled city the American soldiers blocked the entry points. A very tense atmosphere ensued that was ready to explode into a firefight had it not been for Filipino Generals Noriel and Ricarte and U.S. General Thomas Anderson, whose friendly relations diffused the situation. Anderson telegraphed Aguinaldo in Bacoor asking him to order his troops out of Intramuros in order to prevent a bloody confrontation, and the order was given. Reluctantly, the Filipinos moved out of the walled city. The other Filipino generals wanted to take the opportunity to strike at the Americans, but Aguinaldo stayed calm and refused to be pushed into a war. He continued to entertain the hope that the promises of Consul Pratt, Consul Wildman and Admiral Dewey would be respected by the McKinley administration, if not, by the United States Congress. With the surrender of Manila, the land area controlled by the Americans significantly increased.

U.S. General Elwell S. Otis, who took over from General Merritt on August 21, 1898, continued to do what his predecessor had done - maltreat Aguinaldo. General Otis demanded that Filipino troops evacuate the city of Manila and suburbs by September 15 beyond the demarcation lines marked on a map that Otis presented to Aguinaldo. Otis claimed that the August 12 Peace Protocol signed in Washington D.C. between Spain and the United States gave the latter the right to occupy the bay, harbor and city of Manila. Aguinaldo questioned the inclusion of some villages and tried to secure a written commitment that the same position of the troops will be restored to the Filpinos should the United States decide to leave the islands to Spain. But General Otis simply ignored him.

When Otis realized that the Filipinos were not showing signs of evacuating the city and suburbs he gave an ultimatum on September 13 threatening to use force. Aguinaldo gave in and on September 15, while the congress of the first Philippine republic was being inaugurated at Malolos, four thousand Filipino soldiers in their bright blue drilling uniforms and every man with his rifle marched out of the city of Manila to the cadence of the ninety piece Pasig band, amidst the enthusiastic shouts of a multitude that lined the streets. As Colonel Juan Cailles and his brigade passed by the Wyoming barracks near the city walls and cheered by American soldiers an observer remarked that ".. it sounded strange to hear one force cheering another which the day before was looked on as half an enemy." (Stickney, 296-297)

Like a cue from a prepared script, more incidence of maltreatment followed. The following incidents were enough reason to commence war against the Americans but these failed to provoke Aguinaldo:

(1) On September 23, 1898, Dewey ordered the seizure of the 700 ton Filipino steamer, the Patria, which was disguised as the Abbey and registered as an American steamer. This vessel was clandestinely smuggling arms and ammunitions for the Filipino army. The seizure of the steamer was protested by the Filipinos to no avail.

(2) The following month, Dewey suddenly seized all thirteen other Filipino vessels that constituted the Filipino navy.
[Ships were also acquired by the Revolutionary government of Aguinaldo. The native crew of Spanish commercial vessel, the Purisima Concepcion, mutinied, killed its twelve Spanish officers, hoisted a Filpino flag and joined Aguinaldo. The ship was fitted with guns taken from sunken Spanish ships in the bay and rechristened Filipinas. Another vessel, the Taaleno, was donated by the rich, patriotic Agoncillo family of Batangas. The addition of eight captured Spanish launches and three more vessels of greater dimensions that were purchased from Singapore – Balayan, Taal and Bulusan - constituted the flotilla of what could be considered today as the first Philippine naval force. These steamers flew the Filipino flag, moved in and out of Manila Bay, were saluted by Dewey's ships, and usually laden with troops, arms and ammunition, supplies and mails that regularly sailed to Northern Luzon, the Bicol provinces, the Visayas and some parts of Mindanano. The converted warship, Filipinas, had its first engagement in early July when it proceeded to Subic bay and bombarded the Spanish garrison at Isla de Grande. Although the bombardment was ineffective the Spaniards probably thought their situation was hopeless and decided to raise the flag of surrender. The German gunboat Irene came to the rescue and approached the Filipinas to take it as prisoner, claiming the flag it flew was not recognized as a belligerent. The Filipinos hurriedly hauled down the Filipino flag and raised a white flag and left to tell Aguinaldo of the incident. Aguinaldo complained to Dewey, who immediately dispatched two American gunboats - the Concord and the Raleigh. Upon seeing the approach of the American vessels, the German gunboat left. Shells were fired towards the Spanish garrison and 500 Spanish marines surrendered and were turned over to Aguinaldo with instructions from Dewey to treat them fairly.]
(3) After the Treaty of Paris was signed in December 10, 1898, but before its ratification by the U.S. Senate, McKinley ordered General Otis to effect the establishment of a military government that will administer the islands with him, Otis, as Governor General. The formal protest of Aguinaldo, who took it as an affront to his position as president of the Philippine republic, was ignored.

(4) Almost simultaneous with McKinley's order to Otis, General Marcus Miller sailed for Iloilo to occupy the city. The Ilonggo general, Martin Delgado, and his Tagalog aide, Ananias Diokno, opposed the disembarkation of American troops without prior authorization from Aguinaldo. General Miller could have used force to break the impasse, but he preferred to lay in wait in Iloilo harbor for a more opportune time because a forcible occupation of the Iloilo at that time, without a ratified treaty, would be considered aggression. The opportune time came in less than two months, i.e., on February 4, 1899, the date hostilities were opened, and Iloilo fell into American hands after a quixotic resistance by the Ilonggos.

Filipinos already administering the islands

It should be recalled that prior to February 4, the Americans were confined within the limits of the city of Manila and the Filipinos held the rest of the country. An importat document, the Memorial to the Senate of the United States, which was presented by Felipe Agoncillo to the State Department and copied to the U.S. Senate, articulated the situation, viz:

"America is in actual possession at this time [around October, 1898 - author] of 143 square miles of territory, with a population of 300,000, while the Philippine Government is in possession and control of 167,845 square miles, with a population of 9,395,000, and only a few scattered Spanish garrisons are to be found in islands having an area of 51,630 square miles, with a population of 305,000. The figures, as to the Spanish possessions, should be diminished, and those of the Philippine Government enlarged, by virtue of the fact that the inhabitants of the islands where Spanish troops yet remain have practically confined such troops to the narrow quarters of their garrison towns." (Atkinson, 4)

In other words, in terms of land area, the Philippine government held ninety-three percent of the country, while the United States, only seven percent. In terms of population, the Philippine government administered to ninety-four percent of the people, while the United States, to only three percent. Unfortunately, no weight was given to the memorial because no official acknowledgment was received from the U.S. State Department. A similar document in the form of a protest was also ignored by the American and Spanish peace commissioners at the Paris conference during their deliberations from October 1, 1898 to December 10, 1898, the date McKinley signed the treaty.

War needed to ratify the treaty

Unknown to Aguinaldo, General Otis was actually facing a problem. McKinley's orders, originally given to General Merritt, to establish immediately a military government that will administer American authority on all of the islands, had not been accomplished. General Otis knew he could not comply with the order because the only territory that the Americans occupied was the city of Manila which the Spaniards yielded in an act of surrender, and later qualified by the Peace Protocol of August 12. The Treaty of Paris which was supposed to cede the islands to the United States, although signed by McKinley, was not effective until the U.S. Senate had ratified it. It did not clothe the American forces with authority to forcefully evict the Filipinos from the territories they held and doing so would have been considered criminal aggression.

But the situation was not favorable to the Americans because the Filipinos had established a functioning government that administered the policitical, social and commercial affairs of the islands, including the regulation of customs at all major ports excepting the port of Manila. General Otis knew that the only way to implement the instructions of McKinley was to get the Philippine government out of the way and raise the American flag over the dead bodies of Filipino soldiers. This, of course, meant opening hostilities with the Filipinos.

The treaty of peace between Spain and the United States was up for a U.S. senate vote on February 6. The expectation was the treaty would not be ratified because the senate was lukewarm to the idea of administering an archipelago 10,000 miles away from the U.S. mainland. John Foreman, the widely quoted English historian said:

"A week before the vote was taken it was doubtful whether the necessary two-thirds majority could be obtained. It was a remarkable coincidence that just when the Republican Party was straining every nerve to secure the two or three wavering votes, the first shots were exchanged between a native and an American outpost in the suburbs of the capital." (Foreman, 486-487)

U.S. Senator Pettigrew supported the contention that the unilateral extension of American outpost lines was the primary cause of the outbreak of the war. He said that the Filipinos were patrolling what they thought were their side of the demarcation line when the incident occurred. Here is the statement of the senator:

"It appears that there was a town between the lines of the two armies, occupied by the forces of Aguinaldo - a town 150 yards in advance of the line of the American troops - and that Otis wished to obtain possession of it. He therefore entered into an agreement to have Aguinaldo withdraw his pickets therefrom and retire to a greater distance. This was done. On the night after this had been accomplished a patrol of the insurgents entered the abandoned town. A patrol is not a war party; a patrol is simply to pick up stragglers. They had occupied the place the night before, and they sent a patrol in the evening to see if any of their men had remained behind - if there were any stragglers in this village. We had occupied the place as a picket station, and when these Malays, who do not speak our language, came along, a Nebraska boy ordered them to halt, and they did not halt." (Pettigrew, 214)

The senator also read before the U.S. senate a letter from a soldier named Abram L. Mumpher from Colorado, supporting the claim that Americans intruded into Philippine territory, viz:

"The Nebraska regiment had been sent to Santa Mesa. Aguinaldo had vigorously protested against this and pointed out to General Otis that Santa Mesa was outside the line of the protocol. General Otis looks it up and admits to Aguinaldo that such is the case (pages 20 and 21, General Otis's report), but holds fast to the position. Here, outside the limits of the protocol, in an effort to make the insurgents move back a sentry post, the first shot was fired. Grayson, the man who fired that shot, told me, on board the Hancock, as his regiment was ready to sail for America, that it was "the damn bullheadedness of the officers in invading insurgent territory" that was responsible for that shot. But we fired the second shot and third shot before we got a response. And this was two days before the Senate was to vote upon the peace treaty, and many of the insurgent officers away from the firing line! This is the way the insurgents made what the President calls a "foul attack" upon us. But the Filipinos returned the fire and the war was on." (Pettigrew, 270)

Filipinos did not want war

The Filipinos did not want a war with the Americans. If they did, war would have broken out much earlier. Atkinson, a noted anti-imperialist of Boston, Massachusetts, cited a report of General MacArthur about an incident on February 2, 1899, or two days before the outbreak of hostilities, indicating that Filipino officers respected the demarcation line separating the two armies:

"The original note from these headquarters, which was prepared after conference with the department commander, was carried by Major Strong, who entered the insurgent lines and placed the paper in the hands of Colonel San Miguel. The answer of Colonel San Miguel was communicated in an autograph note, which was written in the presence of Major Strong, who also saw Colonel San Miguel write an order to his officer at the outpost in question, directing him to withdraw from the American side of the line." (Atkinson, 37)

According to Aguinaldo, the Filipinos could not have started the war. On that day, being Saturnday, many Filipino officers were on leave and only General Pantaleon Garcia was at his post at Maypajo. Here is Aguinaldo's statement:

"While I, the Government, the Congress and the entire populace were awaiting the arrival of such a greatly desired reply [proposal for an independent Philippines under American protectorate - author], ... there came the fatal day of 4th February, during the night of which day the American forces suddenly attacked all our lines, which were in fact at the time almost deserted, because being Saturday, the day before the regular feast day, our Generals and some of the most prominent officers had obtained leave to pass the Sabbath with their respective families. General Pantaleon Garcia was the only one who at such a critical moment was at his post in Maypajo, north of Manila, Generals Noriel, Rizal and Ricarte and Colonels San Miguel, Cailles and others being away enjoying their leave. …Filipinos could never be the aggressors as against the American forces, with whom we had sworn eternal friendship and in whose power we expected to find the necessary protection to enable us to obtain recognition of our independence from the other powers. General Otis, according to trustworthy information, telegraphed to Washington stating that the Filipinos had attacked the American Army. President McKinley read aloud the telegram in the Senate, where the Treaty of Paris of the 10th December, 1898, was being discussed with a view to its ratification, the question of annexation of the Philippines being, the chief subject of debate, and through this criminal procedure secured the acceptation of the said Treaty in toto by a majority of only three votes." (Aguinaldo, 51-52)

Senor Escamillo, Aguinaldo's private secretary, was arrested by the Americans in Manila the day after the outbreak of the war. If there was anyone who should know if the Filipinos would launch an attack on American positions would be the Aguinaldo's private secretary. If there was really a plan to attack the Americans, Sr. Escamilo would perhaps had the better judgment of not loitering in the city.

That the Filipinos did not intend to commence hostilities is borne out by the official report of General Otis to the Department of war in Washington which said in part: "It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wish to open hostilities at this time" (Storey, 92). The day after the outbreak of war, Aguinaldo sent General Torres to General Otis to discuss the temporary cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a neutral zone to separate the two armies while negotiations are undertaken to resolve the conflict. General Otis refused and gave this stern reply: "the fighting having once begun must go on to the grim end" (PIS-V1N06, 38). This inflexible position of General Otis betrayed the true motives of the Americans and reflected the imperialist policy of McKinley when he said:

"There will be no useless parley until the insurrection is suppressed and American authority acknowledged and established. The Philippines are ours as much as Louisiana, by purchase, or Texas, or Alaska." (Sawyer, 120)

McKinley knew that the cessation of hostilities would give the American public and his enemies - the anti-imperialists - the opporutnity to investigate and learn more about the character of the Filipinos and the truth about the conflict in the Philippines that could put his dream of retaining the Philippines and his chances of reelection in jeopardy.

[McKinley's conquest of the Philippines became a controversial issue in the United States. The 1900 U.S. Presidential elections saw Democrat candidate William Jennings Bryan embraced the immediate independence of the Philippines as the principal program of the Democratic party. Bryan's campaign rode on the declaration that McKinley was leading the United States towards imperialism. McKinley won and his victory signalled the death of Philippine independence. It also placed the Filipinos in an akward position of having to prove wrong McKinley's misrepresentations: first - that the Filipinos were savages distributed among several tribes, second - that McKinley embarked on a humanitarian mission to uplift the Filipinos and prepare them for self government, and third - that the insurgency was waged by the Tagalog tribe alone, and the rest of the other tribes were not opposed to American sovereignty. Liberal members of the U.S. Congress and prominent American citizens sharply criticized McKinley for double talk, citing his self-declared, lofty principle: "Forcible annexation, according to our American code of morals, would be criminal aggression." (Olcott, 289)]

Conclusion

General Otis clearly understood McKinley's predicament. Dutifully, he delivered to his chief a moderate-sized war and charged it to the account of Aguinaldo. Subsequent events would show that McKinley was the principal beneficiary of the outbreak of the war. Apart from being reelected, he succeeded in acquiring the Philippine islands as an American colony with the full backing of the United States Senate and the American people, notwithstanding the prohibition in their constitution and their proud libertarian heritage. All these came about because private Grayon fired on the Filipino lieutenant in consequence of General Otis's maneuver to provoke the Filipinos into a war. Without the shoot out at Sta. Mesa the American military would have no reason to proceed further beyond the city of Manila, the Treaty of Paris would have been rejected by the U.S. senate, and the Filipinos would have proven their capability for self-government. Obviously, given McKinley's mandate, if it was not Grayson, another American soldier would have fired the shots anyway.

Cebuanos at war with the Americans

2006-12-31T05:14:00.000-08:00

Cebu was a hotbed of Filipino guerrilla activities during the war of resistance against the imposition of American sovereignty in the Philippine Islands at the close of the 19th century.

Before the arrival of the American troops in Cebu, a Filipino revolutionary government was already established in December 27, 1898 after the Spanish governor of the province, Montero, abandoned the island and sought refuge in Zamboanga. Juan Climaco and Arcadio Maxilon were responsible for the establishment of the local government and its adhesion to the Filipino government in Malolos, assisted by emissaries sent by Aguinaldo, namely: Pantaleon E. Del Rosario, Melquiades Lasala, a Cebuano of Bogo, Andres Jame, Lorega, and an Ilocano named Mateo Luga who had served in the Spanish army. The military arm was placed under the supreme command of General Arcadio Maxilon, with Juan Climaco as second in command.

In late February, 1899, the American expeditionary force arrived in Cebu and the commander of the American gunboat Petrel demanded the surrender of the fort and city. The Filipino governor of the province, Luis Flores, wary of the superiority of American arms but remaining very loyal to the Filipino government under President Emilio Aguinaldo, yielded, but filed the following protest:

"In view of the verbal intimation made by the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Petrel, of the U.S. Squadron, to this government, demanding the surrender of the garrison and city of Cebu, to be accompanied by the hoisting of the American flag in the peremptory term of fourteen hours, the assembled magma, convoked for its consideration, and the members of which are representative of all the vital forces of the country, agreed unanimously to accede to said demand in view of the superiority of the American forces; but without omitting to point out that neither the government of the province nor any inhabitants thereof have the power to conclude decisive acts prohibited by the honorable president of the Filipino republic, Senor Emilio Aguinaldo, our legitimate ruler, recognized as such by virtue of his indisputable capabilities of just government and illustrious generalship and universal suffrage.

"Sad and painful is the situation of this city, without means to defense and obliged to act contrary to its own convictions: in view of which it declares before the whole world that the occupation of this town is not based on any of the laws which form the code of civilized nations, which could hardly expect to behold such scenes at the end of a century called the enlightened one.

"We are told of conquests, of protectorates, of cessions made by the Spaniards; as if the Archipelago, and especially our souls, were merchandise subject to barter, when a single one is worth more than a thousand worlds of that metal called vile, perhaps for the reason that it fascinates as the eyes of a serpent.

"But be that as it may, of all this the commanding office must treat as already stated, with Senor Aguinaldo, without whose acquiescence the act which is demanded from this government cannot be legal.

"A copy of this manifesto will be given to each of the consular agents established in this city, the greatest possible publicity will be given it, and we shall communicate with Aguinaldo, remitting him a copy of this document.

"Given in Cebu, the 22nd of February, 1899.
"Louiz Flores,
"The Commander in Chief". (PIS-V1N08, 14-16)

Eventually, the Americans ran out of patience and resorted to extreme and harsh measures. According to John Foreman, a vigorous policy of devastation was adopted. Towns, villages and crops were laid waste; Pardo, the Filipino military centre, was totally destroyed; peaceful natives who had compulsorily paid tribute to the Filipino government at whose mercy they were obliged to live, were treated as enemies; their homes and means of livelihood were demolished, and little distinction was made between the warrior and the victim of the war.

In an effort to prevent further desolation and suffering of the people, the Filipino provincial governor arranged with the American authorities for cessation of hostilities, paving the way for the surrender of the leaders of revolutionaries after two years of heroic stand.

Here's an account by John Foreman, in his book, The Philippines:

“In July 24, 1899, Juan Climaco and Arcadio Maxilon, chafing at the diminution of their influence in public affairs, suddenly disappeared into the interior and met at Pardo, where the military revolutionary centre was established. Aguinaldo's emissary, Pantaleon E. Del Rosario, Melquiades Lasala, a Cebuano of Bogo (known as Dading), Andres Jame, Lorega, and an Ilocano named Mateo Luga who had served in the Spanish army, led contingents under the supreme command of theinsurgent General Arcadio Maxilom. In the interior they established a fairly well-organized military government. The Island was divided into districts; there was little interference with personal liberty; taxes for the maintenance of the struggle were collected in the form of contribution according to the means of the donor; agriculture was not altogether abandoned, and for over two years the insurgents held out against American rule. The brain of the movement was centered in Juan Climaco, whilst Mateo Luga exhibited the best fighting qualities.

“In the meantime American troops were drafted to the coast towns of Tuburan, Bogo, Carmen, etc. There were several severe engagements with slaughter on both sides, notably at Monte Sudlon and Compostela. Five white men joined the insurgent leader Luga, one being an English mercenary trooper, two sailors, and two soldiers; the last two were given up at the close of hostilities; one of them was pardoned, and the other was executed in the cotta for rape committed at Mandaue.

“The co-existence of an American military administration in Cebu City conducting a war throughout the Island, and a Philippine provincial government with nominal administrative powers over the same region, but in strong sympathy with the insurgent cause, was no longer compatible. Moreover, outside the city the provincial government was unable to enforce its decrees amongst the people, who recognized solely the martial-law of the insurgents to whom they had to pay taxes. The Americans therefore abolished the provincial council, which was not grieved at its dissolution, because it was already accused by the people of being pro-American. Philippine views of the situation were expressed in a newspaper, El Nuevo Dia, founded by a lawyer, Rafael Palma, and edited conjointly by Jayme Veyra (afterwards a candidate for the Leyte Island governorship) and an intelligent young lawyer, Sergio Osmena, already mentioned at p. 521. This organ, the type and style of which favorably compared with any journal ever produced in these Islands, passed through many vicissitudes; it was alternately suppressed and reviled, whilst its editors were threatened with imprisonment in the cotta and deportation to Guam.

“Meanwhile the Americans made strenuous efforts to secure the co-operation of the Filipinos in municipal administration, but the people refused to vote. Leading citizens, cited to appear before the American authorities, persistently declined to take any part in a dual regime. The electors were then ordered, under penalties, to attend the polling, but out of hundreds who responded to the call only about 60 could be coerced into voting. Finally a packed municipal council was formed, but one of its members, a man hitherto highly respected by all, was assassinated, and his colleagues went in fear of their lives.

“The war in Panay Islands having terminated on February 2, 1901, by the general surrender at Jaro (vide p. 518), General Hughes went to Samar Island, where he failed to restore peace, and thence he proceeded to Cebu in the month of August at the head of 2,000 troops. A vigorous policy of devastation was adopted. Towns, villages and crops were laid waste; Pardo, the insurgent military centre, was totally destroyed; peaceful natives who had compulsorily paid tribute to the insurgents at who mercy they were obliged to live, were treated as enemies; their homes and means of livelihood were demolished, and little distinction was made between the warrior and the victim of the war.

“Desolation stared the people in the face, and within a few weeks the native provincial governor proposed that terms of peace should be discussed. The insurgent chief Lorega surrendered on October 22; Mateo Luga and Arcadio Maxilom submitted five days afterwards and at the end of the month a general cessation of hostilities followed. A neutral zone was agreed upon, extending from Mandaue to Sogod, and there the three peace commissioners on behalf of the Americans, namely Miguel Logara, Pedro Rodriguez, and Arsenio Climaco met the insurgent chiefs Juan Climaco and Arcadio Maxilom. As a result, peace was signed, and the document includes the following significant words, viz: putting the Philippine people in a condition to prove "their aptitude for self-government as the basis of a future independent life." After the peace, Mateo Luga and P.E. del Rosario accepted employment under the Americans, the former inspector of Constabulary and the latter as Sheriff of Cebu.

“A few months later, the Americans, acting on information received, proceeded to Tuburan on the government launch "Philadelphia," arrested Arcadio Maxilom and his two brothers, and seized the arms which they had secreted on their property. On the launch, one of the Maxiloms unsuccessfully attempted to murder the Americans and was immediately executed, whilst Arcadio and his other brother jumped overboard; but Arcadio being unable to swim, was picked up, brought to trial at Cebu, and acquitted. Thus ended the career of General Arcadio Maxilom, whom in 1904 I found living in retirement, almost a hermit's life, broken in spirit and body and worried by numerous lawsuits pending against him.

“ On April 17, 1901, Governor W. H. Taft went to Cebu accompanied by a Filipino, H. Pardo de Tavera, whose views were diametrically opposed to those of the Cebuano majority. Governor Taft established civil government there, although the law of habeas corpus had to be suspended because the war was still raging throughout the Island outside the capital. The provincial government as established by Governor Taft comprises a provincial board composed of three members, namely the Philippine Provincial Governor, the American Supervisor, and the American Treasurer; hence the Americans are in permanent majority and practically rule the Island. The executive of this body is the provincial governor and his staff. The first provincial governor appointed by Governor Taft was Julio Llorente, who resigned the magistracy in Manila and returned to Cebu to take up his new office until the election took place in January, 1902, when, by popular vote, Juan Climaco, the ex-insurgent chief, became provincial governor, and on the expiration of his term in January, 1904, he was re-elected for another two years.” (Foreman, 524-526)

The Patriot and the Elite

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An interesting exchange of letters between Benito Legarda, former cabinet member of President Aguinaldo, in whose honor one of the streets near Malacanang is named after, and Aguinaldo himself, which clearly differentiates the thinking of an elite and a patriot.

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

Legarda wanted the Filipinos to give up the fight and submit to American rule, while Aguinaldo defiantly stood for continuation of the struggle.

In his reply to Legarda, Aguinaldo expressed his frustrations, which, apparently was directed towards the elite of Philippine society, when he said:

“What is life to us if we are to be the slaves of the foreigner? It is a pity that all the enlightened Filipinos do not employ their knowledge and experience in the defense of their country.”

The Legarda and Aguinaldo letters presented below were lifted verbatim from pages 26-30 of the pamphlet "The Luzon Campaign", Vol. 1, No. 7, published by the Philippine Information Society, Boston, 1901, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005 (PIS-V1N07).

Here is the letter from Legarda:

“Manila, July 7, I899.
“SR. DON EMILIO AGUINALDO:

“MY DEAR DON EMILIO:

“Mr. Olimpio Guamson has delivered your message to me, asking for my frank and honest opinion concerning our present political situation, and the probable future which awaits us. I shall give it with pleasure, not only because it is my duty as a Filipino, but because of the sincere friendship which binds me to you. I will refrain from making a critical judgment of all your actions prior to the 4th of February, the date of the Outbreak of Hostilities, taking them simply as data upon which to base my deductions, and will presuppose in all of them good faith from the point of view of the patriotic motives which impelled you to perform them.

“We have commenced hostilities; we have had our wish, for remember perfectly well that war was the desire of the majority in Malolos, the military element, however, being prominent in this majority, and raising its voice upon the subject, dragging after it the rest of the people. And what has been gained? Nothing but ruin, death, and desolation.

“We have not been able to prevent the Americans from going anywhere they pleased, and it has been plainly evident that the valor upon which we depended was not enough, but to conquer it is necessary to have many things which the Americans possess in abundance, and which we lack.

“As time goes on our chances for victory grow less, and the further the American troops advance so much worse is our condition for asking concessions for our unhappy country.

“Up to the present time the American troops, in my opinion, have had no other object in view than to show their bravery, a quality which had unjustly and erroneously been denied them both privately and in the public press. So far, either on that account or for other reasons, America has not sent here an army capable of a military occupation of all our territory, nor has a formal campaign been commenced; that America can do so we are unable to doubt, and that it will be done if we persist in our present attitude we may feel certain. And what will then remain to us?

“What could we ask for?

“We are in error, and yet we persist in that error, impelled by those who dream of a triumph of a party which is to-day in a minority in the United States, without perceiving that this party is also American, and that they are not going to give us our independence out of hand as a matter of sentiment at the expense of the honor of America and in spite of the grave responsibility, both international and domestic, contracted under the Treaty of Paris. Others dream that because part of the press of Europe copies from American anti-imperialist papers the criticisms of that party against the Government of President McKinley a European intervention in our favor is to take place, without reflecting that the Treaty of Paris was made before all the civilized world and with its assent.

“The war so far has only laid bare our insufficiency and our shortcomings.

“In my judgment, giving these conditions, the time has arrived for your policy to change in a radical manner, unless you wish to see forever annihilated the hope that our people may some day take its place in the concert of the civilized world, unless you wish to see the complete ruin of our race and of all our country, and unless you are willing to accept the grave responsibilities which will fall upon you. To-day then I address you as a friend and as a Filipino and say "Peace is an imperative necessity.

"Nothing can prevent the triumph of America.. Do not struggle against the inevitable.

“Peace must come some time, and the man who restores peace to the Philippines will win the admiration of the world, and the gratitude of his country. Be that man. Since 1896 you have been the soul of the people, and have merited their blessings for your wonderful and providential wisdom. Be now the peace-maker that your glory may be perpetuated. As you are the man who, when brought here by the Americans, roused the people as one to the work of our emancipation from Spain, be now the one to say 'Enough of conflict.'

“We have seen that our ideals cannot be realized by this means; let us make peace, and let us work and learn. For by working and learning with a free people, such as the Americans, we shall cast from us the vices of our old masters, and will some day win the independence we so much desire.

“This is what I believe you are called upon to do, and I think that you will never repent it. There is no other remedy - no other path open. Do not forget that many Filipinos are losing their lives every day in the defense of the impossible: that every day the ruin of property sacrificed in vain is greater, and that, if finally there is no help other than to submit to American sovereignty, it is not just to sacrifice more lives and property, whereby you will contract before God and man responsibilities of such proportions that they alarm me.

“Stop while you may, and believe me that now is the appointed time: a little later the policy of the American Government will change completely the sentiment of that free and noble people, which loves its own liberty as much as it desires that of other nations, and then a race war will come which will end in our extermination.

“I believe that with what I have said I have performed my duty and complied with your wishes. I must, however, state that I have done so freely, without suggestions or coercions of any kind, and also that I have made no special political studies, nor have I had preparation for speaking upon matters of this nature. The only merit of this opinion is that it is the manifestation of the intimate conviction of a citizen who is inspired by the best of good faith and the desire of his people.

“I am, as ever, your affectionate friend and obedient servant,

“B. LEGARDA.”

And here is Aguinaldo's reply:

“Personal.
“REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
“OFFICE OF THE PRSESIDENT,
“Tarlac, September 14, 1899.

“SR. BENITO LEGARDA, Manila.

“MY DISTINGUISHED FRIEND:

“Your two kind letters have reached my hands and I have informed myself of all you say in them. Many thanks for the information you give me. I beg that you will pardon me for my delay in making reply, but I must tell you that sometime elapsed before they reached me.

“I believe what you tell me as to the re-enforcements of the enemy which will not be long in arriving. Not only do I believe this, but I am convinced of this fact, and even before the outbreak of hostilities was sure that with their wealth and their innumerable and powerful elements of war, they could, whenever they so desired, send as many as they need.

“In reply to this I must tell you that it is impossible for me to turn back from the enterprise which I have undertaken -that of defending our country, and especially as I have sworn that as long as life lasts I shall labor until I gain the acknowledgment of the independence of the Philippines. Do not attribute this declaration to my vanity, but to my desire to fulfill a former promise. This, aside from the fact that the struggle for the independence of our country is just and based upon our perfect rights.

“We are not alarmed by the numerous arms nor the valor of our enemy. What is life to us if we are to be the slaves of the foreigner? It is a pity that all the enlightened Filipinos do not employ their knowledge and experience in the defense of their country. I repeat, we will not give up the struggle until we gain our longed-for independence: death is of but little moment to us if we are but able to ensure the happiness of the people and of future generations.

“We must no longer allow ourselves to be fascinated by the flattering promises of the enemy. You know that they first solemnly assured me that they would acknowledge our independence. Nevertheless, the attempt is now being made to force autonomy on us by superior strength. They have been using explosive bullets since the 9th of August last, and have bombarded defenseless forts, contrary to the precepts of international law. But it matters not that they use these elements of destructive warfare. Resistance and firmness of our resolution will be sufficient to wear them out. If this is not enough to induce our enemies to desist from their endeavor, we will go, if necessary, into the mountains, but never will we accept a treaty of peace dishonorable to the Philippine arms and disastrous to the future of the country, such as that which they seek to impose.

“For this reason I advise all those who do not feel themselves strong enough to accept this sacrifice, and whose services are not indispensable to our Government, to return to Manila and the towns occupied by the enemy, reserving themselves to strengthen the organization of our Government when our independence is gained, replacing those who, wearied by the struggle, are in need of rest.

“I am not displeased that some Filipinos have consented to hold office under the Americans; on the contrary, I rejoice that they have done so, for thus they will be enabled to form a true estimate of the character of the Americans. I also rejoice that our enemies having had recourse to the Filipinos for the discharge of the duties of high positions in the public service in its various branches, have shown that they recognize the capacity of our people for self-government.

“Before closing I take the liberty of addressing you the following question: To what is due that policy of attraction employed by our enemy if not to the resistance of our army?

“One should never repent of a just determination.

“Kind regards to your family, and to Messrs. Arellano, Pardo, Torres, and other friends.

“Command at will your most affectionate friend,

“E. AGUINALDO.”

An American defector to the Aguinaldo army

2006-12-07T23:13:00.000-08:00

There were several defections of American soldiers to the Filipino side during the Philippine-American war. The most famous and very controversial was the defection of David Fagen from the all black 24th Infantry, USV. Fagen was enlisted as lieutenant in General Alejandrino's command in Arayat, promoted to captain and later served under General Urbano Lacuna's Nueva Ecija brigade. (Ganzhorn, 191)

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

In Caloocan, a British observer saw two Americans in Filpino uniform, apparently having deserted the American army and joined Aguinaldo's army. (Sheridan, 148)

There was also the case of bugler Maurice Sibley of the 16th Infantry, who became the right hand man of General Tomines of Isabela and eventually married an Igorot woman.(Khaki[1], 36) , and the musician Vance, a deserter from the 37th U.S. Infantry who was captured in Pakil, Laguna. (Herman, 101), and the infamous White Bandit, who was later identified as George A. Raymond, a deserter from the 41st Infantry, who operated in Pampanga. (Funston, 435)

In Cebu, five white defectors joined the forces of General Arcadio Maxilon. (Foreman, 524).

Other defections to the Filipino army by American soldiers occurred in many parts of the country. In Marinduque, some captured American soldiers opted to join the forces of Colonel Maximo Abad.

It is not the purpose of this article to inquire into the reasons why these American soldiers defected to the Filipino side. Suffice it is to say that no war in the military history of the United States can compare with this little war, as U.S. President McKinley called the Philippine-American war, on the number of defections to the enemy.

The following is an account on one such defection that can qualify as a plot for a movie:

“We will call him Jackson. Jackson was silent, morose man, who had few friends in the battery. He was evidently of good education, and he spoke Spanish fluently. Ordinarily, he was a first class soldier, doing his duties efficiently. He had one failing, however, that made him unpopular. Occasionally he would break out in a wild spree, always ending in the guard-house. When drunk, he was a fighting lunatic, quarreling with everyone.

“Jackson fell in love with a pretty mestiza girl who, with her mother, conducted a cantina in the plaza. In time they were married in church by the native padre. After that wedding, Jackson was shunned by his comrades. There is an unwritten law among soldiers that a white man must not wed a native.

“The artilleryman resented the scorn of his fellow-soldiers, become more sullen, and spent more time than was good for him in the company of the Filipinos. One pay-day he went on one of his mad sprees. While fighting madness was on him he attacked a young lieutenant, striking him in the face.

“To attack an officer is a grave crime in the army. Jackson was court-martialed and sentenced to six years in military prison. While he was confined in the guard-house awaiting transportation to the United States to serve his sentence, a member of the guard permitted him to escape. It is a hard duty to mount guard over a friend and treat him like a caged animal.

“Jackson was supposed to make his way to Manila and stow away on an outgoing steamer for the China coast. Instead, he made his way by night to the casa of his wife, and together they stole away to the insurgent army.

“A few weeks later we began to hear stories of the white renegade. He was in command of a company of insurrectos. He moved like a ghost about the country, appearing in the most unexpected places. Again and again his command attacked American outposts. On one occasion he captured two army wagons loaded with supplies, killing several members of the guard.

“For months we were kept busy chasing Jackson. The natives protected him, and he was always warned of our approach. One night the main army of insurgents surrounded the town of Imus and made a general attack. The fight continued for several hours in the darkness.

“As I lay in the trenches, I could distinctly hear the voice of Jackson swearing and calling to his troops to advance. The insurrectos were driven off, and by daylight they had disappeared.

“Months later, when I was with the native scouts, I witnessed the tragic end of Jackson's career. A column under General Swan attacked the Filipino trenches near Noveleta, west of Imus. The scouts were in the advance guard.

“When we went over the trenches, we found Jackson lying by the roadside. He was twice wounded, - through the lungs and abdomen. Although it may read like a fiction, it is a fact that his native wife was crouched in the mud of the road, holding his head in her lap. He refused to speak to us and died defiant, fighting against the flag he had sworn to uphold.

“A few months later his wife became the mother of a blue-eyed boy. She always seemed to hate the Americans, and would never afterward speak to an American soldier.

“An interesting sequel to Jackson's story followed in the visit of an American lawyer to the Islands sometime later. He hunted up several of the men who were present when Jackson died, and asked them to aid him in locating the body. It had been buried in a trench with about sixty Filipinos who died in the fight. The lawyer had the body exhumed, placed in an iron coffin, and shipped back to the United States.”(O'Reilly, 102-104)

To the American People, an Appeal

2006-12-07T18:21:00.000-08:00

Among the important steps Aguinaldo took shortly after the declaration of Philippine independence in June 12, 1898 was the creation of the diplomatic corps to work for the recognition of the new Philippine republic by the foreign governments.
Galicano Apacible was appointed as head in June 23, 1898, with prominent propagandists such as Rafael del Pan, Antonio Regidor, Sixto Roxas, Mariano Ponce and Jose Basa as members.

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

Apacible's credentials were impressive even by contemporary standards. A Filipino patriot and propagandist from Balayan, Batangas and a cousin of Dr. Jose Rizal, he was a physician trained at the University of Barcelona and an active member of the La Solidaridad in Spain. He collaborated with the likes of Marcelo H. del Pilar and Graciano Lopez Jaena and organized the Comite Central Filipino, a Filipino propaganda group in Hong Kong during the revolution against Spain.

The diplomatic work was distributed with Apacible concentrating in Europe, to give way to Felipe Agoncillo who was handpicked by Aguinaldo to be the plenipotentiary to the United States. Ponce was stationed in Japan, del Pan and Lopez assisted Agoncillo in the United States, Regidor, in Spain and Basa, in Hongkong.

After Agoncillo hurriedly left Washington on the eve of outbreak of the Philippine-American war in February 4, 1899, there was created some friction among the Filpino diplomats, which was immediately settled with a letter of September 12, 1899 to Galicano Apacible, possibly by Buencamino, urging them to agree on a common approach.

On September 5, 1899, Apacible advised the Revolutionary Government that there were two ways open, one was to continue the struggle until Bryan was elected United States president and the other was to deal directly with President McKinley. It was decided to try both ways. (KalawM[1], 242)

Apacible himself went to Toronto, Canada, by way of Europe. With the help of Rafael del Pan and Sixto Lopez, he continued the work in North Ameica left behind by Agoncillo, hoping to negotiate with the McKinley administration or with the leading figures of the Democratic Party.

From Canada he issued an appeal to the American people, that they listen to the voice of the Filipinos; he reaffirmed that the Filipinos were not savages as heretofore presented to the American people and were actually fit for self-government; he decried the unequal treatment from the McKinley administration which granted the Cubans their independence but denying the same to the Filipinos.

"What would America do with nine million Filipinos?", asked Apacible in his APPEAL. Would America allow them to become citizens, or, would the Filipinos be held as subjects in an American colony. Apacible said that in the former case, Filipinos would compete for jobs with native and black Americans and the cheaper labor could be utilized by American corporations to undersell similar products manufactured in the United States. On the other hand , if the Philippines were kept as a colony, it would smear the America's image as a bastion of freedom and democracy.

Apacible's APPEAL did not produce any positive results because the American public believed and even reelected President McKinley. The latter's victory signaled the defeat of Philippine independence because it signified the American people's affirmation of McKinley's claim that Divine Providence had placed upon the United States a sacred mission, that of civilizing and preparing the Filipinos for self-government.

However, in spite of the press censorship in Manila, the American public slowly came to realize the real situation in the Philippines through the letters of American soldiers to their families describing the horrors and atrocities of the war which were published in local newspapers. Some U.S. senators began to take interest in Philippine affairs and initiated senate investigations on the conduct of the war. Their findings confirmed what Apacible and the Anti-Imperialist group in the U.S. had been ranting about.

The last part of the APPEAL states that the war in the Philippines will immediately end, if the Americans will respect the aspirations of the Filipinos for their independence. In exchange for this recognition, the Filipinos offered to do the following: pay back the $20 million that the United States paid to Spain under the treaty of Paris, give the Americans suitable coaling stations, and, conclude a treaty of a mutually beneficial commercial relations.

Apacible's proposed settlement was ignored by the McKinley administration and the Philippines became a U.S. colony for fifty years. Right after World War II, the Philippines signed with the United States what looked like Apacible's proposal fifty years before - a military bases treaty to keep and hold Subic and Clark Field, to name only the major ones, for ninety-nine years as U.S. naval and air force facilities; and, the so-called "parity rights" under the Laurel-Langley trade agreement that gave the Americans equal rights as Filipinos in commerce as well as in the exploitation of natural resources of the country.

Apacible's arguments that the United States would not benefit by retaining the Philippine islands was echoed by a critic of the American imperialist policy, viz:

"To sum up —the islands are a source of expense and trouble to the American people as a whole, and our occupation thus far, has been injurious to the native inhabitants. There is no advantage accruing to us from their retention which cannot be gained through reasonable trade and military arrangements with our possible successors. The only possible economic argument for continuing in the administration of the islands is found in the interests of those who want specially favourable terms for getting access to the lands, mines, etc., of the archipelago. To give any weight whatever to this argument would be to place the interests of a very limited class of moneyed commercial exploiters above those of the American nation as a whole." (Willis, 440)

Apart from its historical value, the "Appeal" is a literary masterpiece in superb prose. Many Filipinos who went through high school during the fifty's and sixty's would recall how their better classmates would memorize Lincoln's address at Gettysburg for a provincial declamation or oratorical contest. Perhaps their minds had been so accustomed to American arts and literature that it never occurred to them somewhere in the dustbins of history a passionate, patriotic cry - Apacible's "To the American People an Appeal" - lies unnoticed and unread, waiting to be exhumed from ignominy and laid to rest in the minds of the Filipino youth, where it deserves its rightful place.

Here is Apacible's APPEAL, a political essay and a literary masterpiece:

"PLEASE READ AND CIRCULATE
"TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AN APPEAL
"by G. APACIBLE

"God Almighty knows how unjust is the war which the Imperial arms have provoked and are maintaining against our unfortunate country! If the honest American patriots could understand the sad truth of this declaration, we are sure they would, without the least delay, stop this unspeakable horror. And, that they may have a just understanding of it, we entreat them to hear our voice, to meditate on our exhortations and to weigh our statements against the misrepresentations under which Imperialism seeks to conceal its designs. Turn not away from our prayer, Americans, but listen, and give judgment according to reason and conscience.

"We, the Filipinos, are a civilized, progressive and peace-loving people. Many impartial writers and speakers have testified that we are advanced in civilization, that we are capable of improvement, that many of our people for two centuries have enjoyed the advantages of university education, that the number of illiterates among our people is small, and that as artists, scientists, magistrates, generals and dignitaries of the Church, the sons of the Philippines, have distinguished themselves greatly and have achieved many positions of eminence, especially so in Spain. That we are progressive, was well shown by the conduct of our whole country when, at the time of the capitulation of the city of Manila, the inhabitants of our islands, supposing themselves to have entered upon a career of national independence that was to be assured to them by the United States Government, instead of abandoning themselves to any revolutionary fever and excess, established with careful thought and scrupulous regard for justice a prudent government which respected all rights created legitimately; they convoked a Congress whose legislative work has not been justly criticized by anybody; they re-organized the administrative machinery which had been disturbed by recent struggles: telegraphs, railroads and means of communication began to work. regularly; we had adopted the electric light in some of our towns; and we had established a new university, four high and several primary schools. In brief, the new nation had entered upon a path of progress which already promised a bright future. All this progress the Imperialists have disturbed; all this progress have they destroyed.

"For proof that we love peace, we ask you to remember the story of our relations with Spain. For three hundred years our country has been at the mercy of Spanish domination; we were the subjects of that monarchy; the government of that nation denied us any voice in the enactment of remedial legislation: they denied us representation in the Spanish Cortes. They allowed themselves to be directed by the most reactionary elements and took counsel chiefly from the friars who sought to estrange the mother country from us and to deny us the blessings of liberty, so that they might the more completely exploit us at their will. They denied us freedom of the press, restricted the right of peaceable assembly and violated the security of our homes. They created the so called administrative process (expedientes gubernativos); so that, often, without hearing and without trial the most peaceful citizen was snatched from his house and condemned to the miseries of banishment. In brief, the Spanish- government, whose despotic cruelty American Imperialism now imitates, and in some respects surpasses, denied to us many of the liberties which you were already enjoying when, under pretext of oppression, you revolted against British domination. Notwithstanding these great wrongs we submitted quietly, confining our protests to earnest prayers for reparation; such was our love of peace. Only when we became convinced that our requests were absolutely disregarded, that the most worthy officials were removed from office, even those of' eminent character, when it was made known that they had manifested even a slight sympathy for us, when we had lost every hope of peaceful remedy and all faith in the oft promised liberal reforms, only then it was that the armed protest, the Philippine revolution, the most justifiable of all revolutions, began. It was an uprising void of every feeling of hatred and revenge toward Spain, the country that we respected and loved; it was a revolt against her bad government, just as we now revolt, not against America, whose power and greatness we recognize, and whose justice we still hope to see proven, but against her unworthy rulers. Those who tell you that we are an adventurous and seditious people, ready to go to war at the least pretext, basely deceive you in this as in many other calumnies invented by the Imperialists. If, yesterday, we fought against Spain, and, to-day, are resisting your powerful arms, even though sure to be vanquished, it is because we have been forced as a last resort to an unequal and bloody war for the attainment of an aspiring people's legitimate ambitions. Thus we can repeat proudly and with the firmness of one who carries the truth on his lips and in his heart, that if our character and culture entitle us to independence, still more do we show ourselves entitled to it by the high motives which have always inspired our resistance. Why, then, do you deny us liberty? Why, forgetful of all your history and the noble precepts of your illustrious forefathers, are, you fighting against the cause of Independence, of Progress and of Justice, which is our cause? What has come to pass between you and us that should cause you to permit this incredible and monstrous war to be waged against us?

"When you declared war against Spain you proclaimed to the world at large that you had appealed to arms only in order to free oppressed peoples; and when your flag waved before the coasts of the Philippines on powerful vessels which easily destroyed the weak fleet of the enemy it was an emblem of liberty then. Your diplomatic representatives invited the most famous of our Filipino leaders, Hon. E. Aguinaldo, to an offensive alliance against those whom you represented to us as a 'common enemy," in order that by vanquishing them, we might achieve our aspirations for peace and happiness. It was then that your idol, Admiral Dewey, and your distinguished generals. Merritt and Anderson, treated us as friends and allies, saying sincerely that we were fit for independence, even more so, as the admiral asserted, than the Cubans to whom you have with equity promised to give it. It was then that the flag of the new Philippine nation waved in the shadow of the Stars and Stripes at Manila Bay. It was then that the independence of the Philippines was proclaimed at Cavite, within range of your cannons, without any opposition, and in almost the very words of your immortal Declaration. It was then that your soldiers hailed the new nation, while ours were cheering the American liberators. It was then, to save your cause, since you had assured us that your cause embraced our freedom, that the Filipinos gave their blood for you in your fight against valiant and obstinate enemy, and at the same time placed in your reach all available resources and aid. You were at that moment almost at the point of breaking into hostilities with another nation which had manifested her sympathy for Spain by attempting to bar at Subig Bay the course of what you yourselves had called "an army of liberation." That was the hour of the beautiful fiction: now we seem to have come to the time of the bitter reality, the cruel disenchantment. Then we were received and treated as allies; now we are scourged back into the mountains and denied every right except that of fighting the very flag in whose beneficent shadow we had expected to find freedom and happiness. From the outset our country took sides with the United States in the war with Spain, and we marched proudly with your sons as comrades in arms, as soldiers in the same cause, to victory. At all times during that war, and for months afterward, the civil, military and naval authorities of the United States caused us to hope for Independence. Papers and pamphlets advocating this ideal were published in Manila under the protection of the United States authorities: with their consent the revolutionary army had been conquering the Spanish positions and establishing in them provincial governments dependent on that of the Filipine Republic. America was then a great republic, releasing the Cubans and the Filipinos from the iron grasp of an imperial government and conducting them to emancipation and freedom; and our people hailed the Stars and Stripes as an emblem of freedom, as the token of liberty for the living and the badge of honor for the patriots dead. With renewed energy, with proud alacrity, with fearless determination they pressed on, side by side with your noble sons, to the end. What reward did we get? Did the expected freedom come to us? No! As a requital for our sacrifices and as a reward for our loyalty, subjugation is offered to us instead of freedom. We may have a colonial government of the United States, administered in a foreign language, instead of the colonial government of Spain, which, at least, was administered in a language already known to us and which we have made ours. We are to have a colonial government which will deny us the citizenship of its nation. In spite of their imperialistic tendencies, the Spanish government never went so far as to deny us citizenship!

"When, on a day of sad recollections, we declined to accept this shame, when we protested against this iniquitous ingratitude, then the guns of the United States were turned upon us; we were denounced as traitors and rebels; you destroyed the homes to which you had been welcomed as honored guests, killing thousands of those who had been your allies, mutilating our old men, our women and our children, and watering with blood and strewing with ruins the beautiful soil of our Fatherland. Behold. therefore, Americans, and consider not only our right to independence but what your conduct has been, and what your plain duty is towards us in good faith, and then judge, in view of these antecedents, whether the crusade of extermination which the Imperialists have inaugurated against our unfortunate country is a worthy one, whether it is just, and whether it is in the least degree excusable. These and only these are the true terms of the simple problem. Do not give ear to the specious arguments of those who, in order to excuse a political crime and in order to disguise their greed and covetousness, tell you the contrary by means of assertions whose falseness is as great as the bad faith of their author. They tell you that we are incapable of self-government, as if the accomplished facts had not proven the contrary; and as if, also, all the Americans who had calmly judged us, previous to this war of conquest, had not unanimously asserted otherwise. They assure you that there exist deep divisions among us and that the withdrawal of the American troops would create anarchy and misgovernment in our country, as if it were not evident that the most complete order prevailed there until the Imperial troops had with their unjust war, brought confusion. They tell you that the government of the Philippine Republic had never been recognized by the whole country. This is a manifest falsehood, because it had been recognized even by the Mohammedans in the South, whom the Imperialists, their friends and allies, boast so much of having reduced to submission; and by the mountain races of Luzon, who always refused to recognize the Spanish Government and who will do the same to the American Government. The Philippine government is the only one which can conciliate and redeem them, for in that government only have their confidence a success for civilization which Imperialism could never accomplish. They assert that the existence of these mountain races makes the Philippine Independence impossible. This is an absurd assertion, which would be equal to maintaining that you are incapable of self-government simply because there are Indians on your soil in a proportion almost equal to that which the Ingorrotes, Aetas, etc., represent among us. They mislead you with the idea that because the Tagalogs, the Visayos, the Ilocanos, etc., speak different dialects, it is not feasible for us to constitute a national unity. This is an objection of gross ignorance which forgets that in the most civilized European nations people speak different dialects and even different languages, as in the highly civilized Switzerland; it is also a sophistical objection which overlooks the fact that in all the provinces of the Archipelago, in the Tagal, the Visayan, and the Ilocos provinces, etc., whose inhabitants are of the same ethnical condition and culture, the only language officially spoken is the Spanish. They allege that the majority of the Filipinos are in favor of the American sovereignty, and that they would rather be colonials of America than be independent. This is a base falsehood, which belies the fact of the thousands of soldiers which the Imperialists have had to put on the islands, and of the regime of military tyranny, more terrible than was ever known before by us, of which they were compelled to avail themselves, imprisoning thousands of honest people, suppressing serious newspapers, and other endless abuses against all law, in order to smother the cries for independence. They also tell you that we were the aggressors in the present war, as if it were not evident how much we have done in order to prevent the outbreak of hostilities with which we were daily provoked, and how many times we proposed a cessation in the fight in order that we may come to an agreement, a demand which your rulers nave always refused to grant us. They further tell you that our country has great and unexploited riches and that with it America would gain. This is a new deception of Imperialism, because such treasures, even the mines, have already been carefully exploited by Spaniards, Germans, and English, and they never obtained the marvelous success of which Imperialism now dreams; on the contrary, the record of these exploitations shows more failure than success. They go on to say that there are in our country rich lands to distribute and cultivate. To this the deceived American immigrants who, believing such promises, shall go and succumb to the rigors of the climate, so fatal to their race, will answer accursing those who made them leave their rich and habitable land. That the highest interests of Christianity demand the retention of the Islands, is another deception, because if our subjugation becomes a reality, we could never forget how much religious fanaticisms have had to do with it, and our present Christian belief would, stagger and perhaps we would look with distrust on the creeds of our subjugators. Finally, the Imperialists say that God trusted in their hands the government of the future destinies of the Philippines, as if the Supreme Spirit could have been incarnated in the gold of the twenty millions of dollars which were paid to Spain, and in the steel of the quick-firing guns which are mutilating the unfortunate Filipinos.

"No, do not listen to the false assertions of the Imperialists, listen only to the voice of reason and justice. Heed not the suggestions of those who pretend to excite your national self-love and your innermost feelings, in order that you may convert yourselves into docile instruments of their cupidity and ambition, of their immoralities and scandals which are peculiar, to every colonial administration, and which have already dishonored the until now immaculate name of America and her foreign policy. Do not be deceived by false charges, nor allured by false promises. Give judgment without hypocrisy and without self-deception. On the one hand your honor and your glorious traditions are calling upon you to accord to us our rightful and well-earned independence. On the other hand the distorted dreams of avarice, the dark conspiracies of greed and remorseless ambition, nurses of Imperialism throughout all time, these counsel you to uphold the war of subjugation which your rulers, but not your people, have authorized and forced upon us. Choose, then sons of Washington, of Jefferson and of Lincoln, between these two alternatives: Freedom for the hapless peoples who are in your power, and thus, under God's just laws, the recompense to you of a larger freedom for yourselves, or, tyranny and destruction for your struggling but helpless victims, whose wrongs the Great Ruler of all will in due time avenge by the mournful destruction of your own liberties. Shall it be generosity, or colonial greed? Shall it be right, or wrong? Give ear to your own conscience, and we are sure you will incline yourselves toward mercy, toward justice, and toward the only honorable course that will restore peace to our ransacked homes and to our devastated fields, stopping at once and forever this horrible war which has already cost so much in treasure and blood, and which, if not abandoned, will yet cost much more, because our resolution is fixed: Liberty or death; independence or annihilation.

"Why do the Imperialists wish to subjugate us? What do they intend to do with us? Do they expect us to surrender to yield our inalienable rights, our homes, our properties, our lives, our future destinies, to the absolute control of the United States? What would you do with our nine millions of people? Would you permit us to take-part in your elections? Would you concede to us the privilege of sending Senators and Representatives to your Congress? Would you allow us to erect one or more federal states? Or, would you tax us without representation? Would you change your tariff laws so as to admit our products free of duty and in competition with the products of your own soil? And thus would you allow the American trusts to utilize our cheap labor in the manufacture of goods that would compete with the products of your own factories? Would you permit the trusts to bottle up our people to sub serve their own ends, depriving us even of those liberties which you are enjoying Would you admit our artisans, mechanics, laborers, and servants to take employment in your country on an equal footing with American citizens, Indians and Negroes? Would you allow us to prohibit Chinese immigration? Would you permit us to retain our own language and not force us to adopt yours? Would you let us elect our own local officers? Would you allow us to share your offices, your honors and your privileges? And, as for the saloons (which were almost unknown in Manila before) would you allow them to go on multiplying at the appalling rate at which their number has increased there within the past two years? Would you allow the lands in the Philippines to remain at all untaxed, as formerly, simply because some religious corporations have acquired enormous and fraudulent properties in them? Would you remove your American soldiery and permit us to create an army of our own? Or, if you were determined to maintain a powerful army and fleet in order to protect your newly acquired "property" from foreign ambitions, aid from our natural and perpetual anxieties for liberty, would you do this solely at your own expense, because the revenues of a poor country like ours could not do so? You who so ardently protest against the destruction by England of two small republics which challenged her to war, would you continue to remain indifferent whilst your rulers are engaged in annihilating a weaker republic which is much more helpless than those of South Africa, and which, far from declaring war against you, was your obliging friend, your successful ally? What would you do with the Philippines and with the Filipinos if you refused to allow them to become a new American state, if you refused to allow them to enjoy your citizenship?

"Imperialism knows not how to answer these questions. It is inspired only by greed, by a vile thirst for gold and by the lust of spoliation. But, ever misled by its ruthless impulses, it cannot determine which would be its better plan, which should be its settled purpose for the future, or how far it may safely indulge its insatiable appetites. For the dilemma is inexorable: either the retention of the Philippine Islands, if it is realized with a noble purpose, will result in great harm to your industries and your commerce, or, it will become a system of merciless and shameful colonial spoliation which will forever blot out the honor of whatever there is that is lofty and noble in your history. Can it be possible, sons of America, that you will allow us to become subjects or slaves? Should this happen, how will you reconcile it with the wise and noble principles set forth in your Declaration of Independence: 'That all men are created equal: that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.' Will you transform these beautiful and honorable sentiments into specious deceits, fraudulent promises, and high-sounding but hollow words? No! You cannot belie your whole history. You cannot tolerate the violation which Imperialism is so evidently working against your most venerable and fundamental principles. Until Congress succeeds in redressing the illegal aggressions of which we are the victims, and shall suppress these violations of reason, of solemn contracts and of the elementary conceptions of gratitude, we shall rely upon and appeal to the high sense of justice which has hitherto so honorably characterized the free American conscience. We do not believe you will allow us to be enslaved; it would be a dishonor to yourselves.

"Influence, then, as soon as possible your legislators and rulers to give us self-government, which by right belongs to us, and peace will be restored immediately, to your benefit and ours, ending the now incessant and fruitless bloodshed entailed upon us by the present war.

"We are ready to make peace, and, in order to facilitate this end, we propose:

"First: That we will pay back to the United States the twenty million dollars paid by them to Spain.

"Second: That the most amicable and perpetual commercial relations shall exist between us for our mutual benefit and for the greater progress of our country.

"Third: That we will grant to the United States whatever space is reasonably necessary for coaling stations outside of our established cities.

"Fourth: That we will not allow monopolies of any kind in the Islands, and that we will give to your citizens all the guarantees and protection accorded to our own citizens for the security of life and property.

"Fifth: That we are ready to entertain whatever terms you may -desire for yourselves, so long as they do not infringe upon our individual and political liberties, or upon the integrity of our nationality.

"After these offers, it only remains that you, the free citizens of America, for the glory of your name throughout the world and for the honor of your flag, shall do justice. Thus shall the hands of your noble sons be no longer stained with innocent blood. Thus shall it not be said that the vile inspirations of greed have banished from your hearts those lofty traditions of liberty and philanthropy which you have inherited from your honest forefathers.

"Toronto, June, 1900.
"For the Central Filipino Committee,
"G. APACIBLE"

Balangiga - victory in guerrilla warfare

2006-12-07T03:48:00.000-08:00

In September 29, 1901, the American garrison in the town of Balangiga, Samar was attacked by a force of Filipino guerrillas led by Eugenio S. Daza, an officer from the command of Filipino General Vicente Lukban, assisted by the villagers. Of the 74 American soldiers from Company C of the 9th U.S. Infantry stationed at the garrison, 50 were killed or died later of wounds while 24 were able to escape, of which 20 were wounded.

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

The attack was precipitated by the use of forced labor in cleaning the town that the officer in command of the American troops imposed on the villagers. Able-bodied men were canvassed from their homes and made to work for days, under guard in the heat of the sun and were not allowed to go home. They were given little food and water and slept in two tents which were very cramp and damp. Then, at the suggestion of the presidente (town headman), some eighty men were enlisted from a nearby village who indicated they wanted to work without pay provided the time they spend would be applied to their tax obligations. The American officer consented, not realizing that he was being set up for an entrapment because the men were from the guerrilla organization of Lukban.

While the Americans were having breakfast in the morning of September 29th, they were surprised by the guerrillas and a horde of bolo-wielding villagers. It was carnage - blood, entrails, brains and dead bodies were strewn all over the encampment.

The aftermath was a grim retaliation by the Americans. Apart from burning the town of Balangiga and killing every Filipino in sight, General Jacob H. Smith undertook to avenge the death of the American soldiers upon the whole population of Samar which, according to the American Encyclopedia, had in 1881, a population of over 250,000 persons and an area of 5,000 square miles. Smith ordered the scorching of Samar and turning it into a howling “wilderness where not even a bird could live.” (Storey[2], 32)

To quote from Mr. Root's (Secretary Root of the U.S. War Department) letter to the President of July 12, General Smith gave the following oral instructions:

"I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn: the more you kill and burn, the better you will please me," and, further, that he wanted all persons killed who were capable of bearing arms and in actual hostilities against the United States, and did, in reply to a question by Major Waller asking for an age limit, designate the limit as ten years of age.” (Storey[2], 33)

Here is a first hand account of the Balangiga incident:

“The 9th U. S. Infantry had but recently returned from the China expedition. It had performed signal service there; had taken part in the capture of Tientsin, and had been among the first to rush the walls of the Imperial City at Peking. With the cessation of the Boxer activities in China, it had returned to the Philippines and had been scattered in small garrisons throughout the Islands. On August 11, 1901, Company C had been sent to Samar and had occupied without opposition, the small coastal village of Balangiga. The officials of the town professed friendship for the Americans. The company, whose strength consisted of seventy-four men, was housed in the public buildings. The company commander, Captain Thomas W. O'Connell, was a West Point graduate in the class of 1894. Lieutenant E. C. Bumpus, second in command, had served throughout the Insurrection in Luzon and had accompanied the regiment to China. Major Richard S. Griswold, attached to the company as surgeon, had seen service throughout the Insurrection. The company itself consisted mainly of veterans; a few had gone through the campaign in Cuba-many through the Insurrection in Luzon, and all through the Boxer campaign. One man had been a member of the crew of the Olympia during the battle of Manila Bay.

“It was known that the die-hard leader, Vicente Lucban, was active throughout the Island of Samar, but since he had confined his activities to the regimentation of the hapless natives in the interior of the Island, or the attack of small patrols of American troops, no particular trouble was expected from him.

“Established comfortably in Balangiga, Captain O'Connell set out to clean up the town. He directed the local Presidente to assemble the citizens and put them to work sweeping up the years old accumulation of rubbish and trash scattered throughout the streets and clearing the underbrush which had been permitted to grow unrestricted under houses and in the streets. In response to a complaint from the Presidente that he was unable to get the people to volunteer for work, the company canvassed the town and forced some one hundred able-bodied men to work under guard. A short time later, the town Presidente and the chief of police suggested that since several natives in the hills close to the town were supposed to work out their taxes, that it would be a good idea to assemble them in Balangiga to assist in the work. O'Connell assented and a couple of days later, eighty natives were brought in and lodged in conical tents in the vicinity of the soldier's barracks. As was later determined, these men were picked bolomen from the guerrilla force of General Lucban.

“In the evening of September 27, 1901, Lieutenant Bumpus with a detail of men, returned from the town of Basey, some twenty miles away, with the company mail. Basey was just across the narrow Sanjuanica (San Juanico) Straits from the larger town of Tacloban on the Island of Leyte. With Tacloban it contained a fairly large garrison. Company C of the 9th Infantry had received no mail for four months and the men were overjoyed at the large sack which Lieutenant Bumpus brought back with him. Also, they learned for the first time of the assassination of President McKinley, some three weeks previous.

“By 6:30 the following morning, the company was up and about, the men anxious to read their mail. The native workmen were lining up near the barracks under the supervision of the civilian chief of police. On guard were three sentries. The remainder of the company was at breakfast at an outdoor kitchen about thirty yards from the barracks. The only time that the soldiers were permitted to move out of their barracks without a loaded rifle was while actually messing.

“While everything was apparently quiet and according to routine, the native chief of police walked up to one of the sentries and without warning snatched the rifle from his hands and felled him with the butt. Immediately the bells in the town church rang, conch (sic) shells blew from the hills, and the entire male populace of Balangiga, assisted by the bolomen from Lucban's force, rushed Company C.

“The few survivors of this massacre were able to give vivid details of what actually happened. The three sentries armed with rifles were dispatched in the twinkling of an eye. A native group hidden in the town church rushed the officers' quarters, which were in the convent across the street from the barracks. Captain O'Connell, caught in his pajamas, jumped from the second story window of his room, started to cross to the barracks, was beset by twenty to thirty bolomen, and hacked to death. Lieutenant Bumpus was surprised sitting in a chair in his room, his mail in his lap; a bolo cut on the bridge of the nose severed the entire front part of his head. He was found in this position by the survivors. The surgeon, Major Griswold, was overwhelmed and stabbed to death without having a Chinaman's chance.

“Across the street the majority of the company were seated at the mess tables and most of them were killed before they could get on their feet. The First Sergeant was caught in the act of washing his mess kit and had his head split in two by a blow from an axe. One Sergeant's head was completely severed from his body and fell in his plate. In his hands were grasped a knife and a fork. The company cook, one of the few survivors, had fortunately a few weapons at his disposal. He threw a pot of boiling coffee at the first group of natives who rushed him and then held them off by hurling all the canned goods he could reach. When these were exhausted, he grabbed a meat cleaver and fought his way to the barracks where the rifles were located.

“The few men who had gained their feet and survived the first onslaught grabbed any weapon they could lay their hands on and tried to reach the barracks-picks, shovels, baseball bats, clubs, a bolo wrenched from a native's hand. Three men mounted a rock pile and defended themselves with rocks. Sergeant George F. Markley, a man of herculean proportions, though he was wounded, managed to reach the barracks by swinging his arms like a flail and kicking natives in the stomach. He obtained a rifle and began pumping Krag-Jorgenson bullets into the natives surrounding him. One soldier reached the barracks, but was grabbed by three natives who threw him down under a shower of bolo cuts. His arm reaching out in a last effort, touched a pistol thrown on the floor in the melee, and he was able to save his life by shooting his assailants.

“Hopelessly outnumbered, the Americans were butchered like hogs. American brains and entrails strewed the plaza and barracks. A few who sought flight in the water nearby were hunted down in boats and boloed to death.

“Fifteen minutes after the attack started, all but five of the seventy-four men of the company had either been killed or wounded. Of those wounded, twelve were able to be on their feet, and under the protection of Sergeant Markley's fire had managed to unite and gain possession of rifles. This small group, despite the disparity in numbers, firing their rifles until they became too hot to hold, were finally able to drive the bolomen away from the immediate vicinity of the barracks.

“A quick check indicated that the small group could not expect to hold the town. So a decision was made to escape by boat to the nearest American garrison. Under fire from the natives who had retired to a respectful distance, the senior survivor, Sergeant Bentron, loaded the group on five barotas [small dug-out canoes] which were found in the vicinity, and started towards Basey. The dead, fifty-six rifles, and several thousand rounds of ammunition were left at Balangiga. Before leaving, at the cost of two more casualties, the survivors hauled down the American flag which flew over the city hall, and took it with them.

“The trip of the survivors to Basey was nearly as harrowing as the massacre itself. The barotas, small, narrow, canoe-like craft, whose equilibrium was maintained by outriggers, could be rowed only at a snail's pace. A short distance out, one barota containing four men, filled up with water and slowly drifted back to shore. Then two wounded men were boloed to death. The other two, by running for their lives and then hiding, finally managed to find another boat and put to sea where they were picked up the following day by a steamer.

“Another boat containing two men floated away from the rest and drifted into shore where its occupants were butchered to death. The other three boats contained enough unhurt men to row, and gradually worked their way along the coast toward Basey. At noon the water supply became exhausted and drinking salt water only increased the suffering of the wounded. Boats put out from shore containing natives armed with spears and bolos. They intended to board the barotas but were held off only by the rifle fire of the few who were able to shoot. Several attempts to land were prevented by the appearance of large numbers of natives on the shore armed with spears and a few rifles. A school of sharks, attracted by the blood dripping from the boats, followed the beleaguered fleet. With only one man able to talk, the survivors reached Basey at 3:30 the following morning. Of the twenty-six survivors, twenty-two were wounded. Two had died enroute.

“Company G of the 9th Infantry, under Captain Edwin V. Bookmiller, was stationed at Basey. Bookmiller obtained the services of the steamer 'Pittsburg,' which was at Tacloban, and with fifty-five men of his company, immediately proceeded to Balangiga, arriving there at noon the same day. The Insurgents were driven from the town without difficulty, but the sight which met Bookmiller's eyes was not pretty to see. The barracks were on fire, consuming the bodies of the American soldiers there. Other bodies had been thrown down a well. The body of a Sergeant and the company dog were found in the kitchen covered with flour. The eyes of the dog had been gouged out and replaced by stones. The body of Lieutenant Bumpus was found with his eyes gouged out and his face smeared with jam to attract ants. The bodies of American soldiers not burned in the barrack's fire were denuded of clothes and mutilated in one way or another. Captain Bookmiller buried the bodies of the three officers and twenty-nine enlisted men in the plaza, burned the town and returned to Basey. Yet, surprised though they were, the Americans had sold 202 their lives dearly.” (Herman, 197-202)

How the treasury of the Malolos Republic vanished

2006-11-26T01:43:00.000-08:00

The Philippine Republic of 1898 had a functioning fiscal system that supported the raising and equipping of the army and navy and provided for expenditures of the various government functions like foreign affairs, interior, public instructions, communications and public works and agriculture, industry and commerce.

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

According to Leandro H. Fernandez, the 1899 budget of the republic was Mexican dollars $6.3 million, of which $4.0 million were receipts from war tax levied on all persons eighteen years old and above, and the rest came from receipts from direct taxes and custom duties, $1.0 million, indirect taxes, $0.5, and special taxes, $0.8 million. A special fund was also raised from a national loan denominated in Series A and B bonds, which yielded $0.3 million. (Fernandez, 165)

It is not known how much money was left in the treasury at the time American troops overran the penultimate Filipino capital of Tarlac in November, 1899. What is known are accounts of Aguinaldo's effort to hide the money which eventually fell into the hands of American troops.

As the U.S. forces of Gen Arthur McArthur were closing in on Tarlac, President Emilio Aguinaldo commissioned a party of four Tagalog officers and twenty soldiers to hide the money and important documents of the government. Maximo B. Sevilla confirms the existence of the treasure and describes the manner it was hidden:

"As the Tagalog army suffered a succession of defeats in all fronts, the enemy of the people was triumphant; in all engagements the Tagalog soldier was no match, much like a leaf waylaid by a raging storm. Wanting in food and armaments the Filipinos were forced to retreat, precipitating the dispersion of the army of the people, like the native broom of coconut midribs freed of its shackle. The Filipino soldiers went on their own way and hid from the enemy. Only a few patriots were left fighting in the fields, defending against the swarm of the Americans. The old man Celso was sent for by the higher authorities which at that time had the seat of government in Tarlak. He was entrusted with the care of the treasury of the revolution, with instructions to hide it and prevent it from falling into the hands of the Americans. And the order was followed. The treasury was loaded in eighteen bull carts and accompanied by four officers and twenty soldiers, the group proceeded north. " (author's translation of Tagalog text found in Sevilla, 133-134)

The party traveled from Tarlak to Pangasinan over mountain passes and narrow paths and eventually the pursuing American troops came close to overtaking them. Coronel Selso, as the leader of the party is called, made the decision to unload the treasure into a ravine after releasing the soldiers and letting them go on their own.

Sevilla describes how the money was hidden:

"The group started hiding the treasure; there were by then only four of them and instead of digging to bury the treasure, the group decided to unload it from a gorge. As the treasure was being unloaded the sound of silver coins hitting the rocks below disturbed the silence of the night. Then they burned the paper money and the important documents which contained significant accounts of the history of the revolution, together with the boxes that were used as containers of the silver coins. It was almost daylight when they finished their task and each one went on his own way . But the flame that the group thought would seal their secret was the same signal that invited the curiosity of the Americans who sent a party to investigate." (author's translation of Tagalog text found in Sevilla, 163-164).

American troops soon discovered the treasure after one of the Tagalog soldiers surrendered and pointed to the hiding place. Swarm of American troopers and cavalrymen got their hands full. Two hundred thousand dollars were turned over to the officers of the Third Cavalry of the U.S. army, but many American soldiers succeeded in keeping the rest for themselves.

Here is an account by United States army officer, Major Edward S. O'Reilly:

"We had been there two days when Aguinaldo's famous buried treasure was discovered. I have seen this story printed in several magazines, but I have never heard the true story told. Here are the facts of the incident. A Tagalog bull-cart driver came into the camp of the Scouts one night and asked for something to eat. After he had been fed he was questioned, and admitted that he had worked for the insurrectos. Finally, after two hours of cross-examination, he told the following story.He had driven one of the carabao carts which had hauled the baggage of the insurgent government-officials. This had included three cart-loads of silver money, many loads of furniture, and numerous boxes of documents. The money had been buried in a canyon a mile above the beginning of the mountain-trail. He had seen it buried. All of the carteros had been herded under guard after the money was buried and taken into the mountains. Fearing that he would be shot because he knew too much about the treasure, this particular cartero had escaped into the mountains and made his way back to San Nicholas. He had arrived there footsore and hungry.

"When the story was finally told, Lowe's Scouts jumped for their guns and started for the canyon. Every man had visions of great chests of silver pesos and sacks of Spanish gold. We were about halfway to the canyon when a troop of the Third Cavalry passed us on the gallop. In some mysterious manner the story of the treasure had circulated through the town. We were on foot, and of course the cavalry left us far behind in the race. When we arrived at the canyon, we saw the boxes of silver being packed on commandeered carts. A box of gold coin was also found. We learned afterward that more than two hundred thousand pesos had been turned over to the officers of the Third Cavalry. To my knowledge this was not all of the treasure. We were an angry and disappointed bunch of men. We watched those cavalrymen with war in our hearts. Every time a cavalryman moved he clanked like a sack of money. Even their saddle pockets were stuffed with silver. Drearily we hiked back to town.

"The troopers knew that they would be searched when they returned to San Nicholas. Therefore they tried every scheme to hide the coin before their arrival in town. Tying the coins in and kerchiefs, they dropped them into the bushes by the roadside, or behind rocks. The troop was drawn up in the plaza and every man was searched by the officers. Many thousands of dollars were taken from them.As it happened, the Scouts were on outpost duty on the side of town nearest the trail. That night several cavalrymen were seen stealing out past our lines, and the wise members of the Scouts realized what was going on. A number of our fellows formed a chain-guard and awaited the return of those wealthy cavalrymen. It was a case of stand and deliver, or get arrested and taken to the guard-house.

"Thus it came about that the Scouts did not altogether miss sharing in the treasure-trove. A few days later we discovered the cache of furniture from the insurgent government headquarters. In a cleared space in the jungle, a few yards from the trail, we found a great heap of desks, chairs, and furniture of every description. Most of it was made of beautiful hardwoods, - mahogany, nara, rosewood, and teak. We couldn't spend furniture at the canteens, so we left it in the jungle. " (O'Reilly,119-121)

Observations of an American POW

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Aguinaldo was fighting a war, at the same time, he was running a government. These two facets of Philippine life in the 1900's was observed closely by an American prisoner of war named Albert Sonrichsen.

(Photo source: University of Michigan Digital Library)

Sonrichsen was arrested on charges of espionage by Filipino troops while taking photographs inside Filipino lines in January 27, 1899, a few days before the outbreak of the Philippine-American war. He was in company of American soldiers who were dressed in civilian clothes. They were held as prisoners under guard in Malolos.

At the outbreak of the war in February 4, 1899, enraged Filipinos tried to lay their hands on prisoner Sonrichsen, but the Filipino jail guards shielded him, and made sure he was safe. As the war progressed and the Americans began to advance from Manila, the Filipinos retreated to the north, bringing with them all the prisoners, mostly Spaniards, including Sonrichsen.

In April 22, the prisoners were joined at San Isidro, Nueva Ecija by other American prisoners - Lieutenant Glenmore and soldiers under him, who were captured by Filipino troops in Baler, Tayabas (Quezon) during an attempt by the Americans, on orders of Admiral Dewey, to rescue the Spanish contingent holed up in a besieged church.

In June, Sonrichsen became seriously ill and found himself in Vigan being treated in a Filipino hospital and cared for by a nurse. Later, he was moved to Abra, where he was allowed free movement. He taught in a Filipino school and was paid a salary equivalent to the pay of a lieutenant in the Filipino army. During this period, he observed that Filipinos under 30 have the ability to read and write, if not in Spanish, at least in their native dialect. He also noted that Filipinos took every opportunity to learn and improve themselves.

In November, he escaped and was appointed guide and interpreter to U.S. General Young's forces. In this capacity, he was able to make comparison between the government of Aguinaldo, and the American controlled government. If he were to make a choice, he said, he would choose the Aguinaldo government. Among his observations - Filipino soldiers are disciplined and humanely treated the prisoners; schools were established in each town, even while the war was going on; a fine college was being ran in Vigan; cockfighting was strictly forbidden which was allowed by the Americans. He further remarked that the American officers do not seem to understand the native - they inspire fear, rather than respect.

Here is a letter from Sonrichsen (Pettigrew, 298-299), recounting his captivity and his observations:

"NEW YORK,
"December 26, 1900.

"DEAR SIR: In answer to your letter of the 20th I hereby offer you any assistance that lies within my power. After a consultation with Messrs. Scribner's Sons, with whom I have made a contract to publish my book on the Philippines, I find that they have no objection to my position as an anti-imperialist before the public, although my narrative takes rather an unbiased stand. It gives merely an account of my ten months' experience as a prisoner of war among the insurgents of Luzon, stating facts as they presented themselves to my eyes, regardless of political factions, leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions, which can not, however, but be in favor of the Filipinos.

"With regard to the authentic facts for which you have asked me, I am rather puzzled as to what you could make the best use of. If you mean anything that comes within my own personal experience, I am only too glad to serve you. Possibly I had best give you a brief outline. On January 27, I899, I left Manila in company with a friend and entered the insurgent lines for the purpose of taking photographs. We were arrested as spies and taken on to the insurgent capital at Malolos, and there held until hostilities broke out, a week later. The Filipinos certainly had every right to take us for spies, since we were dressed in civilian clothes and had a camera in our possession, my companion being recognized as a member of the American Army.

"Upon learning that the outbreak had occurred, great excitement prevailed at Malolos. A wild rabble gathered before the gates of the prison in which we were confined and attempted to drag us out, but our guards, the insurgent regular soldiers, threw themselves in between us and the mob, fighting in our defense until we were removed to safer quarters. This rather goes to prove that the insurgents are neither savages nor armed rabble, but well disciplined and acquainted with the rules of international law.

"We were also informed by Filipino officials several days later that the outbreak was the result of a sentry's blunder and that they had hastened to apologize and offered to make reparation, but that General Otis had refused to consider all advances made by them for a peaceful settlement. In March the renewed activity of the Americans forced the insurgents to retreat to San Isidro, taking us with them. Our treatment was at times hard, but owing rather to circumstances than to the Filipinos themselves, who seemed on the whole inclined to make our lot as bearable as possible.

"In San Isidro we were joined by Lieutenant Gilmore and several of his men on April 22.

"In May we were once more on the march, together with several hundreds of Spaniards, retreating constantly until, in June, we found ourselves in Vigan, the capital of the northern province of Ilocos.

"Here several of us became seriously ill and were sent to the local hospital. Medicines and medical skill were sadly in want. Still we were treated equally as well as the wounded Filipinos themselves, the women nursing us as they did their own. In September we were taken up the Abra River to Bangued, in the heart of the Abra Mountains, and here we were allowed the full liberty of the town, well treated and cared for. I was able to teach school here, for which I received a pay almost equal to that of a second lieutenant in the insurgent army. Many of my companions were able to do likewise; all, in fact, that were capable of speaking the Spanish language. Even during the war the Filipinos established schools in every town, and Vigan could boast of an excellent college which followed its daily routine as in times of peace. Upon the arrival of the Americans these schools and colleges were broken up, and the buildings ever since have been confiscated as barracks.
"I also observed that every Filipino under 30 could read and write, if not Spanish, at least his native dialect. The Spanish friars discouraged the study of Spanish, and for this reason the poorer people were unable to learn more than what was taught in the convent schools -reading, writing (in native dialect) Bible history, psalm singing, and the rudiments of arithmetic. Whenever given the opportunity, however, the people of all classes are anxious to learn and improve themselves.

"In November I succeeded in effecting my escape, and was appointed guide and interpreter to General Young's forces. In this capacity I was able to make comparisons between the two governments and am forced to say that I drew my conclusions in favor of the Aguinaldo government. The people were more discontented, becoming more and more so every day. Our officers do not seem to understand the natives, and inspire fear rather than respect. Cock fighting, which is strictly forbidden by the insurgents, is freely allowed in American territory. Taxes are heavier than formerly, and our soldiers have so raised the prices of food products that the poorer people are suffering heavily from want.

"These are the facts which I present to you now, but whether they are suitable for your purpose or not I can not say. Should you wish further details, I am willing to oblige you - or the cause rather - of which I am strongly in favor.

"Respectfully yours,
"ALBERT SONRICHSEN"